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This is a study on the economic, social and environmental impact of the modulation provided 
for in Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003. The objectives of the study are: 
 
… to provide a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impacts of modulation 
on rural areas, social and economic performance, environment, competitiveness, 
community and national budgets. The study will take into account the re-distribution 
effects of modulation, within and between Member States, between economic sectors 
and types of holdings.1 
 
 
Contributing researchers: Commission Steering Group members 
 
Peter Nowicki  LEI-WUR (Project Leader) Peter Wehrheim  AGRI (Technical Officer) 
Kaley Hart  IEEP Noemi Beigbeder  AGRI 
(Coordinator non-modelling approach) Christiane Canenbley  AGRI 
Hans van Meijl  LEI-WUR Guido Castellano  AGRI 
(Coordinator modelling approach) Luca Cianfoni  AGRI 
David Baldock  IEEP Nicolas Clisson  AGRI 
Martin Banse  LEI-WUR Marc Cropper  AGRI 
Justin Bartley  IEEP Carina Folkeson  AGRI 
Karel van Bommel  LEI-WUR Michael Grams  ECFIN 
John Helming  LEI-WUR Annette Hurrelmann  AGRI 
Kristina Jansson  LEI-WUR Edit Konya  AGRI 
Torbjörn Jansson  LEI-WUR Elsa Laval  AGRI 
Ida Terluin  LEI-WUR Thomas Lesaffer  AGRI  
Hennie van der Veen  LEI-WUR Andreas Lillig  AGRI 
Peter Verburg  Alterra-WUR Josefine Loriz-Hoffmann  AGRI 
David Verhoog  LEI-WUR Johan Magnuson  AGRI 
Geert Woltjer  LEI-WUR Christine Möller  AGRI 
 Jukka Niemi  AGRI 
Case study experts: Nivelin Noev  AGRI 
 Elena Panichi  BUDG 
Vincent Chatellier  INRA (FR) Rob Peters  AGRI 
Justin Bartley  IEEP (UK) Michael Pielke  AGRI 
Zbigniew Karaczun  WAU (PL)) Caroline Raes  AGRI 
Thomas Kuhmonen  Fin-Auguuri Oy (FI) Pedro Ramirez Granados  AGRI 
Manuel Belo Moreira  UTL-ISA (PT) Monique Raquet  EMPL 
Bernhard Osterburg  FAL (DE) Patrick Salez  REGIO 
Nico Polman  LEI-WUR (NL) Martin Scheele  AGRI 
Andrej Udov  UL (SI) Ludwig Vandenberghe  SANCO 
 Thierry Vard  AGRI 
 Beatrice Velasquez  AGRI 
 Antonella Zona  AGRI 
 
 
The project team gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and support of the European 
Commission Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development, and in particular of 
Peter Wehrheim, the project manager on behalf of the Commission. Any shortcomings of the 
study are, nonetheless, the responsibility of the project team. 
                                                 
1
 Reference to the specifications of Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 established by Directorate 
General for Agriculture and Rural Development with LEI and IEEP. 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... I 
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................................. III 
LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................................................V 
LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................................................V 
LIST OF BOXES.............................................................................................................................. VIII 
LIST OF ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................... IX 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................X 
SOMMAIRE ......................................................................................................................................XIX 
1 MODULATION AS POLICY MECHANISM AND THE LOGIC OF INTERVENTION ...1 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF MODULATION AS A POLICY MECHANISM ....................................................2 
1.2 GENERAL LOGIC OF INTERVENTION ........................................................................................4 
1.3 INTERVENTION LOGICS FOR THE PILLAR 2 MEASURES ............................................................8 
1.4 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF MODULATION ....................................................16 
1.4.1 One region, fixed prices..................................................................................................16 
1.4.2 Two regions, market feedback ........................................................................................17 
1.4.3 General macro-economic framework for the modulation study .....................................19 
2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPACT ANALYSIS.............................................................23 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY THEMES AND THE BASIC HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY...........23 
2.1.1 Scenarios ........................................................................................................................23 
2.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH .....................................................................................................27 
2.2.1 Non-Modelling Approach ...............................................................................................28 
2.2.2 Modelling Approach .......................................................................................................31 
2.2.3 Analysis of modulation within the modelling framework................................................33 
2.3 ISSUES REGARDING THE METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................36 
3 ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION AND BUDGET EFFECTS ...............................................40 
3.1 ISSUES ..................................................................................................................................40 
3.2 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................40 
3.3 INITIAL SITUATION DP AND EAFRD BUDGET 2007-2013 ....................................................42 
3.4 BASELINE SCENARIO............................................................................................................42 
3.4.1 Changes in the DP budget 2007-2013 as a result of compulsory modulation................42 
3.4.2 Changes in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 as a result of compulsory modulation ........46 
3.4.3 ‘Winners’ and ‘losers’ due to compulsory modulation...................................................46 
3.4.4 Increase in the second pillar budget due to modulation funds .......................................48 
3.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN THE BASELINE SCENARIO ...........................................................49 
3.5.1 Budget changes 2007-2013 with 20% compulsory modulation......................................49 
3.5.2 Franchise of 0 and 10,000 euro......................................................................................50 
3.5.3 Consequences of sensitivity analyses for levels of national co-financing.......................50 
3.6 HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ..................................................................................................51 
3.6.1 Changes in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 under Health Check Scenario.....................52 
3.6.2 Increase in the second pillar budget in the Health Check Scenario ...............................53 
3.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO..................................................54 
3.7.1 Changes in national co-financing...................................................................................55 
3.7.2 No national co-financing of additional modulation funds ..............................................56 
4 EFFECTS ON FARM STRUCTURE AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR .................57 
4.1 ISSUES ..................................................................................................................................57 
4.2 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................57 
4.3 IMPACT ON FARM STRUCTURE ..............................................................................................57 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page II 
4.4 IMPACT ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR..............................................................................61 
4.5 CONSUMER PRICES ...............................................................................................................69 
5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MODULATION...........................................................71 
5.1 COMPETITIVENESS OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ............................................................71 
5.1.1 Issues ..............................................................................................................................71 
5.1.2 Summary .........................................................................................................................71 
5.1.3 Measuring Competitiveness............................................................................................71 
5.1.4 Gross Value Added .........................................................................................................73 
5.1.5 Effects on trade...............................................................................................................77 
5.1.6 Welfare effects ................................................................................................................79 
5.2 EFFECTS ON FARM INCOME AND FARM HOUSEHOLD INCOME..............................................80 
5.2.1 Issues ..............................................................................................................................80 
5.2.2 Summary .........................................................................................................................81 
5.2.3 Findings from FES..........................................................................................................82 
5.2.4 Findings from CAPRI .....................................................................................................92 
5.2.5 Findings from LEITAP ...................................................................................................95 
5.2.6 Findings from the case studies .......................................................................................96 
5.2.7 Concluding comments.....................................................................................................98 
5.3 EMPLOYMENT ......................................................................................................................99 
5.3.1 Issues ............................................................................................................................100 
5.3.2 Summary .......................................................................................................................100 
5.3.3 Sector and total employment ........................................................................................101 
5.3.4 Findings from the case studies .....................................................................................102 
5.4 QUALITY OF LIFE IN RURAL AREAS ...................................................................................104 
5.4.1 Issues ............................................................................................................................104 
5.4.2 Summary .......................................................................................................................104 
5.4.3 Definition of Quality of Life..........................................................................................105 
5.4.4 Impacts of reducing Pillar 1 payments .........................................................................107 
5.4.5 Impacts of increased availability of funding within Pillar 2.........................................108 
6 ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................114 
6.1 ISSUES ................................................................................................................................114 
6.2 SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................................114 
6.3 ANALYTICAL APPROACH ...................................................................................................115 
6.3.1 Data and analytical issues arising................................................................................116 
6.3.2 Significance of Pillar 2 measures for the environment.................................................120 
6.4 IMPACTS OF COMPULSORY MODULATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT.......................................123 
6.4.1 Overall assessment .......................................................................................................123 
6.4.2 Changes in Land Use....................................................................................................126 
6.4.3 Biodiversity...................................................................................................................130 
6.4.4 Landscape.....................................................................................................................135 
6.4.5 Water Quality ...............................................................................................................137 
6.4.6 Water Quantity .............................................................................................................140 
6.4.7 Soil Quality ...................................................................................................................141 
6.4.8 Climate Change ............................................................................................................143 
7 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................148 
7.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ..........................................................................................148 
7.2 THE REDISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY MODULATION .......................................151 
7.3 IMPACTS OF MODULATION ON THE STUDY THEMES – SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS.........152 
7.4 GAPS / RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL ISSUES THAT NEED FOLLOW-UP ................................157 
ANNEX 1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIN OF MODELS: LEITAP – ESIM – CAPRI – FES – 
DYNA-CLUE ......................................................................................................................................159 
ANNEX 2 THE MONETISATION OF PUBLIC GOODS IN THE CONTEXT OF RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT...............................................................................................................................177 
 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page III 
LIST OF FIGURES 
1 MODULATION AS POLICY MECHANISM AND THE LOGIC OF INTERVENTION......1 
FIGURE 1.1 INTERVENTION LOGIC FOR COMPULSORY MODULATION........................................................7 
FIGURE 1.2 POPULATION, GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA, ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (%, 2007-2013) .......20 
FIGURE 1.3 REAL VALUE ADDED IN DIFFERENT SECTORS, 2013 (2007 = 100) .......................................21 
FIGURE 1.4 SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF THE EU IN 2005 AND 2013 (% OF GDP) .....................................22 
2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPACT ANALYSIS ...............................................................23 
FIGURE 2.1 SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE METHODOLOGY .............................................................28 
FIGURE 2.3 BUDGET MODEL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL............................................................................31 
FIGURE 2.4 QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS ........................................................................................32 
3 ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION AND BUDGET EFFECTS..................................................40 
FIGURE 3.1 COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND PILLAR BUDGET ....................................................................47 
4 EFFECTS ON FARM STRUCTURE AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR....................57 
FIGURE 4.1 EU-27 PRODUCTION VOLUME OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURE – 5% / 13% MODULATION (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ............................................................................61 
FIGURE 4.2 PRODUCTION VOLUME OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURE – EU-15 / EU-27 (% CHANGE OF THE 
HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ...............................................62 
FIGURE 4.3 IMPACT OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS ON EU-27 PRODUCTION VOLUME OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURE 
(% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013).......................................................................63 
FIGURE 4.4 IMPACT OF CO-FINANCING ON ESTIMATED EU-27 PRODUCTION VOLUME OF PRIMARY 
AGRICULTURE (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013)................................................63 
FIGURE 4.5 BEEF MEAT PRODUCTION INTENSITY IN THE BASELINE, MEASURED AS KG BEEF/HA UAA. 
DARKER REGIONS MEAN GREATER PRODUCTION..............................................................................67 
FIGURE 4.6 CHANGE IN BEEF PRODUCTION IN HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO COMPARED WITH THE BASELINE.
.........................................................................................................................................................68 
FIGURE 4.7 CONSUMER PRICE OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURE AT 5% AND 13% MODULATION RATES (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ............................................................................70 
5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MODULATION .............................................................71 
FIGURE 5.1 SECTORAL VALUE ADDED GROWTH (% CHANGE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO RELATIVE TO NO 
MODULATION IN 2013) .....................................................................................................................74 
FIGURE 5.2 DIFFERENCE IN GVA PER HECTARE UNDER THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO RELATIVE TO 
BASELINE (EUR/HA UAA)...............................................................................................................76 
FIGURE 5.3 EU-27 QUANTITY OF EXPORTS IN PRIMARY AGRICULTURE – 5% / 13% MODULATION (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ............................................................................78 
FIGURE 5.4 EU-27 QUANTITY OF IMPORTS IN PRIMARY AGRICULTURE – 5% / 13% MODULATION (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ............................................................................78 
FIGURE 5.5 WELFARE (EQUIVALENT VARIATION, EU-15, MILLION USD, CHANGE HEALTH CHECK 
SCENARIO RELATIVE TO BASELINE IN 2013) .....................................................................................80 
FIGURE 5.6 DIRECT PAYMENTS OF PILLAR 1 PER FARM UNDER THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO IN THE 
EU-15 REGIONS, 2013 (CHANGE IN % RELATIVE TO BASELINE SCENARIO) ......................................83 
FIGURE 5.7 CHANGES IN FARM INCOME PER FARM UNDER THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO IN THE EU-15 
REGIONS, 2013 (%) ..........................................................................................................................88 
FIGURE 5.8 CHANGES IN FARM INCOME UNDER THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ACCORDING TO FARM 
SIZE IN THE EU-15, 2013 (%) ...........................................................................................................89 
FIGURE 5.9 CHANGES IN FARM INCOME UNDER THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ACCORDING TO FARM 
TYPE IN THE EU-15, 2013 (%)..........................................................................................................91 
FIGURE 5.10 CHANGE IN GROSS VALUE ADDED PLUS PREMIUMS PER HECTARE IN HEALTH CHECK 
SCENARIO VERSUS BASELINE............................................................................................................94 
FIGURE 5.11 EU-27 AGRICULTURAL INCOME GROWTH IN PRIMARY AGRICULTURE WITH 5% AND 13% 
MODULATION, 2013 (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013).......................................95 
FIGURE 5.12 IMPACT OF CO-FINANCING ON EU-27 AGRICULTURAL INCOME WITH 13% MODULATION, 
2013 (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ..............................................................96 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page IV 
FIGURE 5.13 IMPACT OF DEADWEIGHT OR CROWDING OUT ON EU-27 AGRICULTURAL INCOME WITH 13% 
MODULATION, 2013 (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013).......................................96 
FIGURE 5.14 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY 
MODULATION BETWEEN PILLAR 1 AND PILLAR 2 AT THE LEVEL OF THE BENEFICIARY IN FRANCE ...98 
FIGURE 5.15 EU-27 GDP GROWTH – 5% / 13% MODULATION (% CHANGE OF THE HEALTH CHECK 
SCENARIO RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013)........................................................................111 
FIGURE 5.16 IMPACT OF CROWDING OUT ON EU-27 GDP GROWTH – 13% MODULATION AND SENSITIVITY 
(% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013).....................................................................112 
6 ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................................................114 
FIGURE 6.1 AGRICULTURAL LAND USE – EU-15 / EU-27 (% CHANGE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO 
RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ........................................................................................128 
FIGURE 6.2 IMPACT OF CO-FINANCING ON EU-27 LAND USE OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURE WITH 13% 
MODULATION, 2013 (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013).....................................128 
FIGURE 6.3 EU-27 AGRICULTURAL LAND USE – GRASSLAND / CROPLAND (% CHANGE HEALTH CHECK 
SCENARIO RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013)........................................................................129 
7 CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................................................148 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page V 
LIST OF TABLES 
1 MODULATION AS POLICY MECHANISM AND THE LOGIC OF INTERVENTION.XIX 
TABLE 1.1 OVERVIEW OF COMPULSORY AND VOLUNTARY MODULATION RATES IN THE EU MEMBER 
STATES, 2000-2013............................................................................................................................3 
TABLE 1.2 ANNUAL VOLUNTARY MODULATION RATES FOR UK REGIONS, 2005-2013 (%) .......................4 
TABLE 1.3 ADDITIONAL RATES OF MODULATION AS SET OUT IN THE COMMISSION’S HEALTH CHECK 
PROPOSALS ........................................................................................................................................4 
TABLE 1.4 OBJECTIVES FOR MEASURE 111 FOR VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND INFORMATION ACTIONS....10 
TABLE 1.5 OBJECTIVES FOR THE AGRI-ENVIRONMENT MEASURE (214)...................................................11 
TABLE 1.6 RURAL DEVELOPMENT MEASURES AND CORRESPONDING ECONOMIC DRIVERS......................12 
TABLE 1.7 ECONOMIC DRIVERS IN RELATION TO THEMATIC INDICATORS................................................14 
TABLE 1.8 RURAL DEVELOPMENT MEASURES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO NON-MARKET INDICATORS 15 
TABLE 1.9 A PRIORI EFFECTS OF MODULATION ........................................................................................17 
TABLE 1.10 EXOGENOUS DRIVERS IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK, 2007-2013 .......................................19 
TABLE 1.11 ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE BASELINE SCENARIO IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK, 2007 .............20 
2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPACT ANALYSIS ...............................................................23 
TABLE 2.1 WEIGHTING OF ADDITIONAL COMPULSORY MODULATION FUNDS UNDER THE HEALTH CHECK 
SCENARIO. .......................................................................................................................................26 
TABLE 2.2 OVERVIEW OF INDICATORS FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES ..................................................................................................................................31 
TABLE 2.3 AGRICULTURAL SPECIALISATION ON THE BASIS OF THE CODES FOR THE TYPES OF FARMING 
(TF) IN THE COMMUNITY TYPOLOGY (REG. 85/377/EEC), USING 8 STANDARD CLASSES.................33 
TABLE 2.4 TREATMENT OF DIRECT PAYMENTS (PILLAR 1) IN MODELS ...................................................34 
TABLE 2.5 TREATMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT MEASURES* IN QUANTITATIVE MODELS ...................35 
3 ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION AND BUDGET EFFECTS..................................................40 
TABLE 3.1 DP, EAFRD AND P2 BUDGET IN THE BASELINE AND HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO IN THE EU-
15, 2007-2013..................................................................................................................................41 
TABLE 3.2 SHARE OF THE BUDGET FOR DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) OF THE FIRST PILLAR AND THE EAFRD 
BUDGET FOR THE SECOND PILLAR IN THE TOTAL BUDGET (EU-27), 2007-2013 (MILLION EURO) .....43 
TABLE 3.3 CHANGES IN THE DP AND EAFRD BUDGET DUE TO COMPULSORY MODULATION IN THE EU-
15, 2007-2013..................................................................................................................................44 
TABLE 3.4 5% COMPULSORY MODULATION AND INCREASE EAFRD BUDGET SECOND PILLAR IN THE EU-
15 MEMBER STATES, 2007-2013......................................................................................................45 
TABLE 3.5 MAXIMUM EU CO-FINANCING RATES OF THE SECOND PILLAR, 2007-2013 (%)......................47 
TABLE 3.6 EXAMPLE OF THE CALCULATION OF THE INCREASE IN THE TOTAL BUDGET FOR THE SECOND 
PILLAR DUE TO COMPULSORY MODULATION PER MEASURE..............................................................48 
TABLE 3.7 ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MODULATION FUNDS OVER THE EAFRD BUDGET.48 
TABLE 3.8 INCREASE P2 BUDGET DUE TO 5% COMPULSORY MODULATION IN EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 
2007-2013 (MILLION EURO) .............................................................................................................50 
TABLE 3.9 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CO-FINANCING OF THE EAFRD BUDGET (EU-15) 2007-
2013.................................................................................................................................................51 
TABLE 3.10 BUDGET DIRECT PAYMENTS AND MODULATION IN THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO (EU-
15), 2007-2013 ................................................................................................................................52 
TABLE 3.11 INCREASE OF EAFRD BUDGET IN THE SECOND PILLAR IN THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO 
(EU-15), 2007-2013 ........................................................................................................................53 
TABLE 3.12 INCREASE P2 BUDGET IN THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO (EU-15), 2007-2013 (MILLION 
EURO)...............................................................................................................................................54 
TABLE 3.13 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CO-FINANCING OF THE EAFRD BUDGET AND THE 
HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO (EU-15), 2007-2013 ........................................................................55 
TABLE 3.14 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS INCREASE P2 BUDGET IN HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO AND NO 
NATIONAL CO-FINANCING (EU-15), 2007-2013 (MILLION EURO) .....................................................56 
4 EFFECTS ON FARM STRUCTURE AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR....................57 
TABLE 4.1 NUMBER OF FARMS AS A RESULT OF REDUCTIONS IN PILLAR 1 DIRECT PAYMENTS UNDER THE 
BASELINE AND HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013..........................59 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page VI 
TABLE 4.2 SYNTHESIS OF THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF COMPULSORY MODULATION OF P1 AND P2 ON FARM 
STRUCTURE INDICATORS IN THE EU-15 CASE STUDY COUNTRIES (FI, FR, PT UK) ..........................59 
TABLE 4.3 PRODUCTION RESULTS FOR EU-27 (% DIFFERENCE TO BASELINE SCENARIO) IN SELECTED 
SIMULATIONS. ..................................................................................................................................65 
TABLE 4.4 DECOMPOSITION OF CEREALS PRODUCTION INTO YIELD AND ACREAGES FOR EU-27 (PERCENT 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO BASELINE SCENARIO) ....................................................................................66 
5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MODULATION .............................................................71 
TABLE 5.1 GROSS VALUE ADDED PER HECTARE OR HEAD FOR DIFFERENT AGRICULTURAL SECTORS FOR 
EU-27. VALUE IN BASELINE AND CHANGE (∆ EURO/HA OR HEAD) IN SIMULATIONS UNDER HEALTH 
CHECK SCENARIO VS. BASELINE.....................................................................................................74 
TABLE 5.2 NET TRADE IN DIFFERENT PRIMARY AND PROCESSED COMMODITIES. BASELINE VALUE IN 1000 
T AND OTHER SIMULATIONS AS PERCENT DIFFERENCE TO BASELINE. ...............................................79 
TABLE 5.3 DIRECT PAYMENTS OF PILLAR 1 PER FARM IN THE DIFFERENT SCENARIOS IN THE EU-15 
MEMBER STATES, 2013 (EURO)........................................................................................................82 
TABLE 5.4 PROPORTION OF DIRECT PAYMENTS OF PILLAR 1 IN FARM INCOME PER FARM TYPE UNDER 
THE BASELINE SCENARIO IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013 (%)..............................................84 
TABLE 5.5 ADDITIONAL MODULATION FUNDS FOR PILLAR 2 MEASURES IN THE HEALTH CHECK 
SCENARIO PER FARM IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013............................................................85 
TABLE 5.6 CHANGES IN FARM INCOME IN THE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO PER FARM (EU-15), 2013.....87 
TABLE 5.7 PROPORTION OF FARMS WITH AN INCREASE OF OVER 0.5% IN FARM INCOME UNDER THE 
HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ACCORDING TO FARM SIZE IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013 (%) .90 
TABLE 5.8 PROPORTION OF FARMS WITH A DECREASE OF OVER 0.5% IN FARM INCOME UNDER THE 
HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ACCORDING TO FARM SIZE IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013 (%) .90 
TABLE 5.9 PROPORTION OF FARMS WITH AN INCREASE OF OVER 0.5% IN FARM INCOME UNDER THE 
HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ACCORDING TO FARM TYPE IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013 (%) 91 
TABLE 5.10 PROPORTION OF FARMS WITH A DECREASE OF OVER 0.5% IN FARM INCOME UNDER THE 
HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO ACCORDING TO FARM TYPE IN THE EU-15 MEMBER STATES, 2013 (%) 92 
TABLE 5.11 MODIFIED GROSS VALUE ADDED AT PRODUCER PRICES PLUS PREMIUMS IN EU-27 IN 
DIFFERENT SIMULATIONS COMPARED WITH THE BASELINE (% DIFFERENCE) ....................................93 
TABLE 5.12 CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT IN PRIMARY AGRICULTURE IN THE EU-27, 2013 (% CHANGE 
RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ........................................................................................101 
TABLE 5.13 CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT IN THE EU-27, 2013 (% CHANGE HEALTH CHECK SCENARIO 
RELATIVE TO NO MODULATION IN 2013) ........................................................................................102 
6 ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................................................114 
TABLE 6.1 ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS AND THEIR POTENTIAL FOR USE WITHIN THE STUDY ............117 
TABLE 6.2 PRIORITIES FOR AGRI-ENVIRONMENT SCHEMES IN 19 EU MEMBER STATES........................122 
TABLE 6.3 RESULT INDICATORS – CONTRIBUTION OF MODULATION TO THE ANTICIPATED AREA OF UAA 
SUPPORTED BY AXIS 2 MEASURES (HECTARES) ..............................................................................124 
TABLE 6.4 RESULT INDICATORS - ANTICIPATED FORESTRY AREA SUPPORTED BY AXIS 2 MEASURES ....125 
TABLE 6.5 SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS FROM CAPRI, FOR EU-27 IN THE HEALTH 
CHECK SCENARIO VERSUS THE ZERO MODULATION SCENARIO, FOR 2013, VARIOUS UNITS AND 
INDICES (ABSOLUTE VALUE IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO AND PERCENT DIFFERENCE FOR HEALTH 
CHECK AND SELECTED SIMULATIONS) .........................................................................................126 
TABLE 6.6 CMEF RESULT INDICATOR FOR AGRI-ENVIRONMENT MEASURE: ANTICIPATED AREA OF LAND 
ON WHICH LAND ABANDONMENT IS TO BE AVOIDED ......................................................................130 
TABLE 6.7 2013 TARGETS FOR BIODIVERSITY IMPACT INDICATORS IN THE CASE STUDY MEMBER STATES
.......................................................................................................................................................134 
TABLE 6.8 CMEF RESULT INDICATOR FOR THE AGRI-ENVIRONMENT MEASURE: ANTICIPATED AREA 
UNDER SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT FOR BIODIVERSITY AND HNV FARMLAND ..............................135 
TABLE 6.9 TARGETS FOR THE WATER QUALITY IMPACT INDICATOR IN THE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES, 2013
.......................................................................................................................................................139 
TABLE 6.10 CMEF RESULT INDICATOR FOR AGRI-ENVIRONMENT MEASURE: AREA UNDER SUCCESSFUL 
MANAGEMENT FOR WATER QUALITY ..............................................................................................140 
TABLE 6.11 CMEF RESULT INDICATOR FOR AGRI-ENVIRONMENT MEASURE: AREA UNDER SUCCESSFUL 
MANAGEMENT FOR SOIL QUALITY ..................................................................................................143 
TABLE 6.12 TARGETS FOR THE CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT INDICATOR IN THE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES, 
2013...............................................................................................................................................146 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page VII 
TABLE 6.13 CMEF RESULT INDICATOR FOR AGRI-ENVIRONMENT MEASURE: AREA UNDER SUCCESSFUL 
MANAGEMENT FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ............................................................................................146 
7 CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................................................148 
 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page VIII 
LIST OF BOXES 
2.1 The two principle scenarios of the Modulation study, including sensitivity analyses ................p24 
2.2 Overview and limitation to the modelling methodology ............................................................p 38 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page IX 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AWU Annual Work Unit 
BG Bulgaria 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy (EU) 
CAPRI Common Agricultural Policy 
Regional Impact Analysis model 
CM Compulsory Modulation 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
DE Germany 
DE-BAV Bavaria 
DE-NRW  Northrhine-Westphalia 
DE-SAXA Saxony-Anhalt 
DE-THU Thuringia  
Dyna-CLUE Dynamic Conversion of Land 
Use and its Effects model 
EAFRD European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development 
EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund 
EEA European Environment Agency 
EEC European Economic Community 
ES Spain 
ESIM European SImulation Model 
EU European Union 
EU-10 Ten Countries in CEE that became 
Member States of the European 
Union in May 2004 
EU-15 Fifteen Member States of the 
European Union before May 2004 
EU-27 EU-25 plus Accession countries 
(Romania and Bulgaria) 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations 
FI Finland 
FR France 
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GHG Green House Gases 
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project 
GVA Gross Value Added 
ha hectare 
kg Kilogram 
LEITAP Extended GTAP version 
implemented by LEI (Landbouw 
Economisch Instituut) 
LFA Less Favoured Area 
m Metre 
mio Million 
MS Member State (of the EU) 
MTR Mid-Term Review (2003) 
NL Netherlands 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
p.a. per annum 
P1 Pillar 1 of CAP 
P2 Pillar 2 of CAP 
PL Poland 
PT Portugal 
RD Rural Development 
RDP Rural Development Plan 
RO Romania 
SAPARD  Special Accession Programme for 
Agriculture and Rural Development 
SAPS Single Area Payment Scheme 
SFP Single Farm Payment 
SI Slovenia 
t Tonne 
TRQ Tariff Rate Quota 
UAA Utilised Agricultural Area 
UK United Kingdom 
VM Voluntary Modulation 
WFD Water Framework Directive (EU) 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page X 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction and Background 
 
‘Modulation’ is a policy mechanism for shifting funding from the part of the CAP 
budget dedicated to providing direct payments to farmers (Pillar 1) to the European 
Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (Pillar 2), which aims to provide targeted 
support to rural areas, to improve the competitiveness of the farming and forestry 
sectors, enhance the environment and improve quality of life.  
 
In keeping with requirements under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), changes 
have been made to the way the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) operates in 
recent years to ensure greater market orientation. Central to this were the 2003 
reforms, which introduced the decoupling of direct payments from production as well 
as, amongst other changes, modulation on a compulsory basis for the EU-15 under 
Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003.  
 
Greater market orientation within the agriculture sector means that the influence the 
CAP once had on patterns of production through production related payments and 
market interventions has significantly decreased, and will decrease further over the 
coming years. The market now plays an increasingly significant role in determining 
what gets produced, where and how, and is becoming increasingly global in nature as 
legal arrangements governing trade, through bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
become less constraining to the free movement of goods. At the same time, support 
within the CAP has started to place a greater emphasis on sustainability, the 
environment and rural development, encouraging the provision of public or non-
market goods. 
 
One means of assisting this transformation of agricultural production policy into a 
rural development policy – in which agriculture plays a key role – has been to adjust 
the balance of the budget allocated to the two Pillars of the CAP. Former guarantee 
and guidance measures are now transformed into a support fund for the farming sector 
(Pillar 1 of the CAP) and a rural development fund for both farmers and other rural 
actors as well (Pillar 2). The balance of funding between these two Pillars is 
progressively being shifted – or ‘modulated’ – from Pillar 1 to a series of programmes 
that provide incentives within Pillar 2: (a) to improve the competitiveness of the 
agricultural and forestry sectors, (b) to maintain and enhance the environment and 
countryside, and (c) to improve the quality of life in rural areas.  
 
The aim of this study has been to explore what the economic, social and 
environmental effects of introducing compulsory modulation are, both under current 
rates and rules (the baseline scenario), and a potential future scenario (the Health 
Check scenario), based on the Commission’s proposals for increasing modulation as 
part of the CAP Health Check. The results should help to bring about a greater 
understanding on the degree to which these benefits are tangible, and how they might 
change under possible higher rates of modulation in the future. 
 
To understand the impact of modulation it is necessary to understand the economic 
drivers influencing both the agricultural sector and the economies of rural areas more 
generally. This sector has been undergoing a profound transformation for decades, 
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and policy can only encourage inflections in trends that are otherwise driven by 
factors outside of the policy arena to a greater or lesser degree. The impacts of 
compulsory modulation, therefore, must be set against the broader changes taking 
place in relation to factors including macro-economic developments (often dominated 
by technological evolution), population growth (and migration), and market forces 





The methodological approach that has been taken to understand the impact of 
modulation is based on several different types of analysis, which can be divided into 
two broad categories: a modelling approach and a non-modelling approach. The 
modelling approach allowed for results to be generated on impacts across the EU-27, 
and for simulations of the likely changes of these impacts under different rates of 
modulation, while the non-modelling approach allowed for more qualitative, context 
specific insights into the impacts of modulation to be made. The use of models also 
permitted an exploration of any differences that might emerge from changes to rules 
relating to franchise levels, co-financing requirements, or allocation of funds within 
Pillar 2 to specific measures, albeit based on a set of generalised assumptions.  
 
The modelling approach consists firstly of a custom-built budget model, which allows 
the transfers of money involved from the national cuts in the first pillar through to the 
expenditure for each Rural Development measure within Member States’ Rural 
Development Programmes to be tracked. Secondly there is a suite of economic 
models that place the Pillar 1 reductions and the additional budget available for Pillar 
2 measures within the framework of the world economy, from both a general and 
partial, or sector-specific (agriculture), perspective. Finally a land-use model 
attributes changes in land-use that are calculated by the economic models to particular 
areas, on the basis of a 1 km grid covering the European Union. The use of economic 
models to understand the impact of Pillar 2 expenditures has been carried out for the 
first time, and has been informed by insights acquired from the non-modelling 
approach. The non-modelling approach included a literature review, case studies 
undertaken in eight Member States, questionnaires to Member State authorities for 
agriculture and rural development, and an assessment of standard indicators compiled 
within the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for EU rural development 
policy.  
 
A number of difficulties were encountered in identifying the precise impacts of 
compulsory modulation on the range of themes addressed by this study, some 
methodological, and some relating to data availability. These are to be expected in a 
relatively new policy area and included: the lack of empirical studies (ex post), 
especially on the effectiveness and efficiency of pillar two measures, lack of data, the 
use of analytical tools that are not in every case specifically designed to accomplish 
the task required, and the need for complementary research in a context where time 
and human resources are limited. The quantitative modelling approach is therefore 
limited to ex ante analyses and based on strong assumptions. One way to control the 
robustness of the results obtained from the model outputs with regard to crucial 
assumptions has been through conducting ‘sensitivity analyses’, in which 
counterfactual hypotheses were investigated using the same tools but with changes in 
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variables (one at a time). The differences in magnitude of the outputs demonstrate the 
sensitiveness of the results with regard to some key assumptions that are uncertain. 
The qualitative analysis has to a slight degree been limited by the fact of a policy 
review on modulation occurring at the same time as the study. As a result, eliciting 
reliable information about the likely response of authorities in the Member States to 
hypothetical increases in modulation was a challenge, given the political sensitivity of 
the topic and the inherent uncertainty of future policy choices.  
 
The impacts of modulation 
 
The study of the impact of modulation has been undertaken through a double 
perspective of two different scenarios: a baseline scenario of compulsory modulation 
at 5%, and a Health Check scenario based on a 13% modulation rate, as elaborated in 
the Commission proposals in May 2008. As the effects of modulation per se are quite 
limited, in comparison with the macro-trends affecting agriculture since the 1950s, it 
is often the higher modulation rate that provides an indication of what the influence of 
modulation might in fact be. 
 
The results of the combined analysis are consistent for the two primary observations 
coming from the study. Firstly, the reduction of first pillar payments made through the 
modulation process – at the level that occurs at present – has a negligible influence on 
agricultural commodity production and on the viability of farm businesses generally. 
However, the impact on farm income is naturally negative. Secondly, there are 
beneficial effects in evidence as a result of the availability of additional modulated 
funds within the second pillar – both for farmers and to other actors within the rural 
economy. This is in a large part due to the fact that these measures have clear 
objectives, are targeted at areas of identified need and the total amount of money 
available is higher due to co-financing requirements. As a result, the second pillar 
measures are able to provide the leverage that they are intended to, whether it is in 
increasing productivity and competitiveness through Axis 1, maintaining and 
improving the environment through Axis 2, enhancing the vitality of the rural 
economy through Axis 3, or encouraging local leadership and partnership through 
Axis 4 (the LEADER programme). However, the transaction costs of targeted 
payments and the monitoring costs are not quantitatively taken into account in this 
study. 
 
Modulation can lead to a significant transfer of support between farms of differing 
type and size. Logical deduction from the existing pattern of payments suggests that, 
in general, modulation tends to lead to a redistribution of funds from: 
 
• Larger  to smaller farms, although the participation of rather small farms in 
many Pillar 2 measures is low in many Member States 
• Larger arable farms to: 
o Livestock farms, including a significant proportion of more extensive 
farms, which are the main recipients of Axis 2 money, but also dairy 
farms, potentially accessing funding under all axes. 
o Other farm types which are able to access physical and human capital 
investments under Axis 1. 
o Forestry and farm/forestry enterprises (through the forestry measures). 
o Beyond the agricultural sector to the broader rural economy. 
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It is important to remember, when considering the impacts of compulsory modulation, 
however, that its effects extend considerably beyond a simple readjustment to the 
funds available within the two pillars, as the additional funds that are made available 
for Pillar 2 are then augmented by national co-financing and, for certain measures, by 
private sector contributions. The funds provided by the Member States themselves, 
therefore, make a substantial contribution to the impact of second pillar resources. In 
contrast, the financial gain or loss from changing the level of the ‘franchise’ – the part 
of Pillar 1 payments that are not taken into consideration for the modulation amounts 
– is minor. As such, compulsory modulation acts as a conduit for leveraging an 
increase in funding available for rural areas, both to the agricultural sector and 
beyond.  
 
In relation to the impact of compulsory modulation on the specific study themes, the 
key findings are summarised below. These are more fully elaborated in the 
conclusions of the study. 
 
Farm Structure: Modulation on the scale examined here is not seen to have a 
significant net impact on changes in the number or size of farms within the EU-15 – 
although it may accelerate existing trends towards fewer, larger farms and certain 
categories of investment, particularly as a result of the availability of additional funds 
for the physical and human capital investments in Pillar 2. However, compulsory 
modulation may also serve to slow down structural change as a result of increased 
support for Pillar 2 measures, such as LFA and agri-environment, which can help 
maintain the economic viability of farm businesses, particularly in marginal areas, 
that would otherwise disappear.  
 
Production: According to the models, the net overall agricultural production effect 
due to modulation under the Health Check scenario appears to be positive, albeit 
small, for primary agriculture in the EU-15 (0.48%) and the EU-27 (0.4%). Taken 
alone, the reduction of Pillar 1 direct payments has a minimal negative production 
effect (-0.06%), which is to be expected, given that payments are decoupled. 
 
There are some differences between products. The net production effect is slightly 
positive for all broad groups of products (e.g. oilseeds, vegetables and permanent 
crops, meat), with the meat sectors being the most strongly influenced by modulation 
in terms of production. The exception to this is cereals, where the models indicate a 
slight net decrease in production of durum wheat, which at present still receives 
coupled payments in some areas, and, benefits from significant Article 69 support, 
particularly in Italy.  
 
The main cause of this positive effect is the availability of additional money for Pillar 
2 measures, particularly physical capital investment measures. While investments in 
human and physical capital measures through Axis 1 may increase production, 
however, investments in Axis 2 measures will equally require the maintenance or 
introduction of more extensive management practices, which may conversely 
constrain production.  
 
Competitiveness: Increased rates of compulsory modulation appear to have a small 
net positive impact upon competitiveness within the agriculture sector, albeit 
measured in the narrow sense of gross value added within agriculture.  
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Outputs from the economic models suggest that the increased rates of modulation 
under the Health Check scenario have a small net positive impact on GVA, compared 
with the baseline scenario. The impact on welfare is slightly positive. This is the case, 
without taking into account the anticipated impacts of the additional funds on the 
delivery of environmental non-market goods, which it is not possible to quantify as 
part of this analysis. On the other hand, transaction costs are not taken into account. 
 
The positive impact is mainly caused by the impacts of Pillar 2 measures, particularly 
the dynamic impact of measures that increase the productivity of production factors 
such as human and physical capital mainly in Axis 1, for example those that enable 
investments in new technologies and physical infrastructure to be made, as well as 
those that focus on improving human capital, thereby helping to rationalise production 
processes, or to improve the quality of products. In relation to the service and 
processed food sectors, Axis 3 measures also have a role to play in contributing to 
increased competitiveness outside the agricultural sector, particularly those focused 
on incentivising diversification, improvements to rural infrastructure and stimulating 
tourism. 
 
Farm Income: The impact of modulation on farm family income is unclear, with 
different economic models giving slightly differing results. These results, however, 
have to be treated with extreme caution as they are very dependent on the assumptions 
made about which Pillar 2 measures are considered to have an income effect. General 
conclusions mask more significant local and regional differences, particularly 
between farm types, whereby some type of farms/businesses are likely to benefit and 
some will lose out in terms of income.  
 
Accepting that most measures within Pillar 2 will only have a small income effect, it 
seems that, looking at the overall impact of modulation, the main farm types to ‘lose’ 
from modulation would be arable/permanent crops, and beef producers. These types 
of farm tend to be recipient of higher levels of direct payments through Pillar 1; and 
although they may receive money back through Axis 1 and Axis 2 measures, it is 
conditional on meeting additional obligations in many cases and probably will not be 
sufficient to make up for the losses in their direct payments.  
 
Those that are more likely to gain from modulation include dairy farms and fruit and 
vegetable producers, due to the lower level of direct payment receipts, and the 
possibility of them accessing funds through Axis 1 (and possibly Axis 2), as well as 
suckler cows and sheep and goats, due to the likelihood of their being able to access 
Pillar 2 funds, particularly agri-environment and LFA support, but also support 
through Axis 1.  
 
In addition, there may be some counter-intuitive effects, whereby farms with 
attributes highly compatible with Pillar 2 objectives lose out under modulation 
because they experience Pillar 1 reductions but cannot access any further Pillar 2 
measures, for example because they are participating in all the schemes for which 
they are already eligible. Such farms are most likely to be those enrolled in multi-
annual schemes such as LFA and agri-environment schemes and will include some 
farms providing significant public goods. 
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Employment: While some changes in employment both within agriculture and the 
services, energy and industry sectors are likely to be experienced as a result of 
compulsory modulation, these changes are very minor. Overall, under the Health 
Check scenario, employment in the food processing and services sectors increases 
very slightly (0.02%) and decreases within the primary agriculture sector, albeit only 
by 0.12%. In relation to the agricultural sector, the main reason for this decrease 
stems from the reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments. This is then reinforced by the 
Pillar 2 investments in physical capital (mainly Axis 1), some of which may 
encourage further structural change. Modernization implies that some labour might be 
released in the short run but that the remaining farmers are more competitive in the 
long run. The ones who leave agriculture find a job in other sectors due to Axis 3 
measures and a small GDP growth. Modulation therefore encourages and 
accommodates the process of structural change. 
 
The models, CMEF indicators and case studies, all suggest that, under the Health 
Check Scenario, higher employment levels are likely to be experienced than would be 
the case with no modulation, as a result of the input of additional funds in Axis 2 and 
Axis 3 of the second pillar. However these do not outweigh the decreases seen as a 
result of reductions in Pillar 1 and the additional availability of funds for physical 
capital measures. The LFA and agri-environment measures help maintain and 
generate additional employment both directly within the agricultural sector as well as 
indirectly within other economic sectors. LFA payments, for example, contribute to 
farm income and the maintenance of employment in rural areas, and agri-environment 
schemes can have beneficial employment effects, for example by promoting organic 
farming, which is generally more labour intensive, and through generating the need 
for the use of contractors with specialist and traditional skills. In addition, the 
environmental benefits that accrue from these schemes can lead to indirect 
employment benefits resulting from increased tourism and recreation. Axis 3 
measures relating to creating diversification opportunities, new business start-ups, 
improving service provision in rural areas an enhancing an area’s tourism potential, as 
well as activities funded through the Leader approach, all have the potential to 
increase employment in rural areas, largely outside the agricultural sector. While the 
impact of these measures on employment creation will be small, given the limited 
resources allocated to these measures, the impact may be locally significant, 
contributing to a more diverse and secure job market in rural areas. 
 
Quality of Life: Overall the quality of life in rural areas is expected to benefit from 
increased levels of modulation, although it has not been possible to quantify this 
impact. Taking GDP as a somewhat crude proxy to reflect the material wellbeing 
across the EU, any increase in GDP can provide some indication of the potential 
improvement in the quality of life insofar as this relates to the growth in the economy 
overall. The models indicate that increased rates of modulation under the Health 
Check scenario have a positive, albeit very small, impact on GDP growth (0.04% at 
rates of 13% modulation). This positive result is entirely due to the increased 
availability of funds, and their associated national co-financing, within Pillar 2. The 
effect is largely caused by those Axis 3 measures which are focused predominantly on 
investments outside of the agricultural sector, for example on the setting up of new 
businesses, improving rural services and promoting tourism.  
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Looking beyond GDP, at low levels of modulation, reductions in Pillar 1 would not 
appear to have any real impact on the quality of life in rural areas, as no significant 
effects in terms of farm restructuring or land abandonment are experienced. However, 
drawing mainly on evidence from the case studies, increases in expenditure in Pillar 2 
do have a positive effect on quality of life by increasing the funding available for 
measures that promote innovation, create employment opportunities, improve access 
to services for the rural population or provide funding for activities that can improve 
the economic attractiveness of, and thereby encourage investment in, rural areas. 
Beyond Axis 3 and the Leader approach, the LFA and the agri-environment measures 
stand out as having the potential to enhance the quality of life in rural areas in relation 
to their role in maintaining and enhancing the attractiveness of rural areas, and hence 
in attracting increased tourism. In addition, the case studies highlighted the value of 
these measures for keeping people in farming.  
 
Environment: Overall, the impacts of modulation on the environment are positive for 
all environmental parameters including biodiversity, water quality, soil quality, 
landscape and climate change. These positive impacts are the result of the availability 
of additional funds within Pillar 2 and relate to a whole range of measures across all 
four Axes. The extent of these impacts, however, is hard to quantify beyond general 
terms.  
 
The reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments do not appear to have had significant 
impacts on the environment. This is unsurprising, given that the impacts on 
agricultural producers (in terms of influencing factors of productivity, farm structure 
and income) of reducing Pillar 1 payments have been shown to be limited. The 
models show that there may be a small increase in land leaving agriculture as a result 
of reductions in Pillar 1 payments; however, these appear to have been more than 
compensated for by increases in the availability of funds within Pillar 2, particularly 
for the LFA and agri-environment measures. These impacts could, of course become 
more significant as the modulation rate increases and/or the franchise level changes.  
 
The availability of additional funds within Pillar 2, however, is likely to have a 
significant impact upon the environment across the EU-15, but particularly in Finland 
and the UK (England) where the additional funds have been specifically focused on 
the agri-environment measure. In all Member States, modulation can be seen to have 
a positive impact on the trends identified for the CMEF impact indicators relating to 
the area of HNV farmland, the farmland bird index, nutrient surplus and production of 
renewable energy. In relation to the CMEF result indicators, modulation, under the 
baseline scenario, is estimated to enable over 5 million hectares of land to be managed 
in ways that benefit biodiversity, 3 million hectares to be managed to help improve 
water quality and soil quality and 1 million hectares to be managed in ways that will 
help with climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. 
 
The results also suggest that the availability of additional funds for, in particular, the 
agri-environment and LFA measures is likely to retain slightly more land under 
agricultural management that would be the case without modulation. The models 
show that this land is more likely to be grassland than cropped land. The CMEF 
impact indicators also show that a significant area of land is anticipated to be 
prevented from being abandoned over the 2007-13 programming period. While the 
proportions of land indicated by the models are very small (under 1% of all 
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agricultural land), in reality, the effect could be much greater. It would certainly not 
be a uniform impact across the EU-15 and will depend crucially on local factors such 
as succession, land ownership, remoteness from markets etc. 
 
Gaps / Research and analytical issues that need follow-up 
 
The study has sought to explore the impacts of modulation through the use of 
economic models and national case studies. This has revealed the considerable 
methodological and data challenges inherent in a complex policy evaluation exercise 
of this kind. This is particularly the case in seeking to specify and quantify the 
impacts of rural development policies in Pillar 2. Since these measures are a growing 
element of the CAP it is recommended that further investment both in analytical tools 
and data collection (at different geographical levels) is prioritised at both the Member 
State and EU level.  
 
The availability of good quality, precise and comparable empirical evidence on the 
impacts of Pillar 2 measures at local, regional and Member State level is critical to 
inform future policy evaluations. While the CMEF indicators are a helpful step 
towards facilitating a more informative analysis of the impacts and estimates provided 
by Member States within their RDPs on the anticipated outputs, results and impacts of 
the various measures within Pillar 2, these need to be complemented by detailed 
monitoring programmes at the Member State level. 
 
The newly established rural development and evaluation networks could offer a 
timely opportunity in this regard. These networks could be used to provide an 
assessment of current monitoring and evaluation programmes within individual 
Member States. They could work with the national networks to share good practice, 
and improve monitoring programmes to ensure that the benefits of Pillar 2 measures 
can be assessed more precisely and the information disseminated widely across all 
Member States.  
 
If modelling is to be used to predict the impacts of different policy scenarios in 
relation to Pillar 2 measures with greater confidence, then again empirical evidence of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of these measures is crucial. For example, 
information about the rates of return to human and physical capital investments is 
needed, the level of deadweight or crowding out effects, transaction costs, and the 
impact of environmental measures on yields. Europe-wide economic models need to 
be developed further to enable them to reflect more locally differentiated impacts, 
including by farm type, based on the different ways in which measures are 
implemented in different locations. The work currently being undertaken in EUruralis 
3.0 and the FP7 project ‘CAPRI-RD’ is a good start in this regard. Another large area 
of research is the conceptualization, modelling and monetization of public goods. 
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Considerations for interpreting the results of the study 
 
The results of modelling and other forms of analysis should not be taken 
to represent the impacts of shifting funding from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 of the 
CAP per se, rather they represent the potential impact of a shift in funding 
between the two Pillars subject to a very specific set of assumptions and 
criteria, and the analysis is based on a number of necessarily simplified 
assumptions about how these criteria might change under different 
scenarios. If these criteria and scenarios have an important impact on the 
results and if they were to change, then the results of the study would also 
change. The specific criteria assumed for the operation of modulation are 
set out in Chapter 1 and the scenarios used in the study are set out in 
Chapter 2. 
 
A further note of caution should be raised specifically in relation to the 
results of the economic models. The complexity of Pillar 2 measures and 
the range of ways in which they can be implemented across the EU-27 
means that a series of assumptions have had to be made about the impacts 
of specific Pillar 2 measures on economic drivers in order to calibrate the 
models. These are based on the best available evidence derived from the 
literature, and follow the logic of intervention for each measure, however 
they are nonetheless generalisations. The outputs of the models, therefore, 
are clearly to a considerable degree a function of the assumptions that are 
fed into them and have not been able to take into account the differing 
impacts that measures might have in different Member States. The 
conclusions of the study should be read with this in mind. 
 
Despite these caveats, however, the study team feels that the study offers 
several important and useful insights into the way the agricultural sector, 
and rural areas more generally are affected by the shift of funding from 
direct payments under Pillar 1 to a more targeted support mechanism 
under Pillar 2 through the mechanism of modulation, and provides a 
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SOMMAIRE 
Introduction et Contexte 
 
La ‘Modulation’ est un mécanisme de la politique agricole en vue du transfert des 
financements d’une partie du budget de la CAP consacrée aux paiements directs des 
agriculteurs (Pilier 1) vers le Fonds Européen Agricole de Développement Rural 
(Pilier 2), qui a pour objectif d’offrir aux zones rurales un soutien ciblé, pour 
améliorer la compétitivité des secteurs agricole et forestier, améliorer l’environnement 
et la qualité de la vie. 
 
Ces dernières années, tout en respectant les règles de l’OMC, des changements ont été 
apportés sur la façon dont la CAP fonctionne afin d’assurer une plus grande 
orientation vers le marché. Les réformes de 2003 sont au cœur de ces changements : 
le découplage des paiements directs de la production est introduit ainsi que, entre 
autres changements, la modulation obligatoire dans l’Europe des 15 en application de 
l’article 10 du Règlement du Conseil (CE) N°1782/2003. 
 
Une plus grande orientation vers le marché au sein du secteur agricole signifie que 
l’influence de la PAC autrefois sur les modes de production par le biais des paiements 
directs et des interventions de marché a diminué de manière significative et continuera 
à décroitre dans les années à venir. Le marché joue aujourd’hui un rôle de plus en plus 
significatif pour déterminer ce qui est produit, où et comment, et devient de plus en 
plus global par nature tandis que les accords juridiques qui gouvernent le commerce, 
au travers d’accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux deviennent moins contraignants pour 
la libre circulation des biens. En même temps, pour l’aide apportée au sein de la PAC 
une plus grande importance commence à être donnée à la durabilité, à 
l’environnement et au développement rural, encourageant les prestations de biens 
publics ou non marchands.  
 
Pour accompagner cette transformation d’une politique agricole de production vers 
une politique de développement rural, l’un des moyens utilisés – dans lequel 
l’agriculture joue un rôle clé – a été d’ajuster l’équilibre du budget alloué entre les 
deux piliers de la PAC. Les anciennes mesures de garanties et d’orientation sont 
maintenant transformées en un fonds de soutien pour le secteur agricole (Pilier 1 de la 
PAC) et un fonds de développement rural destiné à la fois aux agriculteurs et aux 
autres acteurs ruraux (Pilier 2). L’équilibre du financement de ces deux Piliers est en 
train d’être progressivement modifié – ou ‘modulé’ – du Pilier 1 vers le Pilier 2 pour 
offrir une série de programmes incitatifs en vue (a) d’améliorer la compétitivité des 
secteurs agricoles et forestiers, (b) de maintenir et améliorer l’environnement et le 
milieu rural ainsi que (3) d'encourager la diversification de l'économie rurale et 
d’améliorer la qualité de la vie en zone rurale.  
 
L’objectif de cette étude a été d’explorer ce que sont les effets économiques, sociaux 
et environnementaux de l’introduction de la modulation obligatoire, à la fois en 
fonction des taux et règles actuels (le scénario de base) et en fonction d’un futur 
scénario potentiel (le scénario Bilan de Santé), basé sur les propositions de la 
Commission d’accroître la modulation lors du Bilan de Santé de la PAC. Les résultats 
devraient contribuer à mieux comprendre comment ces avantages sont tangibles, et 
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comment à l’avenir ils peuvent changer en fonction de taux plus élevés de la 
modulation. 
 
Pour comprendre l’impact de la modulation, il est nécessaire de comprendre les 
facteurs économiques qui influencent à la fois le secteur agricole et l’économie des 
zones rurales en général. Depuis des années, ce secteur est en profonde transformation 
et la politique ne peut qu’encourager des tendances qui sont de toute façon le résultat 
de facteurs externes à la sphère politique, à un degré plus ou moindre. Les impacts de 
la modulation obligatoire doivent donc être comparés aux changements plus vastes 
qui ont lieu, en lien avec les facteurs de développements macro-économiques (souvent 
dominés par l’évolution technologique), la croissance de la population (et les 
migrations), et les forces du marché générées par le commerce au niveau mondial (là 




Pour comprendre l’impact de la modulation, l’approche méthodologique choisie 
s’appuie sur différents types d’analyse qui peuvent être divisés en deux grandes 
catégories : une approche par la modélisation et une approche sans modélisation. 
L’approche par la modélisation a permis d’obtenir la production de résultats des 
impacts à travers l’Europe des 27 et de simuler les changements probables sous 
différents taux de modulation. Quant à elle, l’approche sans modulation a permis 
d’obtenir des informations plus qualitatives, liées au contexte spécifique des impacts 
de la modulation. L’emploi de modèles économiques a également permis d’explorer 
les différences qui peuvent émerger des changements de réglementation liées aux 
niveaux de franchise, les règles de cofinancements ou encore l’allocation de fonds à 
certaines mesures au sein du Pilier 2, bien que ces modèles aient été basés sur des 
hypothèses généralisées. 
 
L’approche par la modélisation consiste tout d’abord en un modèle budgétaire 
construit sur mesure, qui permet de suivre les transferts d’argent lors des 
prélèvements sur les budgets nationaux du Pilier 1 jusqu’aux dépenses prévues pour 
chaque mesure de Développement Rural au sein des Programmes de Développement 
Rural des Etats membres. Deuxièmement, une série de modèles économiques situent 
les réductions du Pilier 1 et le budget supplémentaire disponible pour les mesures du 
Pilier 2 dans le contexte de l’économie mondiale, offrant à la fois une perspective 
générale et partielle ou encore spécifique au secteur agricole. Finalement, un modèle 
territorial attribue à des zones particulières les changements d’utilisation des sols qui 
sont calculés par les modèles économiques, en un quadrillage de 1 km couvrant toute 
l’Union européenne. C’est la première fois que l’on emploie des modèles 
économiques pour comprendre l’impact des dépenses du Pilier 2 ; ils ont été 
renseignés par les informations recueillies par l’approche sans modélisation. 
 
L’approche sans modélisation a consisté en une analyse documentaire, des études de 
cas menées dans huit Etats membres, des questionnaires adressés aux autorités 
compétentes en matière d’agriculture et de développement rural des Etas membres et 
en une évaluation des indicateurs communs du Cadre Commun de Suivi et 
d'Evaluation (CCSE) pour la politique de développement rural. 
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Plusieurs difficultés ont été rencontrées pour identifier les impacts précis de la 
modulation obligatoire sur les thèmes variés abordés dans cette étude, certains d’ordre 
méthodologique, d’autres en lien avec la disponibilité des données. Ces difficultés, 
auxquelles il faut s’attendre en étudiant une politique relativement nouvelle, 
comprennent : le manque d’études empiriques (ex post), en particulier sur l’efficacité 
des mesures du Pilier 2, le manque de données, l’emploi d’outils analytiques qui ne 
sont pas toujours conçus pour accomplir la tâche requise et le besoin de recherche 
complémentaire dans un contexte où le temps et les ressources humaines sont limités. 
L’approche de modélisation quantitative se limite donc à des analyses ex ante et 
s’appuie sur des hypothèses solides. Par rapport à ces hypothèses cruciales, des 
‘analyses de sensibilité’ ont été menées pour contrôler la solidité des résultats obtenus 
par les modèles : des hypothèses contrastées (‘counterfactual’) ont été étudiées en 
utilisant les mêmes outils mais en changeant les variables (une à la fois). Les 
différences d’ampleur des résultats démontrent la sensibilité des résultats par rapport à 
certaines hypothèses qui sont incertaines. L’analyse qualitative a été légèrement 
limitée par le fait qu’une révision de la politique de modulation avait lieu au même 
moment que l’étude. En conséquence, extraire de l’information fiable à partir des 
estimations en provenance des autorités des Etats-membres face aux augmentations 
hypothétiques de la modulation a été un défi, étant donné que le sujet était sensible sur 
le plan politique et les futurs choix politiques implicitement incertains. 
 
Les impacts de la modulation 
 
L’étude de l’impact de la modulation a été menée avec une double perspective grâce à 
deux scénarios différents : un scénario de base avec modulation obligatoire à 5% et un 
scénario Bilan de Santé avec un taux de modulation de 13%, comme présenté par la 
Commission dans ses propositions de mai 2008. Comme les effets de la modulation 
per se sont très limités par comparaison aux tendances majeures qui affectent 
l’agriculture depuis 1950, c’est souvent le taux de modulation le plus élevé qui offre 
une indication de ce que pourrait être en fait l’influence de la modulation. 
 
Les résultats de l’analyse combinée sont consistants avec les deux observations 
principales qui ressortent de l’étude. Premièrement, la réduction des paiements du 
Pilier 1 due au processus de modulation – au niveau actuel – a une influence 
négligeable sur la production de denrées agricoles et sur la viabilité des exploitations 
en général. Cependant l’impact sur le revenu agricole est naturellement négatif. 
Deuxièmement, il y a des effets bénéfiques clairs qui résultent de la disponibilité de 
fonds supplémentaires modulés dans le second pilier – à la fois pour les agriculteurs et 
pour les autres acteurs dans l’économie rurale. Ceci est dû en grande partie au fait que 
ces mesures ont des objectifs clairs, sont ciblées sur des zones dont les besoins sont 
identifiés et le montant total de l’argent disponible est plus élevé en raison des 
obligations de cofinancement. En conséquence, les mesures du second pilier peuvent 
offrir l’effet de levier recherché, que ce soit pour accroître la productivité et la 
compétitivité dans l’Axe 1, améliorer l’environnement dans l’Axe 2, améliorer la 
vitalité de l’économie rurale dans l’Axe 3 ou encourager la dynamique locale et le 
partenariat dans l’Axe 4 (Programme Leader). Cependant les coûts de transaction des 
paiements ciblés et les coûts du suivi administratif et technique ne sont pas pris en 
compte de manière quantitative dans cette étude.  
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La modulation peut entrainer un transfert de fonds entre exploitations de tailles et 
types différents. A partir de la configuration actuelle des paiements, on peut 
logiquement déduire que, en général, la modulation a tendance à mener vers une 
redistribution des fonds : 
 
• Des plus grandes vers les plus petites exploitations, bien que la participation 
des petites exploitations dans de nombreuses mesures du Pilier 2 est faible 
dans de nombreux Etats membres. 
• Des plus grandes exploitations arables vers : 
o Les exploitations d’élevage, y compris une proportion significative 
d’exploitations plus extensives qui sont les principaux bénéficiaires des 
fonds de l’Axe 2, mais aussi les exploitations laitières, qui ont la 
possibilité d’accéder aux financements de tous les Axes. 
o Les autres types d’exploitations qui peuvent accéder aux fonds pour les 
investissements physiques et en ressources humaines dans l’Axe 1. 
o  Les exploitations et entreprises forestières (grâce aux mesures 
forestières). 
o Au-delà du secteur agricole vers l’économie rurale. 
 
En étudiant les impacts de la modulation obligatoire, il est cependant important de se 
souvenir que ses effets s’étendent considérablement au-delà d’un simple réajustement 
des fonds entre les deux piliers, car les fonds supplémentaires mis à disposition du 
Pilier 2 sont augmentés par les cofinancements nationaux et, pour certaines mesures, 
par des contributions du secteur privé. Les fonds en provenance des Etats membres 
eux-mêmes contribuent donc de manière substantielle à l’impact des ressources du 
second pilier. Par contraste le gain ou la perte financière de la modification du niveau 
de ‘franchise’ – la partie des paiements du Pilier 1 qui ne sont pas prises en 
considération dans les chiffres de la modulation – est mineure. En tant que telle, la 
modulation obligatoire agit comme un conduit pour faire levier et augmenter les 
financements disponibles pour les zones rurales, dans le secteur agricole et au-delà. 
Pour l’impact de la modulation obligatoire sur les thèmes spécifiques de l’étude, les 
principaux résultats sont résumés ci-dessous. Ils sont présentés de manière plus 
complète dans les conclusions de l’étude. 
 
Structure des exploitations. A l’échelle utilisée dans cette étude, on ne voit pas que la 
modulation ait un impact net significatif sur le changement du nombre ou de la taille 
des exploitations dans l’Union Européenne des 15 – bien qu’elle puisse accélérer les 
tendances actuelles vers moins d’exploitations de plus grandes tailles et certaines 
catégories d’investissements, en particulier grâce à la disponibilité de fonds 
supplémentaires pour les investissements physiques et en ressources humaines du 
Pilier 2. Cependant, la modulation obligatoire peut aussi permettre le ralentissement 
de changements structurels en raison d’un soutien accru aux mesures du Pilier 2, telles 
que les mesures des Zones Défavorisées et agro-environnementales, qui peuvent 
contribuer à maintenir la viabilité économique des entreprises agricoles, en particulier 
dans les zones marginales qui autrement disparaitraient. 
 
Production. D’après les modèles, dans le scénario Bilan de Santé, l’impact net de la 
modulation sur l’ensemble de la production agricole, se montre être positif, quoique 
faible, pour l’agriculture primaire dans l’UE-15 (0.48%) et dans l’UE-27 (0.4%). 
Prise à part, la réduction des paiements directs du Pilier 1 a un effet négatif minimal 
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sur la production (-0.06%), comme prévu, étant donné que ces paiements sont 
découplés. 
 
On constate certaines différences entre les produits. L’effet net sur la production est 
légèrement positif pour toutes les grandes catégories de produits (par exemple, les 
oléagineux, les cultures légumières, les cultures permanentes, la viande), la 
production des secteurs viande étant le plus fortement influencée par la modulation. 
Les céréales constituent une exception, les modèles indiquent une légère baisse nette 
dans la production de blé dur qui reçoit encore actuellement des paiements couplés 
dans certaines zones et bénéficie d’une aide significative de l’Article 69, en particulier 
en Italie. 
 
La principale raison de cet effet positif est la disponibilité de fonds supplémentaires 
pour les mesures du Pilier 2, en particulier les mesures d’investissements en capital 
physique. Alors que les investissements dans les mesures de capital physique et 
humain de l’Axe 1 peuvent accroitre la production, cependant les investissements des 
mesures de l’Axe 2 demanderont également le maintien ou l’introduction de pratiques 
de gestion plus extensives, ce qui inversement pourra contraindre la production. 
 
Compétitivité. Des taux accrus de modulation obligatoire ont un petit impact positif 
net sur la compétitivité du secteur agricole, bien que mesuré dans le sens étroit de la 
valeur brute ajoutée dans l’agriculture.  
 
Les résultats des modèles économiques suggèrent que, par comparaison avec le 
scénario de base, les taux accrus de modulation sous le scénario Bilan de Santé, ont 
un petit impact net positif sur la valeur ajoutée brute. L’impact sur le bien être 
(‘welfare’) est légèrement positif. C’est toujours le cas sans prendre en compte les 
impacts anticipés des fonds supplémentaires sur la production de biens 
environnementaux non marchants, ce qui n’est pas possible de quantifier dans cette 
analyse. D’un autre côté les coûts de transaction ne sont pas pris en compte. 
 
L’impact positif est principalement dû à l’impact des mesures du Pilier 2, en 
particulier l’impact dynamique des mesures qui augmentent la productivité des 
facteurs de production, tels que le capital physique et humain principalement dans 
l’Axe 1. Par exemple, ceux qui permettent d’investir dans les nouvelles technologies 
et les infrastructures physiques, ainsi que ceux qui mettent l’accent sur l’amélioration 
du capital humain, contribuant ainsi à la rationalisation des processus de production 
ou à l’amélioration de la qualité des produits. Pour les secteurs des services et de 
l’agro-alimentaire les mesures de l’Axe 3 ont aussi un rôle à jouer pour améliorer la 
compétitivité du secteur agricole, en particulier ceux qui mettent l’accent sur 
l’encouragement à la diversification, l’amélioration des infrastructures en milieu rural 
et ceux qui stimulent le tourisme.  
 
Revenu agricole. L’impact de la modulation sur le revenu familial agricole n’est pas 
clair, les différents modèles économiques donnant des résultats légèrement différents. 
Ces résultats, cependant, sont à traiter avec une extrême précaution car ils dépendent 
beaucoup des hypothèses retenues sur les mesures du Pilier 2 qui sont considérées 
comme ayant un effet sur le revenu. Les conclusions générales masquent des 
différentes locales et régionales plus significatives, en particulier entre types 
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d’exploitations : en terme de revenus, certains types d’exploitations ou d’entreprises 
en bénéficieront probablement et d’autres y perdront. 
 
Acceptant que la plupart des mesures au sein du Pilier 2 n’auront qu’un petit effet sur 
le revenu, il semble que, étudiant l’impact d’ensemble de la modulation, les 
principaux types d’exploitation qui y perdront du fait de la modulation seraient les 
exploitations de cultures arables et permanentes et les producteurs de viande. Ces 
types d’exploitations ont tendance à être les bénéficiaires de plus hauts niveaux de 
paiements directs du Pilier 1; et bien qu’ils recevront probablement de l’argent en 
retour grâce aux mesures de l’Axe 1 et 2, cet argent est dans de nombreux cas lié à 
des obligations supplémentaires et ne sera probablement pas suffisant pour compenser 
les pertes des paiements directs. 
 
Ceux qui bénéficieront probablement plus de la modulation sont les exploitations 
laitières, les producteurs de fruits et de légumes, en raison du plus faible niveau de 
paiements directs et de la possibilité qui leur est offerte d’accéder aux fonds de l’Axe 
1 (et éventuellement de l’Axe 2), ainsi que les exploitations de vaches allaitantes, 
élevages ovins et caprins en raison de la probabilité d’avoir accès aux fonds du Pilier 
2, en particulier aux fonds agro-environnementaux et de bénéficier du soutien en 
Zones Défavorisées, mais également du soutien de l‘Axe 1. 
 
De plus, il se peut qu’il y ait des effets contraires, des exploitations avec des 
caractéristiques tout à fait compatibles avec les objectifs du Pilier 2 peuvent y perdent 
sous le régime de la modulation parce qu‘elles font l’expérience des réductions du 
Pilier 1 mais ne peuvent plus avoir accès aux mesures du Pilier 2, parce que par 
exemple, elles participent à tous les programmes pour lesquels elles sont déjà 
éligibles. De telles exploitations sont probablement celles qui sont engagées dans des 
programmes pluriannuels tels qu’en zones défavorisées et comprendront les 
exploitations qui fournissent des services écologiques significatifs. 
 
Emploi. S’il est probable que certains changements dans l’emploi agricole, les 
secteurs des services, de l’industrie et de l’énergie résultent de la modulation 
obligatoire, ces changements sont très mineurs. Dans l’ensemble, sous le scénario 
Bilan de Santé, l’emploi dans l’industrie agro-alimentaire et les secteurs des services 
augmente légèrement (0.02%) et décroit dans le secteur agricole primaire, quoique de 
0.12% seulement. Pour le secteur agricole, la principale raison de cette diminution 
vient de la réduction des paiements directs en provenance du Pilier 1. Ceci est alors 
renforcé par les investissements du Pilier 2 pour le capital physique (principalement 
de l’Axe 1), dont certains encourageront probablement plus de changements 
structurels. La modernisation implique que de la main d’oeuvre sera peut-être libérée 
à court terme mais les agriculteurs restants seront plus compétitifs à long terme. Ceux 
qui quittent l’agriculture trouvent un emploi dans les autres secteurs grâce aux 
mesures de l’Axe 3 et une faible croissance du PIB. Par conséquent, la modulation 
encourage et accompagne le processus de changement structurel. 
 
Les modèles, les indicateurs CCSE et les études de cas suggèrent tous que sous le 
scénario Bilan de Santé, il est probable que les niveaux d’emploi soient plus élevés 
qu’en l’absence de modulation, en raison de l’arrivée de fonds supplémentaires des 
Axes 2 et Axes 3 du Pilier 2. Cependant, ceux-ci ne compensent pas les diminutions 
observées par les réductions du Pilier 1 et la disponibilité supplémentaire de fonds 
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pour les mesures de capital physique. Les mesures des Zones Défavorisées et agro-
environnementales contribuent à maintenir et à générer des emplois supplémentaires 
directement dans le secteur agricole ainsi qu’indirectement dans les autres secteurs. 
Les paiements des Zones Défavorisées par exemple contribuent au revenu agricole et 
au maintien de l’emploi en zones rurales et les programmes agro-environnementaux 
peuvent avoir des effets positifs sur l’emploi, en encourageant par exemple 
l’agriculture biologique, qui généralement est plus intensive en termes d’emplois et en 
générant le besoin de contractants aux compétences spécialisées et traditionnelles. De 
plus, les avantages pour l’environnement qui proviennent de ces programmes peuvent 
entrainer des avantages indirects pour l’emploi résultant de l’augmentation du 
tourisme et des loisirs. Les mesures de l’Axe 3 relatives à la création d’opportunités 
pour la diversification, la création d’entreprises, l’amélioration des équipements de 
services en milieu rural et l’amélioration du potentiel touristique, ainsi que des 
activités financées par le programme Leader, toutes ont le potentiel d’accroitre 
l’emploi en zones rurales, en grande partie en dehors du secteur agricole. Tandis que 
l’impact de ces mesures sur la création d’emploi sera faible, étant donné les 
ressources limitées allouées à ces mesures, leur impact peut être significatif au niveau 
local, contribuant à une plus grande diversité et stabilité du marché de l’emploi en 
zones rurales. 
 
Qualité de la vie. Dans l’ensemble, on s’attend à ce que la qualité de la vie dans les 
zones rurales bénéficie de niveaux plus élevés de modulation, bien qu’il n’ait pas été 
possible de quantifier cet impact. Prenant le PIB comme indicateur brut reflétant le 
bien-être matériel à travers l’Europe, tout accroissement du PIB peut signifier une 
amélioration potentielle de la qualité de la vie dans la mesure où il est lié à la 
croissance de l’ensemble de l’économie. Les modèles montrent que, dans le scénario 
Bilan de Santé, les taux plus élevés de modulation ont un impact positif, bien que très 
faible, sur la croissance du PIB (de 0.04% pour un taux de modulation à 13%). Ce 
résultat positif est entièrement dû à la plus grande disponibilité de fonds et aux 
cofinancements nationaux qui leur sont associés, dans le Pilier 2. L’effet est dû en 
grande partie aux mesures de l’Axe 3 qui ciblent principalement les investissements 
hors du secteur agricole, par exemple l’installation de nouvelles entreprises, 
l’amélioration des services en milieu rural et la promotion du tourisme.  
 
Regardant au-delà du PIB, quand les taux de modulation sont faibles, les réductions 
du Pilier 1 ne semblent pas avoir un impact sur la qualité de la vie en zones rurales, 
car on n’observe aucun effet significatif sur la restructuration des exploitations et 
l’abandon des terres. Cependant, en s’appuyant sur les résultats des études de cas, les 
augmentations de dépenses du Pilier 2 ont un effet positif sur la qualité de la vie en 
augmentant les financements disponibles pour les mesures qui encouragent 
l’innovation, créent des possibilités d’emploi, améliorent l’accessibilité des services 
pour la population rurale ou offrent des financements pour des activités qui peuvent 
améliorer l’attractivité économique des zones rurales et donc y encouragent les 
investissements. Au-delà de l’Axe 3 et de l’approche Leader, ce sont les mesures 
agro-environnementales et celles en faveur des Zones Défavorisées qui ressortent 
comme ayant le potentiel d’améliorer la qualité de la vie en zones rurales, grâce à 
leurs rôles de maintien et d’amélioration de l’attractivité des zones rurale et donc 
peuvent entrainer une augmentation du tourisme. De plus, les études de cas ont 
montré l’importance de ces mesures pour garder les gens dans l’agriculture. 
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Environnement. Dans l’ensemble, les impacts de la modulation sur l’environnement 
sont positifs pour tous les paramètres environnementaux, dont la biodiversité, la 
qualité de l’eau, la qualité des sols, le paysage et le changement climatique. Ces 
impacts positifs résultent de la disponibilité de fonds supplémentaires dans le Pilier 2 
et concernent toute une série de mesures dans l’ensemble des quatre Axes. 
L’importance de ces impacts est cependant difficile à quantifier au-delà du général. 
 
Les réductions des paiements directs du Pilier 1 ne semblent pas avoir eu un impact 
significatif sur l’environnement. Ceci n’est pas surprenant, étant donné que l’impact 
sur les producteurs agricoles de la réduction des paiements du Pilier 1 (notamment 
pour influencer les facteurs de productivité, la structure des exploitations et le revenu) 
s’est avéré limité. Les modèles montrent qu’il se peut qu’il y ait une faible 
augmentation de l’abandon des terres agricoles en conséquence de la réduction des 
paiements du Pilier 1. Cependant, il semble que ceci est plus que compensé par les 
augmentations de fonds disponibles au sein du Pilier 2, en particulier pour les Zones 
Défavorisées et les mesures agro-environnementales. Ces impacts pourraient, bien 
entendu, devenir plus significatifs si les taux de modulation augmentent et si les 
niveaux de franchise sont modifiés. 
 
Il est cependant probable que la disponibilité de fonds supplémentaires au sein du 
Pilier 2 ait un impact significatif sur l’environnement dans toute l’Europe des 15, et 
en particulier en Finlande et au Royaume-Uni (Angleterre) là où des financements 
complémentaires ont été particulièrement ciblés sur les mesures agro-
environnementales. Dans tous les Etats membres, on peut voir que la modulation a un 
impact positif sur les tendances identifiées dans les indicateurs d’impact du CCSE qui 
ont trait aux zones de grande valeur pour la nature, l’index des oiseaux des champs, 
les surplus de nutriments et la production d’énergie renouvelable. En ce qui concerne 
les indicateurs du CCSE, dans le scénario de base, il est estimé que la modulation 
permettra à plus de 5 millions d’hectares d’être gérés selon des pratiques qui 
bénéficieront à la biodiversité, à 3 millions d’hectares d’être gérés pour contribuer à 
l’amélioration de la qualité de l’eau et des sols et à 1 million d’hectares d’être gérés 
de manière à contribuer à l’atténuation/adaptation au changement climatique. 
 
Les résultats suggèrent également que la disponibilité de fonds supplémentaires, en 
particulier les mesures agro-environnementales et celles pour les Zones Défavorisées 
permette de retenir un peu plus de terres sous gestion agricole que cela ne serait le cas 
sans la modulation. Les modèles montrent que les terres concernées sont plutôt des 
prairies que des terres arables. Les indicateurs d’impact CCSE montrent également 
qu’une surface significative de terres pourrait ne pas être abandonnée lors de la 
période de programmation 2007-2013. Bien que les proportions de terres concernées 
indiquées par les modèles sont très faibles (moins de 1% de toutes les terres agricoles) 
en réalité, cet effet pourrait être beaucoup plus important. Cet impact ne serait 
certainement pas uniforme dans l’Europe des 15 et dépendra de manière cruciale de 
facteurs locaux tels que la succession, la propriété, l’éloignement des marchés, etc. 
 
Limites / Enjeux pour la recherche et l’analyse qui requièrent un suivi 
 
Cette étude avait pour objectif d’explorer les impacts de la modulation, grâce à 
l’utilisation de modèles économiques et d’études de cas nationales. Ce travail a révélé 
les défis considérables concernant la méthodologie et les données, défis qui sont 
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inhérents à ce type exercice complexe d’évaluation d’une politique. C’est 
particulièrement le cas lorsqu’on cherche à préciser et quantifier les impacts des 
politiques de développement rural du Pilier 2. Puisque ces mesures sont un élément 
croissant de la PAC, il est recommandé que des investissements supplémentaires 
soient une priorité, à la fois pour développer les outils d’analyse et collecter les 
données (à différentes échelles géographiques), aux niveaux des Etats membres et de 
l’Union Européenne. 
 
La disponibilité de données concrètes de bonne qualité, précises et comparables qui 
montrent les impacts des mesures du Pilier 2 aux niveaux local, régional et des Etats 
membres est cruciale pour renseigner les futures évaluations de cette politique. Alors 
que les indicateurs CCSE sont une étape utile pour faciliter l’analyse des impacts et 
des estimations fournies par les Etats membres dans leurs Programmes de 
Développement Rural (?) sur leurs résultats anticipés, les impacts des différentes 
mesures au sein du Pilier 2, ces données doivent être complétées par des programmes 
de suivi détaillés au niveau des Etats membres. 
 
A cet égard, une opportunité est offerte par les réseaux de développement rural et 
d’évaluation récemment créés. Ces réseaux pourraient être utilisés pour évaluer les 
programmes actuels de suivi et d’évaluation dans les Etas membres. Un travail entre 
réseaux nationaux permettrait de comparer les bonnes pratiques, améliorer les 
programmes de suivi pour veiller à ce que les bénéfices apportées par les mesures du 
Pilier 2 soient évaluées de manière plus précise et que l’information soit largement 
disséminée à travers tous les Etats membres. 
 
Pour utiliser avec plus de confiance la modélisation comme outil de prédiction des 
impacts des différents scénarios politiques concernant les mesures du Pilier 2, la 
démonstration concrète de l’efficacité de ces mesures est cruciale. Par exemple, 
l’information concernant le taux de retour d’investissements des capitaux physiques et 
humains, le niveau des effets d’aubaine (‘deadweight’), les coûts de transaction et 
l’impact des mesures environnementales sur les rendements, est nécessaire. Il est 
également nécessaire d’améliorer les modèles économiques à l’échelle de l’Europe 
pour les rendre capables de mieux refléter et différencier les impacts locaux, y 
compris par type d’exploitation, à partir des différentes façons dont ces mesures sont 
mises en œuvre dans différentes localités. Le travail actuellement entrepris dans le 
projet EUruralis 3.0 et le projet FP7 ‘CAPRI-RD’ est à cet égard un bon 
commencement. Un autre grand domaine de recherche concerne la conceptualisation, 
la modélisation et la monétarisation des biens publics. 
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Pour interpréter les résultats de cette étude  
 
Les résultats venant de la modélisation et d’autres formes d’analyse ne 
doivent pas être compris comme représentant les impacts d’un transfert de 
fonds du Pilier 1 au Pilier 2 de la PAC per se. Ils représentent plutôt 
l’impact potentiel d’un transfert de fonds entre les deux piliers en fonction 
d’une série d’hypothèses et de critères très spécifiques. L’analyse est 
basée sur plusieurs hypothèses nécessairement simplifiées sur comment 
ces critères pourraient changer sous différents scenarios.  Si les critères et 
scenarios ayant un impact important sur les résultats étaient modifiés, les 
résultats de l’étude changeraient également. Les critères spécifiques 
utilisés dans cette étude sur la modulation sont précisés dans le Chapitre 1, 
les scenarios utilisés sont présentés dans le Chapitre 2.  
 
Une autre note d’attention concerne les résultats des modèles 
économiques. La complexité des mesures du Pilier 2 et les diverses 
possibilités d’application dans l’Europe des 27 signifient qu’une série 
d’hypothèses ont dû être faites pour les impacts de mesures spécifiques du 
Pilier 2 sur les facteurs d’impulsion économique afin de calibrer les 
modèles. Celles-ci sont basées sur les meilleures informations disponibles 
dans la littérature, elles suivent la logique d’intervention pour chaque 
mesure, elles sont néanmoins d’ordre général. Les résultats des modèles 
sont donc fonction des hypothèses retenues ; les modèles ne peuvent 
prendre en compte les impacts contrastés que les mesures pourraient avoir 
dans différents Etats membres. Les résultats de cette étude doivent être 
étudiés avec ceci à l’esprit.  
 
Malgré ces limites, l’équipe du projet estime que l’étude apporte plusieurs 
idées importantes et utiles sur la manière dont le secteur agricole, et les 
zones rurales plus généralement, sont affectés par le transfert de fonds des 
paiements directs du Pilier 1 vers les mécanismes de soutien plus ciblés du 
Pilier 2 au travers du mécanisme de la modulation et qu’elle constitue une 
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1 MODULATION AS POLICY MECHANISM AND THE LOGIC OF 
INTERVENTION 
This chapter introduces modulation as a policy mechanism and sets out the 
intervention logic for this instrument, as it currently operates, outlining its rationale 
and purpose. It then further elaborates on the intervention logics of the individual 
rural development measures, considering both the policy targeting and the underlying 
economic mechanisms. A discussion on the conceptual basis for the analysis of 
modulation follows. The chapter ends with a presentation of the general macro-
economic framework for the study. This chapter on intervention logic provides the 
background and basis for the methodological approach to assessing the economic, 




Considerations for interpreting the results of the study 
 
The results of modelling and other forms of analysis should not be taken 
to represent the impacts of shifting funding from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 of the 
CAP per se, rather they represent the potential impact of a shift in funding 
between the two Pillars subject to a very specific set of assumptions and 
criteria, and the analysis is based on a number of necessarily simplified 
assumptions about how these criteria might change under different 
scenarios. If these criteria and scenarios have an important impact on the 
results and if they were to change, then the results of the study would also 
change. The specific criteria assumed for the operation of modulation are 
set out in Chapter 1 and the scenarios used in the study are set out in 
Chapter 2. 
 
A further note of caution should be raised specifically in relation to the 
results of the economic models. The complexity of Pillar 2 measures and 
the range of ways in which they can be implemented across the EU-27 
means that a series of assumptions have had to be made about the impacts 
of specific Pillar 2 measures on economic drivers in order to calibrate the 
models. These are based on the best available evidence derived from the 
literature, and follow the logic of intervention for each measure, however 
they are nonetheless generalisations. The outputs of the models, therefore, 
are clearly to a considerable degree a function of the assumptions that are 
fed into them and have not been able to take into account the differing 
impacts that measures might have in different Member States. The 
conclusions of the study should be read with this in mind. 
 
Despite these caveats, however, the study team feels that the study offers 
several important and useful insights into the way the agricultural sector, 
and rural areas more generally are affected by the shift of funding from 
direct payments under Pillar 1 to a more targeted support mechanism 
under Pillar 2 through the mechanism of modulation, and provides a 
useful basis for future research. 
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1.1 Background of modulation as a policy mechanism 
The term ‘modulation’, was first used in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) during the 1992 McSharry Reforms, and related to a proposal to impose a 
ceiling, or cap, on the amount of subsidy that an individual farmer could receive from 
the CAP. Member States with higher than average farm sizes (and hence subsidy 
receipts) lobbied against the proposal on the grounds that this would further distort the 
agricultural market by hindering rationalisation, and the proposals never became 
policy. 
 
During the Agenda 2000 CAP reform, the meaning of modulation changed. The term 
was used to describe a policy mechanism for shifting funding from the part of the 
CAP budget dedicated to providing income support payments to farmers (Pillar 1) to 
the newly introduced rural development regulation2, known as Pillar 2. At the time 
there was little support for such a mechanism being introduced on a compulsory, EU 
wide basis, and the final agreement resulted in ‘voluntary modulation’ being 
introduced, giving Member States the option to redirect up to a maximum of 20 per 
cent of Pillar 1 funds3 to their rural development programme (RDP) budgets. All 
funds raised were able to be retained within the Member State and had to be match-
funded by them. However, these modulated funds were restricted to certain measures: 
early retirement, agri-environment, Less Favoured Areas and afforestation. 
 
Only three Member States took advantage of this opportunity – France, Germany and 
the UK – and all took different approaches and implemented modulation in differing 
ways (see Table 1.1).  
 
The Mid Term Review of the CAP in 2003 initiated a shift away from support for 
agricultural production along with a greater emphasis on sustainability, the 
environment and rural development. Amongst a number of fundamental changes to 
the operation of Pillar 1 funds, an agreement was reached that made modulation a 
compulsory policy mechanism for all EU-15 Member States to implement, with later 
obligations for the new Member States.   
 
The legal basis for this, current, form of modulation, was laid down in Article 10 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003, which specified that 
all farms within the current EU-15 would be subject to compulsory modulation from 
2005 at levels of 3% in 2005, 4% in 2006 and 5% for 2007-2012, and that these 
resources would be allocated between Member States according to a set of objective 
criteria to be spent on rural development measures. Compulsory modulation does not 
apply to the twelve new Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 until 
their Pillar 1 payments reach the same level as those for the EU-15. This will be 2013 
for the EU-10, and in 2016 at earliest for Bulgaria and Romania. Compulsory 
modulation does not apply to the French overseas departments, Azores and Madeira, 
or the Canary or Aegean Islands. 
 
                                                 
2
 Council Regulation 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural development from the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain 
Regulations. 
3
 The legal basis for voluntary modulation was set out under Article 4 of Council Regulation 1259/99 
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Due to the fact that the compulsory modulation rates were lower than those that were 
being used by those Member States which were already operating voluntary 
modulation, these Member States were allowed to continue to apply voluntary 
modulation, alongside compulsory modulation, to cover the funding of measures 
being financed through this route until the end of the 2000-2006 programming period. 
Only the UK took advantage of this option. 
 
On finalising the budget allocations for Pillar 2 for the 2007-13 programming period, 
it became apparent that certain Member States would face particular difficulties in 
financing their rural development programmes under Council Regulation 1698/2005, 
without being able to levy additional funds via voluntary modulation. The ability to 
continue to apply voluntary modulation in addition to compulsory modulation was 
agreed in March 2007 and is set out in Council Regulation 378/2007. This regulation, 
however, restricts the use of voluntary modulation to those Member States where 
voluntary modulation is already applied according to Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 1655/2004. As a result, voluntary modulation is currently operated in only two 
Member States, the UK and Portugal. 
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Table 1.2 Annual voluntary modulation rates for UK regions, 2005-2013 (%) 
Region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
England 2 6 12 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Wales 1.5 0.5 0 2.5 4.2 5.8 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Scotland 3.5 4.5 5 8 8.5 9 9 9 9 
N. Ireland 0 4.5 4.5 6 7 8 9 9 9 
Source: Defra (2007), Communication to the European Commission by the United Kingdom Government 
concerning voluntary modulation. Accessed on 17/12/07 at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/erdp/pdfs/rdp07_13/vmia.pdf. 
In May 2008, as part of the legislative proposals for the CAP Health Check4,5, the 
Commission proposed the introduction of an additional basic rate of modulation to be 
applied to all payments above the euro 5,000 franchise, combined with a progressive 
element which would be dependent on the size of direct payment received. The 
proposals suggest an increase of the basic rate by 2% annually from 2009 until it 
reaches 8% minimum additional modulation in 2012. The progressive element would 
be applied in 3% bands, as set out in Table 1.3. Under these proposals, New Member 
States (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) would become eligible for modulation in 
2012 at a 3% rate. The current 5% rate of modulation would continue to operate as it 
does currently. It is proposed that the additional funds raised should be focused on the 
‘New Challenges’ of climate change mitigation, renewable energy, water 
management and biodiversity through Member States’ rural development 
programmes; also, the additional modulated funds would remain within each MS. 
Table 1.3 Additional rates of modulation as set out in the Commission’s Health Check Proposals 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
DP < 5,000 euro 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
5,001 euro < DP < 100,000 euro 5 % 5 % 7 % 9 % 11 % 13 % 
100,001 euro < DP < 200,000 
euro 
5 % 5 % 10 % 12 % 14 % 16 % 
200,001 euro < DP < 300,000 
euro 
5 % 5 % 13 % 15 % 17 % 19 % 
DP > 300,000 euro 5 % 5 % 16 % 18 % 20 % 22 % 
NB: Modulation removes funds from Pillar 1 in one year (X) and transfer funds to Pillar 2 in the following year 
(X+1). 
1.2 General logic of intervention 
The rationale underpinning the introduction of compulsory modulation is ‘to achieve 
a better balance between policy tools designed to promote sustainable agriculture and 
those designed to promote rural development’6.  
 
The operational objectives of compulsory modulation are therefore to: 
• reduce direct payments to a proportion of farmers by a set percentage each 
year; and  
• to add the funds levied to individual Member States’ EAFRD allocation, 
requiring them to be co-financed in the same way as the core EAFRD budget. 
                                                 
4
 Council Regulation establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the 
common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, COM (2008) 306/4 
5
 Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), COM (2008) 306/4 
 
6
 Preamble to Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 
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Without the application of compulsory modulation, for the EU-27 the proportion of 
the total CAP budget allocated to Pillar 1 in the 2007-13 programming period is 70%, 
compared to 30% allocated to Pillar 2. This percentage differs considerably when 
broken down for the EU-15 and the EU-12. For the EU-15, this proportion is 86:14 
and for the EU-12 there is a much more even distribution between the two pillars with 
52% of the budget allocated to Pillar 1 and 48% allocated to Pillar 2. By requiring 
EU-15 Member States to apply modulation, and by requiring the funds generated to 
be co-financed, this redresses the balance somewhat in favour of Pillar 2. 
 
At the implementation level, the specific objectives of compulsory modulation are to: 
• ensure that farms in receipt of low levels of direct payments are not 
disadvantaged;  
• ensure there is a balanced distribution of resources between Member States; 
and 
• to support increased rural development activity through redistributing the 
funds through Member States’ Rural Development Programmes. 
 
By reducing direct payments, there is a risk that this may disproportionately impact 
upon the income of small farms, thereby threatening their continued viability. 
Therefore, a ‘franchise’ limit of euro 5,000 of direct payments was put in place, below 
which payments are exempt from modulation.  
 
In order to allow for some redistribution of these modulated funds across the EU-15 to 
areas where the rural development funds are deemed to be most needed, modulation 
receipts between Member States are calculated on the basis of three criteria: 
agricultural area, agricultural employment, and per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). 
  
This key is intended to reflect the importance of agriculture within rural areas and to 
allow for some redistribution from intensive cereal and livestock producing countries 
to poorer and more extensive/mountainous countries, in order to achieve positive 
environmental and cohesion effects7. However, in order to ensure that Member States 
do not lose too significant a proportion of the funds levied from the reductions of their 
farmers’ Pillar 1 payments, each Member State is guaranteed to receive back at least 
80 per cent of these funds. 
 
It is intended that the receipts from compulsory modulation are used by Member 
States to increase the amount of support available under their Rural Development 
Programmes. Unlike with voluntary modulation under Council Regulation 1259/1999, 
there are no restrictions on which measures the funds can be used to support. Not only 
are the modulated funds added to the core EAFRD allocation, but they must also be 
co-financed by the Member State at the rates set out in Article 70 of Council 
Regulation 1698/20058. 
 
                                                 
7
 Commission of the European Communities (2002), Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, Brussels, COM (2002) 394 final, 
8
 For Axes 1 and 3, the maximum EAFRD contribution is 50% (or 75% in Convergence Regions) and 
for Axes 2 and 4 it is 55% (80% in Convergence Regions). The minimum EAFRD contribution rate 
is 20% for all axes. 
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The main objectives of the EAFRD9 are: 
• to improve the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry;  
• to improve the environment and countryside by supporting land management;  
• to improve the quality of life in rural areas and encourage diversification; and 
• to build local capacity for employment and diversification. 
 
These objectives are reinforced by the ‘Community Strategic Guidelines for Rural 
Development (programming period 2007 to 2013)’ which seek to ensure that the rural 
development programmes developed by each Member State are closely aligned with 
overarching Community priorities. These priorities primarily relate to the Göteborg 
sustainability goals laid down in the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development and 
the objectives of the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs. The Strategic Guidelines 
also seek to ensure that rural development is consistent with other EU policies, in 
particular cohesion and the environment, and provides a suitable fit with the reformed 
CAP.  
 
As a general, overarching objective, therefore, compulsory modulation embodies a 
commitment to start to shift the spending of public resources on support for 
agricultural production towards supporting the ‘multifunctionality’ of European 
farming and sustainable rural development.  
 
This intervention logic is set out in Figure 1.1.  
 
                                                 
9
 Council Regulation 1698/2005 
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From the schematic presentation of intervention logic for compulsory modulation, it 
becomes clear that several factors have to be considered in order to effectively assess 
its impacts. These include understanding the effects of reducing Pillar 1 direct 
payments and the effects of the availability of additional funding for Pillar 2 
measures, not just on the agricultural sector, but also on the wider rural economy and 
the environment. To do this, an understanding of the different nature of Pillar 1 and 
Pillar 2 payments is necessary. 
 
Pillar 1 direct payments, as set out within Council Regulation 1782/2003, are an 
income support payment aimed at ensuring a fair standard of living and stability of 
farm incomes. These payments have been progressively decoupled from production; 
however, Member States are still able to choose to pay a proportion of payments on a 
coupled basis for some sectors. In 2007, 18% of payments remained coupled and this 
is set to decrease to 10% by 2013. The level of direct payments is calculated, based on 
the amounts received during a historic reference period of 2000-2002. The basis for 
distributing these payments varies between Member States, but can be divided into 
three models: 
• the historic model – based on payments received and the number of hectares 
farmed for individual holdings during the reference period; 
• the regional model – where reference amounts are averaged across a region to 
provide a flat rate payment per hectare; and 
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• the hybrid model – where payments are calculated using a part historic and 
part regional flat rate approach. 
Pillar 2 on the other hand, embodies a more targeted and programmed approach. The 
EAFRD has a clear set of objectives, beneath which sit a suite of more detailed 
measures, focused on achieving specific outcomes, with detailed criteria for their use. 
Based on the principle of subsidiarity, Member States are given the flexibility to use 
the measures, within the context of the overarching objectives, to meet the needs of 
their national or regional circumstances. Measures are grouped into Axes according to 
their overarching objectives which focus upon improving the competitiveness of the 
agricultural and forestry sectors (Axis 1), improving the environment and the 
countryside (Axis 2), improving the quality of life in rural areas (Axis 3), and the 
LEADER approach, enabling bottom up community initiatives (Axis 4). In order to 
ensure that all objectives are met, there is a requirement for a minimum proportion of 
the EAFRD budget to be allocated to each measure (10% for Axes 1 and 3; 25% for 
Axis 2; and 5% on Axis 4: the LEADER programme). Other key characteristics of the 
Pillar 2 programming approach are the requirement for European funds to be co-
financed by the Member States, and for some measures to require a proportion of 
private funding. Detailed reporting and evaluation procedures are also required, and 
processes are set in place so that this information can then inform revisions to 
programme content, scheme design or implementation processes to improve the added 
value achieved through this form of public intervention.  
 
Given the range of objectives of Pillar 2, and therefore the great variety of outputs and 
impacts that can be expected from the implementation of these measures, it is helpful 
to consider in more detail the intervention logics for individual measures, in order to 
inform the methodological framework and subsequent impacts of compulsory 
modulation. 
1.3 Intervention logics for the Pillar 2 measures 
To assess the effects of modulation in the second pillar arising from greater 
expenditure across a range of measures, it is necessary to develop the intervention 
logic, measure by measure. This demonstrates the intended causality from putting a 
measure in place, via stimulating changes at farm and individual business level, to 
achieving final outcomes on, for example farm structures, employment, quality of life 
and the environment. The intervention logic can be understood both in terms of 
economic mechanisms – the relationship between RD measures and explicit economic 
drivers – and in terms of non-market benefits. 
 
The intervention logic for EAFRD as a whole is complex as measures have different 
types of relations with economic drivers and each driver has a specific impact. In 
addition, one of the key aims of many of these measures is to intervene in the 
provision of environmental and social benefits that are not provided by the market, 
and these also need to be reflected. Although measures can be grouped in relation to 
their broad overarching objectives, to understand the detailed objectives and intended 
outcomes of individual measures, the intervention logic for each measure needs to be 
examined separately. Therefore, we distinguish four steps in determining the 
intervention logic for each RD measure. Firstly, we set out the global, intermediate, 
specific and operational objectives for each measure, derived from Council 
Regulation 1698/2005 and supporting policy documents (for example the Community 
Strategic Guidelines and individual measure fiches linked to the Common Monitoring 
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and Evaluation Framework). In the second step, we examine the causality between 
individual RD measures and economic drivers, such as factor productivity, income 
payments, and human capital. We sub-divide these drivers with regard to the main 
production factors of land, labour, capital, as well as an overall factor index. These 
two steps are expressed in Table 1.6. In the third step we examine the impact of the 
economic drivers on key indicators used in the study as proxies for assessing the 
impacts of modulation on the study themes, as found in Table 1.7. Fourthly, going 
beyond the economic drivers, we consider the relationship between each RD measure 
and the provision of environmental and social non-market benefits.  
 
Table 1.8 sets out the non-market environmental and social benefits that each measure 
within the EAFRD has the potential to deliver. For some measures, these non-market 
benefits are the primary rationale for the existence of the measure and therefore of the 
intervention logic underlying it. For example, the intervention logic for all Axis 2 
measures, with the exception of the animal welfare measure, is to improve the 
environment and the countryside and to support the sustainable use of agricultural 
land, thereby leading to the maintenance or enhancement of biodiversity, landscape, 
water quality, soil quality and helping contribute to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation.  
 
For other measures, while the environmental or social non-market benefits are not the 
primary rationale for the introduction of the measure, improving the sustainability of 
agriculture or enhancing natural capital are still included within their objectives, and 
intervention under such measures can still achieve significant environmental and 
social benefits. Examples of such measures in relation to the environment are the farm 
modernisation measure and the advisory measures under Axis 1, which are focused on 
improving the competitiveness of the farming and forestry sectors, but in doing so can 
improve the quality of the environment, for example by providing support for 
investments to modernise livestock housing, improve silage storage, improve 
equipment for the spreading of animal wastes and renewable energy infrastructure, 
with potential benefits for water quality and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
There is another subset of measures where the potential non-market benefits are more 
of an indirect nature, where possible environmental and/or social benefits are derived 
indirectly from the implementation of the measure. For example, measures focused on 
the development of new products or food quality schemes under Axis 1 or those 
targeted at diversification, setting up new businesses or promoting tourism under Axis 
3. In these cases non-market benefits are only likely to arise where these are required 
to underpin the activity itself, or are a by-product of the activity undertaken. 
 
The four steps together, brought together in Table 1.6, Table 1.7 and Table 1.8, 
provide the causality between RD measures and expected outcomes. For the purposes 
of this study, we have identified indicators in the field of competitiveness, farm 
structure, farm income and employment in Table 1.7, and the environment and quality 
of life as found in Table 1.8. The chain of analysis can be demonstrated by looking at 
two specific examples, relating to the vocational training measures under Axis 1 
(Table 1.4) and the agri-environment measure within Axis 2 (Table 1.5).  
 
Taking the vocational training measure (111) first, Table 1.4 sets out the objectives 
for this measure. 
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Table 1.4 Objectives for measure 111 for vocational training and information actions  
Objective level  Level of 
impact 
111 Vocational training and information actions 
Operational 
Objectives  
Beneficiary To ensure an appropriate level of technical and economic training 
is available, beyond those already available as part of normal 
agricultural and forestry education programmes, for all those 
involved in agricultural, food and forestry activities.  
To include training to develop expertise in new information 
technologies; and awareness in the fields of: product quality, 
results of research sustainable management of natural resources 
Specific 
Objectives 
MS/Region To improve the level of technical and economic expertise of those 
involved in agricultural, food and forestry activities 
Intermediate 
Objectives 
  To enhance and adapt human potential 
General/ Global 
Objectives 
EU To improve the competitiveness of the agriculture and forestry 
sectors 
To enhance the environment and the countryside  
Source: 1) Rural Development policy 2007-2013 Common monitoring and evaluation framework (CMEF) – 
Guidance note E – Measure Fiches; 2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development 
by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 20 September 2005; 3) Council Decision 
2006/144/EC on Community Strategic Guidelines for rural development programming period 2007-2013; 4) SEC 
(2005) 914 Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on Community Strategic Guidelines for Rural 
Development: Update to Impact Assessment Report SEC (2004) 931, Commission Staff Working Document 
From Table 1.4, we can see that this measure aims to develop new skills for all people 
involved in agriculture and forestry. Table 1.6 then, links these objectives to 
economic drivers, demonstrating that higher levels of education are likely to directly 
increase labour productivity (++ = main correspondence between a measure and an 
economic driver), but also that it is likely to improve their skills to use the land and 
capital in a more efficient way. The training also leads to a higher stock of human 
capital in the economy. Table 1.7 illustrates the third step, linking the economic 
drivers to specific indicators. This suggests that an increase in labour productivity is 
likely to lead to an increase, for example, in GVA and output, but has a negative 
impact on employment in the short term. The latter is caused by the assumption that in 
agriculture the direct labour saving effect due to technological change is larger than 
the increased expansion effect due to more production, due to a lower price as costs 
have been reduced (inelastic demand); the long term effect is, however, to strengthen 
the resiliency of the remaining on-farm employment. The overall effect of measure 
111 on employment is therefore not clear and depends on, inter alia, the elasticity of 
demand. The impact on output and farm income should be positive as all economic 
drivers work in the same direction. Although not captured within this table, it is clear 
from the objectives of this measure that it is also likely to provide benefits for the 
environment through, specifically, the improved management of natural resources, 
which is shown in Table 1.8 
 
Taking the agri-environment measure (measure 214), as another example, the focus of 
this measure is the provision of payments to farmers for introducing or continuing 
agricultural production methods compatible with the protection or improvement of the 
environment or the landscape. The objectives for this measure are set out in Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5 Objectives for the agri-environment measure (214) 
Objective level Level of 
impact 
214 Agri-environment payments 
Operational 
Objectives 
Beneficiary To encourage farmers and other land managers to introduce or 
maintain production methods compatible with the protection of the 
environment, the landscape and its features, natural resources, the 
soil and genetic diversity that go beyond mandatory standards 
To require beneficiaries to adhere to cross-compliance requirements 
Specific 
Objectives 
MS/Region To support the sustainable development of rural areas 




 To support the sustainable use of agricultural land 
General/Global 
Objectives 
EU To improve the environment and the countryside 
Source: 1) Rural Development policy 2007-2013 Common monitoring and evaluation framework (CMEF) – 
Guidance note E – Measure Fiches; 2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development 
by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 20 September 2005; 3) Council Decision 
2006/144/EC on Community Strategic Guidelines for rural development programming period 2007-2013; 4) SEC 
(2005) 914 Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on Community Strategic Guidelines for Rural 
Development: Update to Impact Assessment Report SEC (2004) 931, Commission Staff Working Document 
These objectives may lead to lower yields due to extensification of farming practices, 
including fertiliser reduction and reductions in stocking densities, for example. Table 
1.6 links these likely outcomes to the key economic drivers. This indicates that the 
implementation of the agri-environment measures may decrease labour productivity 
as more labour may be required to undertake the actions required, for example, more 
traditional forms of management such as hedgerow management or maintenance of 
other landscape features (stone walls, terraces etc) in good condition. Agri-
environment payments are calculated mainly on the basis of compensation for income 
forgone due to the activities prescribed under the scheme. However, there is likely to 
be an element of deadweight associated with expenditure under the agri-environment 
measure, as some farmers may have continued with same management practices 
without the payments. In this case, these payments can be seen as contributing to the 
income of the farm. In the second step (Table 1.7), the lower productivity aspect has a 
neutral to negative impact on production, whereas the income payment aspect has a 
positive impact. Although not captured within economic related tables, as is clear 
from the objectives of the measure, and demonstrated in Table 1.8 the agri-
environment measure is intended to have a significant positive impact on the 
environment, in relation to biodiversity, landscape, water quality, soil quality, and 
increasingly climate change.  
 
These types of links between the objectives of the measures and the anticipated 
outcomes have been determined for all 40 measures within the EAFRD. They are 
sued to inform the development of hypotheses and assumptions relating to the impact 
of modulation on individual study themes as well as the assumptions for the Pillar 2 
elements of the modelling in relation to LEITAP, CAPRI and FES. These are 
described in detail in Annex 1.  
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 12 
 
Table 1.6 Rural Development measures and corresponding economic drivers 
 Economic drivers 
 Productivity Factor payment  Supporting 
 
Total 













Axis 1             
111 Vocational training and information actions + ++ + +  +   + +   
112 Setting up of young farmers ++ + + +  +    +   
113 Early retirement of farmers and farm workers + ++ + +      -   
114 Use of advisory services by farmers and forest holders ++ + + +  +   + +   
115 Setting up of farm management, farm relief and farm advisory 
services, as well as of forestry advisory services ++ + + + +     +   
121 Farm modernisation +  +    +    ++  
122 Improvement of the economic value of forests + + ++ +     +    
123 Adding value to agriculture and forestry products ++ + +  +    +    
124 Cooperation for development of new products, processes and 
technologies in the agriculture and food sector and in the forestry sector ++    +     +   
125 Improving and developing infrastructure related to the development 
and adaptation of agriculture and forestry ++  +          
126 Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural 
disasters and introducing appropriate prevention actions ++  + +       + + 
131 Helping farmers to adapt to demanding standards based on 
Community legislation     ++        
132 Supporting farmers who participate in food quality schemes     +    ++    
133 Supporting producer groups for information and promotion 
activities for products under food quality schemes     +    ++    
141 Supporting semi-subsistence agricultural holdings undergoing 
restructuring + +   + ++  +     
142 Supporting setting up of producer groups + +   ++ +   + +   
Axis 2             
211 Natural handicap payments to farmers in mountain areas    0 / -/+    ++    + 
212 Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps, other than mountain 
areas 
   0 / -/+    ++    + 
213 Natura 2000 payments and payments linked to WFD        ++    + 
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214 Agri-environment payments  0/-  0/-  +  ++    + 
215 Animal welfare payments   -    ++      
216 Support for non productive investments    0/-   ++      
221 First afforestation of agricultural land    0/+    +    - 
222 First establishment of agro-forestry systems on agricultural land    0/+    +    - 
223 First afforestation of non-agricultural land        +     
224 Natura 2000 payment    -/0    ++     
225 Forest environment payments    -/0    ++     
226 Restoring forestry potential and introducing prevention actions ++   +         
227 Support for non-productive investments       ++      
Axis 3             
311 Diversification into non-agricultural activities       +   ++ +  
312 Support for business creation and development       +   ++ +  
313 Encouragement of tourism activities       +   ++ +  
321 Basic services for the economy and rural population       +   ++ +  
322 Village renewal and development ++         +   
323 Conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage     ++     +   
331 A training and information measure for economic actors operating 
in the fields covered by Axis 3 + ++        +   
341 A skills acquisition and animation measure with a view to preparing 
and implementing a local development strategy + ++        +   
Axis 4             
41 Implementing local development strategies  ++         +   
421 Implementing cooperation projects ++         +   
431 Running the local action group, acquiring skills and animating the 
territory ++         +   
Legend: ‘++’ = principal correspondence between a Rural Development measure and an economic driver; ‘+’, ‘0’ and ‘-’ are additional relative weightings. 
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Table 1.7 Economic drivers in relation to thematic indicators 
 Indicators 
 Competitiveness Farm structure Farm income Employment 
 GVA Gross Output No. of Farms Avg. size* of farms Farm income Agri. labour force Total employment 
Total factor productivity + + - + + ? ? 
Labour productivity + + - + + - ? 
Capital productivity + + - + + ? ? 
Land productivity in agriculture + + - + + ? ? 
Income payment, general ± /2 + /1 + /1 - /1 + + /1 ? 
Income payment, labour ± /2 + /1 + /1 - /1 + + /1 ? 
Income payment, capital ± /2 + /1 + /1 - /1 + - /3 ? 
Income payment, land ± /2 + /1 + /1 - /1 + - /3 ? 
Product quality + + ? + + + + 
Human capital + + ? + + - ? 
Fixed assets + + ? + + ? ? 
Land available for agriculture + + + + + ? ? 
General comments/remarks: 
For this list of economic drivers the assumption is that they are increasing - apart from the last one (shift in preferences) which is not directional. 
Based on the assumption of inelastic demand for agricultural products. 
/1: depends on the objective of each measure and how it has been implemented  
/2: if increased output has a negative price effect GVA might remain constant or even decline 
/3:: if substitution effect is larger than expansion effect, which is often the case in agriculture as demand is inelastic* 'size' in ESU 
Indicators criteria: 1) reflect goals, 2) quantifiable, 3) correspond to our models, 4) independent of one another
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Of Life and 
Rural Vitality 
Axis 1       
111 Vocational training and 
information actions + + + + + + 
112 Setting up of young farmers      + 
113 Early retirement of farmers and 
farm workers       
114 Use of advisory services by 
farmers and forest holders + + + + + + 
115 Setting up of farm management, 
farm relief and farm advisory services, 
as well as of forestry advisory services 
+ + + + + + 
121 Farm modernisation  + +  + + 
122 Improvement of the economic 
value of forests + + + + + Indirect 
123 Adding value to agriculture and 
forestry products +  Potential indirect effect +  + 
124 Cooperation for development of 
new products, processes and 
technologies in the agriculture and food 
sector and in the forestry sector 
 Potential Indirect effect Indirect 
125 Improving and developing 
infrastructure related to the 
development and adaptation of 
agriculture and forestry 
Very variable + 
126 Restoring agricultural production 
potential damaged by natural disasters 
and introducing appropriate prevention 
actions 
Very variable + 
131 Helping farmers to adapt to 
demanding standards based on 
Community legislation 
 + +  + Indirect 
132 Supporting farmers who 
participate in food quality schemes Potential indirect effect + 
133 Supporting producer groups for 
information and promotion activities 
for products under food quality 
schemes 
Potential indirect effect + 
141 Supporting semi-subsistence 
agricultural holdings undergoing 
restructuring 
Potential indirect effect + 
142 Supporting setting up of producer 
groups Potential indirect effect + 
Axis 2       
211 Natural handicap payments to 
farmers in mountain areas + + + + + + 
212 Payments to farmers in areas with 
handicaps, other than mountain areas + + + + + + 
213 Natura 2000 payments and 
payments linked to WFD + + + + + Indirect 
214 Agri-environment payments + + + + + + 
215 Animal welfare payments 
 
     
216 Support for non productive 
investments + + + + + + 
221 First afforestation of agricultural 
land + + + + + Indirect 
222 First establishment of agro-forestry 
systems on agricultural land + + + + + Indirect 
223 First afforestation of non-
agricultural land + + + + + Indirect 
224 Natura 2000 payment + + + + + Indirect 
225 Forest environment payments + + + + + + 
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226 Restoring forestry potential and 
introducing prevention actions + + + + + Indirect 
227 Support for non-productive 
investments + + + + + + 
Axis 3       
311 Diversification into non-
agricultural activities Potential indirect effect + + 
312 Support for business creation and 
development Potential indirect effect + + 
313 Encouragement of tourism 
activities Potential indirect effect + 
321 Basic services for the economy 
and rural population Potential indirect effect + 
322 Village renewal and development Potential indirect effect + 
323 Conservation and upgrading of the 





331 A training and information 
measure for economic actors operating 
in the fields covered by Axis 3 
Potential indirect effect + 
341 A skills acquisition and animation 
measure with a view to preparing and 
implementing a local development 
strategy 
Potential indirect effect + 
Axis 4       
41 Implementing local development 
strategies  + 
421 Implementing cooperation projects + 
431 Running the local action group, 
acquiring skills and animating the 
territory 
 Potential impact but very variable 
+ 
Key: + - where measure has the potential to result in a non-market benefit. Whether these outcomes are achieved 
in practice will depend on the priorities attached to each measure within individual Rural Development 
Programmes, and the design and implementation of schemes in practice. 
Sources: Rural Development policy 2007-2013 Common monitoring and evaluation framework (CMEF) – 
Guidance note E – Measure Fiches - accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/eval/guidance/note_e_en.pdf  
Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD), 20 September 2005 
Council Decision 2006/144/EC on Community Strategic Guidelines for rural development programming period 
2007-2013 
SEC (2005) 914 Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on Community Strategic Guidelines for Rural 
Development: Update to Impact Assessment Report SEC (2004) 931, Commission Staff Working Document 
 
1.4 Conceptual basis for the analysis of modulation  
1.4.1 One region, fixed prices 
Modulation implies transfer of funds from the first to the second pillar of the CAP. 
The present study intends to analyse the impact of such a transfer on agricultural 
production, income and on derived environmental indicators. Before plunging into a 
numerical analysis, it seems appropriate to approach the issue from a more abstract 
point of view, in order to identify critical points for the subsequent numerical analysis 
and to derive the principle directions of the expected impacts. 
 
To keep the exposition simple, we start by assuming a highly simplified model of 
agriculture, where a single, profit maximising firm produces a single good by 
allocating land to the three agricultural activities “intensive agriculture”, “extensive 
agriculture” and “abandonment” with constant yields. Assume, furthermore, that the 
first pillar consists of a single payment of r euro per hectare that the firm receives for 
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intensive or extensive production alike, but not for “abandoned land”. The second 
pillar consists of a payment s per hectare where the amount is higher for extensive 
agriculture than for intensive, but zero for land. The reform that is considered is to 
decrease r and increase s, and the question is what the effect will be on total 
production, land use and intensity. The payment r represents the single farm (or area) 
payment. The payment s is an abstract second pillar measure, where the payment is 
linked to the production of some common good, which is in turn assumed to be more 
strongly linked to the extensive than to the intensive production. 
 
Building on the general logic of intervention as described in Section 1.2, modulation 
is viewed as consisting of two steps, where we first decrease r and then increase s. 
The immediate effect of reducing r is that (1) production, both intensive and 
extensive, decreases, and that (2) there is a shift toward intensive production.  
 
One explanation for the two effects would be the following: (1) If the uniform subsidy 
r is decreased, land abandonment becomes relatively more attractive. (2) With the 
lower r, the firm depends more on market revenues and this affects the intensive 
production less than the extensive production. (1) is particularly interesting. It 
depends on the assumption that “abandoned land” is not eligible for support. IF all 
abandoned land were made eligible, and there were no other way for land to leave 
agriculture but by abandonment, reducing r would have no effect on production 
except for reducing land rents (this simple model contains no wealth or risk effects). 
 
Next consider an increase of s. Increasing s favours production in general and 
extensive production in particular, counteracting the effect of decreasing r; it (1) 
reduces land abandonment, and (2) induces a shift towards extensive production 
(since by assumption support is higher for extensive production). Due to increased 
competition for shared resources, intensive production may be pushed back even 
though it receives some subsidy.
 
Table 1.9 summarises the conclusions so far, and 
also shows the expected net effect of both steps (a-priori unknown). 
Table 1.9 A priori effects of modulation 
Effect – cause Decreasing r Increasing s Net effect r + s 
x3: Land abandonment ↑ ↓ ? 
x1: Intensive production ↓ ? ? 
x2: Extensive production ↓ ↑ ? 
x1/x2: Intensity ↑ ↓ ? 
x1 + x2: Total production ↓ ? ? 
1.4.2 Two regions, market feedback  
Up to this point, only a single small (= price taking) producer was considered. In 
reality, modulation will be applied to the whole EU, and thus market feedback to 
changing quantities should also be considered. To exemplify this the world is 
assumed to consist of only two regions, each with a single producer defined as in the 
previous subsection. The good is perfectly homogeneous, and there is free trade and 
no trade costs. Demand is assumed to be such that if the price drops, demand 
increases, and vice versa. Each producer still operates as if the price were fixed. 
 
Again, we consider modulation in two steps, where first r is decreased in both regions 
and then s is increased, potentially with different amounts in the regions. As before, 
decreasing r would lead to decreased production. However, with the market in place, 
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the decreased production would result in higher prices. Higher prices would favour 
both extensive and intensive production, but since the yield in the intensive 
technology is higher, revenues in intensive production would be less negatively 
affected by the reduced r and more positively affected by the rising price than would 
the extensive production. Market feedback would thus likely increase the tendency 
towards intensification resulting from decreased r. 
 
One conclusion of the preceding analysis was that increasing s leads to an 
extensification of production, but that the direction of change of total production is 
ambiguous, because we cannot determine the effect on intensive production. This 
conclusion still holds. Even if we would consider the extreme case, where only 
extensive production is supported, no more definite conclusions are possible: Albeit 
one may safely conclude that redirecting a fixed budget from r to s would decrease 
total production (because s requires using a less productive technology), the national 
co-financing may be sufficiently large to compensate for the lower productivity of the 
extensive technology. If we for example consider a region where in the initial 
situation much land is fallow (not receiving any r-support), a significant increase in s2 
may cause extensive agriculture to increase by so much that some fallow land is taken 
into production and total production increases. Nevertheless, given that many second 
pillar measures (e.g. human capital investments) are directed toward activities not 
directly linked with production, the opposite, i.e. a production decrease compared 
with the initial situation, seems likely. 
 
An interesting special case arises when only one of the two regions receives s-support 
(but both reduce r-support), and we assume that total production in the region 
receiving s-support decreases as a result of an extensification (as does production in 
the region that only loses r-support), then the market feedback will cause prices to rise 
in both regions and thus lead to intensification. The higher prices will, as previously 
argued, favour intensive production, thus reinforcing the tendency caused by the 
reduction of r, and we end up with a situation where one region is extensive and one 
is intensive. 
 
Another interesting conclusion follows from the above assumed model together with 
Le Chatelier’s principle, which (as applied in economics) roughly states that 
introducing a new constraint to a maximization problem decreases the value of the 
objective function. Applied to modulation, it means that since the producer is required 
to change his production pattern that he would not have chosen with decoupled 
payments, and the total compensation remains unchanged, his profit must be smaller; 
otherwise he would have chosen that production voluntarily at the outset. 
  
In a situation where there are no external effects of agriculture, the shift from r to s 
would imply a loss of efficiency (and thus of welfare). However, since the s-support is 
intended as a compensation for the production of some common good, which would 
not be produced in sufficiently large amounts under pure r-support, the net effect 
under consideration of externalities should be a gain, given that the support level s is 
set appropriately. Valuation of external effects is beyond the scope of this text. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep the existence of such effects in mind when 
evaluating the classical no-externalities welfare impacts of the reform; the potential 
loss in economic efficiency without regard to externalities is also the price to pay for 
the gained external benefits. Last but not least, part of the second pillar support is 
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directed towards human and physical capital investments, which is likely to boost 
productivity, thus offsetting the efficiency loss described above. This is not accounted 
for in the schematic analysis above, but turns out to be of crucial importance in the 
empirical application reported below. 
 
The simple model discussed so far shows that the qualitative effects of modulation a-
priori are ambiguous. Further progress in the analysis requires a numerical analysis 
based on empirical facts. In the absence of this empirical evidence, the modelling can 
go ahead as an ex ante analysis with clear assumptions based on the economic 
mechanisms of modulation. The actual implementation of modulation in the model 
framework is presented in Annex 1.  
1.4.3 General macro-economic framework for the modulation study  
The impacts of compulsory modulation on the study themes need to be set within the 
context of broader macro-economic drivers and trends (Table 1.10). A number of 
assumptions are made, therefore, with respect to variables which are exogenous to this 
analysis. Many of these are non-agricultural policy drivers, and assumptions are based 
on the Scenar 2020 project10, but updated where necessary. Table 1.11 provides an 
overview of these assumptions. Figure 1.2 displays growth rates of population, GDP, 
and per capita GDP until 2013. These assumptions are factored into the models, and 
therefore all modelling results in relation to the impact of modulation, have already 
accounted for these underlying trends. Analysis relating to the results from other data 
sources, however, needs to take account of these trends.  
Table 1.10 Exogenous drivers in the general framework, 2007-2013 
Drivers Source of Assumptions 
Demographics Main population trends as observed in the past  
Macroeconomic growth Moderate growth as seen in the trends 
Consumer preferences More demand for higher value added food products and increasing 
absolute spending for food production per capita  
Agri-technology Continuous trends in cost saving technological developments 
World markets Trends in agri-markets based on OECD/FAO World Agriculture 
Outlook 2008-2017.11 Change from these trends due to different 
assumptions on exogenous and policy-related drivers, especially the 
demand for biofuels. 
EU enlargement No further EU enlargement until 2013 (i.e. EU = EU-27) 
 
Growth of the world population will fall from 1.4% p.a. in the 1990-2003 period to 
about 1% p.a. in the coming ten years, which is due to declining birth rates. Almost all 
population growth will occur in low and middle income countries, whose population 
growth rates are much higher than those in high income countries. Due to low 
population growth in the EU (+0.3% p.a. for the EU-15 and -0.2% p.a. for the EU-
10), the EU share in world population is expected to decline further. 
 
With regard to economic growth, a moderate growth is expected over the coming 
period in almost all regions of the world in the general framework. Economic growth 
will be considerably higher for most of the transition and developing countries than 
for industrialised countries, e.g. the EU-15 and the United States. GDP in the EU is 




 OECD-FAO (2008), Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017, OECD and FAO, Paris, France. 
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expected to increase over the coming years by 2% p.a. for the EU-15 and, due to 
economic transition, 3.8% p.a. for the EU-10. 
 
Furthermore, a number of additional assumptions are made for the general framework 
with respect to the development of the CAP. They also reflect the assumptions of the 
Scenar 2020 study with some differences as a result of the more recent changing 
economic situation, for example in relation to commodity prices. These assumptions 
are depicted in Table 1.11.  
Table 1.11 Assumptions for the baseline scenario in the general framework, 2007 
Topic Assumption 
Market Policies 
Intervention Continuation of current system of intervention prices  
Exclusion of maize from intervention in 2009 
Adjustment of intervention prices to balance markets where necessary in 
order to comply with WTO restrictions on export subsidies 
Intervention price for butter decreases by 15% from 2012 onwards 
Regulations for quota products 
(milk, sugar) 
Reform of the sugar CMO 
Milk quota continues at 2007 level. 
Biofuel policies Biofuel policies such as mandatory blending implemented (2010, 5.75%; 
2020, 10%) 
Trade Policies 
Tariffs, export subsidies and 
TRQs 
Continuation of current trade policies without an implementation of a 
potential WTO agreement 
Direct Payments 
Development of direct 
payments 
SAPS and SFP per ha payments constant in nominal terms (deflated by EU 
inflation rate) 
Modulation rate in EU-15 5% 
Distribution of funds from 
modulation in EU-15 
80% within the MS within which the funds are generated (90% for 
Germany) 
20% reallocation among MS 
Decoupling of direct payments MTR 2003 
Application of the Single Farm 
Payment in EU-10 
Prolongation of the SAPS system until 2013 
Obligatory set aside rates Mandatory set-aside rate at 0% 
 










EU-15 EU-12 EU-27 HDC C&S
America
Asia Africa World
Population growth GDP growth GDP per capita growth
Source: USDA (2008), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/macroeconomics/  
HDC (High developed countries) = US, Canada, Oceania and Japan; C&S America = Central and South 
America. 
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The development of the GDP per capita indicates the most important driver in the 
models applied for this study (see Figure 1.2). The differences in annual income 
growth rates per capita between 2.0% in the EU-15 and 5.6% in the Asian countries 
determine also the regional distribution of growth in demand for agricultural and food 
commodities. 
 
Based on these assumptions, a consideration of the likely trends for growth within the 
different economic sectors. The service sector displays the strongest economic growth 
in the EU-15 and the EU-12 (see Figure 1.3). Within the EU-15, the crop, livestock, 
processed food, and industries sectors stay relatively stable within the 2007-2013 
period. The biofuel directive has a positive impact on the crop production. Within the 
EU-12 all sector show a growth in real value added. The growth within the EU-27 is 
positive for all sectors. Next to the highest growth in services, the growth is relatively 
higher in crops and industries than in livestock and processed food.  









EU -15 EU -12 EU - 27
crops Livestock Food Industry Services
Source: Own calculations, based on LEITAP. 
The general framework thus displays an ongoing trend of structural change between 
key economic sectors, with a declining share of agriculture and industry and an 
increasing share of services in the economy (Figure 1.4). The changes are relatively 
small as the period under consideration is the relatively short period 2007-2013. 
 
This trend is most pronounced for the EU-12, for which industry and agriculture still 
accounted for more than 42% of the economy in 2007, but also holds for the EU-15. 
The declining share of agriculture in the economy reflects a global trend, which stems 
from the fact that the effect of supply shifters (technical productivity) dominates 
demand shifters (population growth, income). Especially due to typically decreasing 
income elasticities in the course of economic development the expenditure share for 
agricultural products declines with rising income.  
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crops Livestock Agri-prim Food Industry Services
EU-12, 2007 EU-12, 2013 EU-15, 2007
EU-15, 2013 EU-27, 2007 EU-27, 2013
Source: Own calculations, based on LEITAP. 
It is against this background that the study of the impact of modulation takes place. It 
is likely that the effects of the modulation policy will cause a relatively small 
inflection in general, global trends that are driving the evolution of the agricultural 
economy. It is the direction and the degree of this inflection which the analysis within 
this study will isolate.  
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2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPACT ANALYSIS 
This chapter sets out the methodology proposed for analysing the core study themes 
of the project. It begins with an introduction to the study themes and basic hypotheses 
of the study, presents the analytical approach, and goes on to an in-depth discussion of 
issues regarding the methodology. 
2.1 Introduction to the study themes and the basic hypotheses of the study 
The objective of this study is ‘to provide a quantitative and qualitative assessment of 
the impacts of modulation on rural areas, social and economic performance, 
environment, competitiveness, Community and national budgets…[taking] into 
account the re-distribution effects of modulation, within and between Member States, 
between economic sectors and types of holding.’ Specifically, the study focuses on 
the following four study themes:  
 
1. Distribution and budget effects 
2. Effects on farm structure and agricultural sector 
3. Socio-economic effects 
a. Competitiveness of the agricultural sector 
b. Farm and farm household income 
c. Employment 
d. Quality of life in rural areas 
4. Environmental effects 
 
The analysis, therefore, needs to focus on an assessment of the full range of social, 
economic and environmental impacts of compulsory modulation, both as a result of 
the effect of a reduction in Pillar 1 direct payments and the redistribution of these 
funds through Pillar 2. To do this, an understanding of the impact at both the farm 
level and the Member State/regional level is needed.  
 
The impacts of modulation is considered for the EU-27 for two separate scenarios 
(with associated sensitivity analyses) in order to explore the potential difference in 
impacts of different overall rates of modulation, and any differences that might 
emerge from changes to rules relating to franchise levels, co-financing requirements, 
or allocation of funds within Pillar 2 to specific measures.  
 
The impact of the redistribution of modulated funds through Pillar 2 is dependent on a 
wide range of variables including the way in which the modulated funds are used, 
how schemes are targeted and who is eligible. One of the key challenges for this study 
is to reflect the complexity of local impacts on the ground – social, economic and 
environmental – and to understand how these relate to the variety of ways in which 
Member States have implemented their Rural Development Programmes, and to 
disentangle the extent to which modulated funds have contributed to these impacts.  
2.1.1 Scenarios 
Two scenarios have been chosen for the Modulation study, each of which is subject to 
a number of sensitivity analyses. These are set out in Box 2.1. 
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The first scenario, the ‘baseline scenario’, is the current system of compulsory 
modulation, in which there is a 5% cut of Pillar 1 direct payments that applies to 
beneficiaries receiving more than euro 5,000 per year. The proportion of funds 
returned to the MS are calculated according to an allocation key (see Chapter 3 for 
details), and are allocated between the Pillar 2 measures for each Member States in 
the same way as the EAFRD budget .  
 
The second scenario, the ‘Health Check scenario’, relates to the Commission’s 
proposals for higher rates of modulation as set out in the Commission Communication 
of 20 May 2008 concerning the ‘Health Check’ of the CAP. This scenario consists of 
an additional 8% rate of modulation, introduced progressively between 2009 and 
2012, and further increased according to the level of Pillar 1 direct payments received, 
as set out in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1. This additional modulation is then distributed to 
measures that can meet the ‘New Challenges’ indicated in the Commission’s Proposal 
for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1968/2005 on support for 
rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD)12 of 20 May 2008, specifically Annex II – Indicative types of operations 
related to priorities referred to in Article 16a. The project team has weighted this 
distribution pattern as shown in Table 2.1, and the same proportional allocation of the 
additional funds are made for each Member State. 
 
There are five components of each scenario. The first is the level of the ‘franchise’, 
that is, the amount of Pillar 1 direct payments that serves as the threshold above which 
modulation is levied13. The second is the modulation rate itself. A third component 
relates to the proportion of modulated funds that is returned to an individual Member 
State for use within the EAFRD. Fourth is the manner in which the EAFRD budget – 
to which the modulated money contributes – is apportioned among the rural 
development measures. Last is the extent of Member State co-financing of the 
EAFRD, which is conditioned by the amount modulated from the Pillar 1 direct 











                                                 
12
 COM(2008) 306 Final. 
13
 In practice, all direct payments are modulated, and then the amount corresponding to the deductions 
made on the first euro5,000 is refunded as so-called “additional aid”. 
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Box 2.1: The two principle scenarios of the Modulation study, including the sensitivity analyses  
Baseline Scenario  
Compulsory modulation as agreed as part of the Mid-Term Review 2003 (Article 10 of 
Council Regulation 1782/2003) 
Franchise: euro 5,000  
Modulation rate: 5% 
EC distribution key: current EAFRD (min 80% in MS, DE 90%) 
RDP allocation: current EAFRD 
MS co-financing: current EAFRD 
 
Sensitivity Analysis (around the Baseline) 
1) Modulation rate: 
(a) 0% 
(b) 20%  
2) Franchise: 
(a) euro 0  
(b) euro 10,000  
 
Health Check Scenario  
With targeting to ‘New Challenges’ 
Franchise: euro 5,000  
Modulation rate = 13% (banded, or ‘progressive’, modulation) 
EC distribution key: 
- 1st 5% = current EAFRD (min 80% in MS, DE 90%) 
- Additional CM stays within MS 
RDP allocation: targeted to New Challenges 
MS co-financing: current EAFRD 
 
Sensitivity Analysis (around Health Check) 
1) RDP allocation: proportional to current EAFRD 
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Table 2.1 Weighting of additional compulsory modulation funds under the Health Check 
Scenario. 












01 - Human Capital Investment      
111 Vocational training and information actions       
112 Setting up of young farmers      
113 Early retirement       
114 Use of advisory services      
115 Setting up of management, relief and advisory services       
02 - Physical Capital Investment      
121 Modernisation of agricultural holdings 0.06 0.06 0.03  0.16 
122 Improvement of the economic value of forests       
123 Adding value to agricultural and forestry products  0.03   0.03 
124 Cooperation for development of new products      
125 Infrastructure related to the development...   0.03  0.03 
126 Restoring agricultural production potential       
03 - Improving Quality of Agricultural Production and 
Products 
     
131 Meeting standards based on Community legislation      
132 Participation of farmers in food quality schemes      
133 Information and promotion activities       
04 - EU-10 & EU-2 Transitional Measures      
141 Semi-subsistence farming       
142 Producer groups      
143 Direct Payment (BG + RO)      
05 - Sustainable Use of Agricultural Land      
211 Natural handicap payments to farmers in mountain areas      
212 Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps...      
213 Natura 2000 payments and payments...    0.03 0.03 
214 Agri-environment payments 0.13  0.06 0.09 0.28 
215 Animal welfare payments      
216 Non-productive investments   0.03 0.03 0.06 
06 - Sustainable Use of Forestry Land      
221 First afforestation of agricultural land 0.03  0.03  0.06 
222 First establishment of agro forestry systems on 
agricultural land 
     
223 First afforestation of non-agricultural land 0.03  0.03  0.06 
224 Natura 2000 payments    0.03 0.03 
225 Forest-environment payments    0.03 0.03 
226 Restoring forestry potential and introducing ... 0.03    0.03 
227 Non-productive investments      
07 - Diversification of the Rural Economy      
311 Diversification into non-agricultural activities  0.06   0.06 
312 Business creation and development   0.03   0.03 
313 Encouragement of tourism activities      
08 - Improving Quality of Life in Rural Areas      
321 Basic services for the economy and rural population   0.03    
322 Village renewal and development       
323 Conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage   0.03 0.03 0.06 
09 - Training and Animation      
331 Training and information       
341 Skills acquisition. animation and implementation of ...      
10 - LEADER      
411 Implementing local development strategies. 
Competitiveness 
     
412 Implementing local development strategies. 
Environment/land  
     
413 Implementing local development strategies. QoL      
421 Implementing cooperation projects       
431 Running the local action group, acquiring skills and ...      
11 - Miscellaneous Assistance      
511 Technical Assistance      
611 BG RO Direct Payments      
Grand Total 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.25 1.00 
NB: The numbers presented are rounded off to the second decimal, reflecting a weighting of 1/31 (0.032258), so 
row totals are not necessarily the same as the apparent sum of the individual cells. 
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2.2 Analytical Approach 
Two separate, but interlinked methodological approaches – the modelling approach 
and non-modelling approach – have been used. This is set out in Figure 2.1. Within 
these two approaches, a range of methodological and analytical tools are used, as 
follows: 
 
Non-modelling Approach  
• Case Studies carried out in eight Member States (Finland, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, United Kingdom), gathering 
information from national literature, assessments of the 2007-2013 RDPs and 
semi-structured interviews with key officials and stakeholders; 
• Questionnaires carried out by telephone interviews in the 19 Member States in 
which case studies were not conducted; 
• CMEF Indicators – collation of information on output, result and impact 
indicators for the case study Member States 
 
Modelling Approach: 
• Budget model, tailor made for the project, provides much of the financial 
detail that is specific to the study,  
• A suite of economic models (LEITAP, ESIM, CAPRI and FES) to assess the 
economic and sectoral impacts 
• Dyna-CLUE, a land-use model, allows the results from the economic models 
to be disaggregated spatially 
 
Some of these tools offer projections, others, such as the case studies, provide insights 
that are context-specific, whilst others provide information on impacts that can be 
compared across the EU-27. Individually they do not provide a comprehensive picture 
of the full range of impacts arising from different modulation scenarios. However, the 
methodology has been developed in such a way so that the data generated from these 
different approaches is complimentary and may be triangulated. This means that the 
results from different methodological tools can be cross-checked and validated. The 
integration of the two approaches is further described in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Schematic presentation of the methodology 
 
Questions from modellers are incorporated in the non-modelling and in return comes target points and 
information to create sound assumptions in the models. The results of the two tracks are then integrated in the 
analysis. 
2.2.1 Non-Modelling Approach  
It is not possible to accurately assess the impacts of particular measures independently 
of the context within which they operate and the specific way in which the measures 
are implemented (i.e. eligibility criteria, targeting etc). For this reason, it is not 
possible for the models to capture the full complexity of the actual situation, 
particularly in relation to the redistributive effects of compulsory modulation through 
Pillar 2. The non-modelling element of the study is, therefore, essential to understand 
and fully take account of the variety of responses to modulation across the EU-27 
Member States and to try and derive as full a picture as possible of what is happening 
on the ground, particularly in order to be able to evaluate the social and environmental 
impacts of the redistribution of money between farm types, regions and countries. The 
approach comprises both quantitative and qualitative tools as set out below. 
 
1. A Literature Review: this looks at existing literature on the implementation of 
modulation and its impacts as well as the social, economic and environmental impacts 
of rural development measures. This allows assumptions regarding the impact of 
specific measures to be formulated and these assumptions are then qualified for the 
specific national/regional context through the case study interviews. It should be 
noted, however, that the most recent official evaluations on Pillar 2 expenditure 
remain the mid-term evaluation reports of the 2000-2006 RDPs as the ex post 
evaluations are not due to be completed until December 2008. The availability of 
quantified data on the impacts of particular measures is variable, and generally 
limited, within these evaluations, and this means that evidence on the impacts of 
specific measures is limited. Where new measures have been introduced in a Member 
State for the 2007-2013 programming period, or the targeting of a particular measure 
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has changed, this makes the assessment more difficult and in these situations, where it 
has been possible to access these, information from the 2007-13 RDP ex ante 
evaluations and Strategic Environmental Assessments has been reviewed. 
 
2. A standardised telephone interview with non case study Member States: Because of 
the variations in policy response to modulation across Member States, particularly in 
relation to the design of their 2007-2013 Rural Development Programmes, and the 
importance of the link between the way in which EAFRD is implemented and impacts 
on the ground, it is important to obtain as full a picture as possible of the different 
policy responses across the EU-27. EU telephone interviews were, therefore, carried 
out with key officials responsible for the development of the current RDPs in 19 
Member States (other than the case study countries, for which the questionnaires are 
integrated in the case study protocol), to collect information on the way in which 
increased funds within the Pillar 2 budget have influenced the structure and design of 
Rural Development Programmes, particularly in terms of the way in which the 
additional funds have been distributed between the different Axes and measures. 
Specifically, some of this information will feed into the budget model to help achieve 
more accurate projections of how additional compulsory modulation funds might be 
distributed within Axis 2 under higher compulsory modulation rates. The information 
gathered also allows us to compare different Member States’ approaches to the use of 
compulsory modulation in a more qualitative way, and provides useful contextual 
information against which we can assess whether or not the case study information is 
representative of broader patterns of use, or very specific to a particular Member 
State.  
 
3. Case Studies: Eight case studies (Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and the UK) were undertaken to a much more in-depth 
analysis of the operation of compulsory modulation (and voluntary modulation in the 
cases of the UK and Portugal) to date, and the impacts that both the reductions in 
Pillar 1 payments and the increased availability of funds through Pillar 2 have had in 
relation to the full range of study themes. The case studies, through a detailed 
assessment of national literature, the Rural Development Programmes, and semi-
structured interviews, are the main source of information for understanding the 
impacts and added value of redistributing compulsory modulation through Pillar 2 
measures as these impacts are in large part dependent upon the way in which the 
EAFRD is implemented within a particular Member State, and as such are more 
difficult to model.  
 
As far as possible, the case studies attempt to collate empirical data that can be fed 
through into the models and the indicator analysis. However, one of the key values of 
the case studies is the contextual information that they provide to enable a 
commentary to be made on the outputs of the models and the indicator analysis that is 
based on the detailed situation for eight different Member States. Providing this 
contextualised commentary on the impact of compulsory modulation in relation to all 
the study themes, both within the context of the two modulation scenarios being 
considered and the outputs of the sensitivity analysis, will be the main way in which 
the case study information will be used.  
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Part of the Case studies was also to investigate the redistribution between farm types 
to determine who will gain and who will not gain. In Figure 2.2, framework for this 
assessment is presented. 
 
Figure 2.2 Analytical framework for assessing the redistributive effects of compulsory 
modulation between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 at the level of the beneficiary 
Unaffected 
• No P1 reduction 
• No P2 payment 
Outright winners 
• No P1 reduction 
• P2 Payment 
Losers 
• P1 reduction 
• (a) Ineligible for P2 
• (b) Less P2 than P1 
• (3) Already maximum 
Net winners 
• P1 reduction 




4. Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) indicator analysis. The 
CMEF indicators provide the main source of non-modelled quantitative information 
on the outcomes of the measures within Pillar 2. The collection of data on the input, 
output, result and impact indicators has been collected from the RDPs of the case 
study countries. While it had been hoped that it would be possible to compare data 
from all RDPS, this did not prove possible, within the timeframe of this study, as the 
way in which the indicators are reported within individual RDPs is very variable. The 
different types of CMEF indicators for which data is collected is set out in Table 2.2. 
 
The information given is prospective, rather than actual. The data needs to be treated 
with some caution as the figures are estimates against which success of the 
programmes will be measured, and may have been influenced to some degree by 
political considerations.  
 
In order to derive the impact of the use of modulation funds within the second pillar 
using the CMEF indicators, a series of calculations based on a number of assumptions 
are made. Firstly, the increase in the second pillar budget due to modulation funds is 
taken from the budget model for each Member State or region. Secondly, an 
assumption is made that each euro of input has the same output, and the total 
anticipated value of the CMEF output or result indicator attributed to modulation is 
therefore proportional to the contribution modulation makes to the RDP budget. 
Thirdly, in order to assess the magnitude of the anticipated output in the RDP, we 
express the total output and the supported units due to modulation as share of a 
benchmark value, for example, the number of supported farmers relative to the total 
number of farmers in the country, or number of supported hectares as a proportion of 
UAA. 
 
Assessing the contribution of modulation to the values given for the impact indicators 
is less straightforward. As the impact indicators are overarching, the direct relation 
between the individual measures and impact is impossible to determine – it is the 
combined effects of the results over all measures that leads to changes in the impact 
indicators. This complicates the quantification of the contribution of the modulation 
funds to the impact indicators and it cannot be calculated in the same way as with the 
output and result indicators. Therefore, we give a qualitative assessment of the 
contribution of modulation funds to the impacts of the RDP, based on the findings in 
the previous steps.  
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Table 2.2 Overview of indicators for assessing the impact of the Rural Development Programmes 
Indicator Description Level 
Input These refer to the budget or other resources allocated at each level of the 
assistance. 
Example: expenditure per measure declared to the Commission. 
Measure 
Output These measure activities directly realized within programmes. 
Example: number of training sessions organized, number of farms 
receiving investment support, total volume of investment. 
Measure 
Result These measure the direct and immediate effects of the intervention. They 
provide information on changes in, for example, the behaviour, capacity 
or performance of direct beneficiaries and are measured in physical or 
monetary terms. 
Example: gross number of jobs created, successful training outcomes. 
Axis 
Impact These refer to the benefits of the programme beyond the immediate 
effects on its direct beneficiaries both at the level of the intervention but 
also more generally in the programme area. They are linked to the wider 
objectives of the programme. They are normally expressed in “net” 
terms, which means subtracting effects that cannot be attributed to the 
intervention (e.g. double counting, deadweight), and taking into account 
indirect effects (displacement and multipliers). 
Example: increase in employment in rural areas, increased productivity 




Source: European Commission (2006), Handbook on Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework; EU Rural 
Development 2007-2013; Brussels, DG for Agriculture and Rural Development, Draft guidance document, 
Version 2. 
2.2.2 Modelling Approach 
The first tool in the Modelling Approach is the development of a budget model, which 
calculates the budgetary impacts of the modulation process by Member State, both in 
terms of the reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments, and the contribution of modulation 
to the EAFRD budget (Figure 2.3). 





DP farm income 
MS CM funds for Pillar 2 
CM funds collected from Pillar 1 
CM allocation to 
MS 
EC distribution key 
% MS co financing MS co-financing of P2 
Partial RD funds for MS Pillar 2 measures (RDP) 
EAFRD funds 
Modulation budget model 
National level 
Funds per measure RDP allocation 
€ out 




Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 32 
Figure 2.3 distinguishes between the operations (on the right-hand side) that 
determine the flow of money from the EAGF budget and monetary sources, and flows 
(from the top downwards) involved in the elaboration of the financial resources for 
the rural development measures in the second Pillar. It also highlights the fact that the 
calculations involved in generating the monetary flows from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 are 
variable, as they depend on the level of the franchise, the percentage of modulation 
applied to direct payments, the EC distribution key, the percentage of MS co-
financing, and the individual Member State allocation of resources between measures 
within their RDPs (on the left-hand side of Figure 2.3).  
 
Once the budgetary effects of modulation have been established by the budget model, 
a range of economic models and a land use model are used to assess the economic and 
environmental impacts of modulation under the different scenarios. FES (a Financial 
Economic Simulation farm economic structure model), provides information on farm 
viability and farm structures, LEITAP provides information on competitiveness, value 
added and employment; ESIM gives projections of agricultural commodity markets; 
CAPRI is able to assess indicators on regional competition, regional environment and 
regional farm income; and Dyna-CLUE disaggregates this information spatially to 
help assess changes in land use and their potential environmental impact. The general 
structure of the Modelling Approach is given in Figure 2.4. 

























FSS to regional 
level
Models are shown with their output contributions in this study. Rounded field indicate national levels and squared 
fields regional levels. The budget model provides basic information to all models and to the case-studies. Case 
studies together with literature provide the basis for the assumptions regarding the parameters human and 
physical capital that are used in the models. 
Figure 2.4 demonstrates that the modelling approach is integrally associated not only 
with the budget model, but also with the case studies, and the modelling approach also 
draws on the literature review in order to investigate the exogenous parameters and 
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multiplier coefficients that are used in the modelling approach. Where such 
information is not available, assumptions with regard to parameters and multipliers 
have to be made by the modellers, on the basis of the best available expert knowledge. 
In order to model the economic and environmental impacts of modulation, it is 
necessary to find a means of linking agricultural commodity parameters with regional 
/ territorial aspects. The global economy-wide dimension is covered by the economic 
model, LEITAP. ESIM provides more agricultural detail for the EU-25 countries, 
CAPRI distributes this impact to the regional (NUTS2) level, and FES to the farm 
level. Dyna-CLUE provides a detailed analysis of land cover change, thereby giving a 
spatial representation of the economic modelling outcomes. 
 
In order to work coherently with agricultural commodity data, a common scheme for 
organising farm types (Table 2.3) and farm sizes is necessary. For this, the standard 
FADN classifications are used for the farm types (‘TF8’), and seven categories are 
used farm size (in terms of ESU14); these categories are 0-4 ESU, 4-8 ESU, 8-16 ESU, 
16-40 ESU, 40-100 ESU, 100-250 ESU and over 250 ESU. 
Table 2.3 Agricultural specialisation on the basis of the codes for the types of farming (TF) in the 
Community typology (Reg. 85/377/EEC), using 8 standard classes.  
Description of TF8 Grouping of TF on the basis of principal types of farming 
Field Crops 13 specialist cereals, oilseeds and protein crops 
14 general field cropping 
60 mixed cropping 
Horticulture 20 specialist horticulture 
Wine 31 specialist vineyards 
Permanent crops 32 specialist fruit and citrus fruit 
33 specialist olives 
34 various permanent crops combined 
Milk 41 specialist dairying 
Grazing livestock 42 specialist cattle – rearing and fattening 
43 specialist cattle – dairying, rearing and fattening combined 
44 sheep, goats and other grazing livestock 
Pigs/poultry 50 specialist granivores 
Mixed 71 Mixed livestock, mainly grazing livestock 
72 Mixed livestock, mainly granivores 
81 Field crops – grazing livestock combined 
82 Various crops and livestock combined 
 
An additional classification scheme is also used in this study, in order to group the 
rural development measures found in the EAFRD into groups of measures that behave 
similarly in terms of the economic mechanisms underlying the intervention logics for 
these measures. These groupings are set out in Table 2.5. 
2.2.3 Analysis of modulation within the modelling framework 
Modelling modulation has been made through a set of linked models. Linking models 
is an intricate task and that work is further described in Annex 1. The modelling was 
carried out in two steps: first Pillar 1 was reduced and second the money was 
introduced in the Pillar 2. The first step is usually quite straightforward (see Table 
                                                 
14
 ESU: The economic size of farms is expressed in terms of European Size Units (ESU). The value of 
one ESU is defined as a fixed number of EUR/ECU of Farm Gross Margin. Over time the number of 
EUR/ECU per ESU has changed to reflect inflation. The current situation is available at the web site 
indicated in the footnote, which also gives the current definition of “commercial farms” in terms of 
ESU (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/methodology1_en.cfm). 
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2.4), with the main challenge being the modelling of decoupled payments (see Annex 
1. The second step is more complicated since modelling the second pillar has never 
been done before; also this is further described in Annex 1. Introductory comments 
regarding the treatment of Rural Development measures are provided below. One 
important aspect of agriculture is its contribution to public goods. The models used in 
this study are not suited for analysing this aspect and the current literature in the field 
also do not allow for any consistent implementation in modelling policy interventions. 
An overview is given in Annex 2. 
Table 2.4 Treatment of Direct Payments (Pillar 1) in models 
Treated in  
Model 
Implementation of direct payments 
LEITAP 
 
Farm payments are implemented as primary factor payments in the various 
agricultural sectors. Coupled payments are directly coupled to sectors. Decoupled 
payments are implemented as an equal payment rate to land in all eligible sectors and 
therefore do not provide an incentive to switch between eligible sectors and between 
production factors used within the eligible sectors.  
FES 
 
Farm payments are directly calculated and implemented at farm level. 
CAPRI Analyses the effects of changes in farm payments at the regional farm and sector 
level. CAPRI distinguishes between a large number of types of premiums. 
Decoupled premiums as, for example, milk and sugar premiums are distributed over 
the eligible crops of the regional farm. Coupled premiums are linked to agricultural 
activities at the regional level. 
 
Following the elaboration of the economic mechanisms underlying the intervention 
logics for the rural development measures as developed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3, the 
economic models and the land use model employed in this study are able to perform a 
series of analyses in order to provide insight on the thematic issues in this study. 
These analyses can not reasonably be performed separately for each of the 46 rural 
development measures, and are thus grouped according to fundamental similarities in 
the economic mechanisms and how these are handled by each of the models. As an 
elaboration of this principle, Table 2.5 presents the groupings of rural development 
measures, the models that are used for their analysis, and what the relationship is 
between the models. Further elaboration of the information obtained for each of the 
groupings is presented in respective sub-sections in the text that follows (for a more 
elaborate description of the implementation of the various measures in the model see, 
Annex 1). 
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Table 2.5 Treatment of Rural Development measures* in quantitative models 
 
Treated in  
Model 
How implemented (information needed from other 
models/case studies) 
LEITAP 
Payments influencing the total factor productivity in 
agriculture. 
Rate of return on investment is 40% (Evenson, 2001) 
Deadweight loss is assumed to be zero (sensitivity analyses is 
done with 25% deadweight loss) 
CAPRI Via link with LEITAP 
01 – Human Capital 
Investment 
[111-115, 131-133] 
FES Payments on investment at farm level 
LEITAP 
Payments which influence the total factor productivity due to 
capital investments in all agricultural sectors. 
Rate of return on investment is 30% (Wolff (1996) and 
Gittleman, ten Raab and Wolff (2006)) 
 Deadweight loss is assumed to be zero (sensitivity analyses 
is done with 25% deadweight loss) 
CAPRI Via link with LEITAP 
02 – Physical Capital 
Investment 
[121-126] 
FES Payments on investment at farm level 
LEITAP Income payment linked to land in agricultural sector. FADN data are used to distribute payments across sectors. 
CAPRI Regional direct support. Distribution over sectors and regions based on FADN data and CLUE results. 
FES Farms receive LFA or mountain area support when they are in these areas (income support) 





LFA support adds to the relative preference for the location 
for arable land or grassland (only for current agricultural land 
within LFA regions) 
LEITAP Income support linked to land in agricultural sector. FADN data are used to distribute payments across sectors. 
CAPRI 
Regional direct support. Distribution over sectors and regions 
based on FADN data and CLUE results. Conditional on 
extensive technology being used. 04 – Natura 2000 [213] 
Dyna-
CLUE 
Agricultural land in Natura 2000 areas receives a higher 
relative preference (as compared to no support) for 
agriculture (only for current HNV agricultural land within 
LFA regions) 
LEITAP 
On the one hand, income support linked to land in 
agricultural sector and on the other hand a yield and labour 
productivity loss. FADN data are used to distribute payments 
across sectors. 
CAPRI 
Regional direct support. Distribution over sectors and regions 
based on FADN data. 50% of the support directed towards 
TF8 farm types 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 is conditional on extensive 
technology being used, for remaining amounts extensive as 
well as intensive technology is eligible. 
05 – Agri-Environment 
measures 
[214-216] 
FES Payment linked to land 
LEITAP 
Investment support for non-agricultural activities that 
increase productivity. 
Rate of return on investment is 30%. Deadweight loss is 
assumed to be zero (sensitivity analyses is done with 25% 
deadweight loss) 
CAPRI Via link with LEITAP 
06 – Forestry 
[221-227] 
07 – Diversification 
[311-313] 
08 – General rural 
development 
[321-323, 331, 341] 
09 – LEADER 
[411-413, 421, 431] 




For forestry: conversion of arable land to forestry or 
grassland in erosion sensitive areas is stimulated by lowering 
the relative preference of current arable land in erosion 
sensitive areas. 
* The RD measure numbers are indicated between square brackets [#]. 
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2.3 Issues regarding the methodology 
As a result of the issues discussed above, it would seem that the main methodological 
issues continue to centre around the accuracy with which it is possible to assess the 
impacts of compulsory modulation as a result of the additional funds in Pillar 2.  
 
General conclusions about the analysis of the impacts of a reduction of Pillar 1 direct 
payments are feasible across EU-27. However, generalised assessment of impacts 
across Member States in relation to the impact of additional funds being available 
through Pillar 2 is far more problematic as so many of the impacts are dependent on 
the way in which Member States have chosen to use the CM funds, the structure of 
the RDP more generally, and how they have designed and implemented the specific 
measures. Problems with the quantification of indicators at the national level and the 
lack of detailed information to feed into the economic models in relation to Pillar 2 
regional (NUTS2) impacts, means that there is a need for additional reliance upon the 
qualitative approach for the analysis of this aspect of the study.  
 
Another consideration is that the impacts of modulation are conditioned by global 
trends that are driving the evolution of the agricultural economy. In contrast to these 
macro-trends, the direction and the degree of the inflection caused by modulation – 
that is the focus for the analysis within this study – are not straightforward to 
distinguish. 
 
A last consideration is that because of the short time span between the implementation 
of the current system of compulsory (and voluntary) modulation and the present time, 
there is relatively little data available with which to inform an ex post study of the 
impacts of modulation. This therefore requires an ex ante approach, with which the 
little evidence that has been collected can be contrasted. The ex ante approach relies 
heavily on the consistent data handling and data generation structure that models can 
give to what has become, in fact, a scenario based examination of the possible effects 
of modulation. For this reason, the importance of the modelling exercise, including 
the critical assumptions behind this work, requires a comprehensive explanation in 
order for the output to be credible, as this is an entirely novel manner by which to 
investigate the effects of modulation.  
Issues of data collection in relation to the case studies 
Modulation and the rules surrounding its implementation was the subject of quite 
some debate at the time when the case studies were undertaken, in the run up to the 
publication of the Commission’s Health Check legislative proposals on May 20th. 
While the case study experts sought to separate these policy considerations from the 
actual empirical effects of reducing Pillar 1 payments and increasing available 
funding in Pillar 2, it is apparent from the case study reports that the on-going policy 
debate has affected the data collection to some extent, particularly in relation to the 
prospective element of the study. This is either because Member States were not 
prepared to divulge what they think the potential impacts of increased rates of 
compulsory modulation might be before they made official statements on their 
position, or because insufficient thought had as yet been given to what the 
implications of an increase in funding for Pillar 2 might be. This means that the 
prospective dimension of the case study reports has not been as elucidating as it might 
otherwise have been.  
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One of the aims of the case studies was to collect detailed empirical data to feed into 
the economic models. This has proved problematic, as the level of detail required in 
relation to the key variables for a particular measure were not readily available within 
the majority of Member States. This means that assumptions for the models have had 
to be made on an aggregate scale based on expert judgement and the meagre 
information available through the literature. 
 
In addition, each case study expert was asked to provide information on the impact of 
compulsory modulation on a range of indicators under each study theme, indicating 
the direction of change of each indicator. Some case study experts found it difficult to 
assess these indicators and we therefore have some gaps in relation to indicator 
information for Germany, Portugal and Poland, and the Netherlands. 
Limitations of information on quantified impacts of RDPs 
In addition, the fact that the 2007-13 RDPs have only recently been approved means 
that it is difficult to assess the impacts of modulation on these programmes, beyond 
making assumptions based on the implementation and evaluation of similar measures 
in the previous programming period and/or assessing the predicted effects of these 
measures using the CMEF indicators. It should be noted, however, that the most 
recent official evaluations on Pillar 2 expenditure remain the mid-term evaluation 
reports of the 2000-2006 RDPs as the ex post evaluations are not due to be completed 
until December 2008. The availability of quantified data on the impacts of particular 
measures is variable, and generally limited, within these evaluations, and this means 
that – unless additional, specific evaluations have been undertaken on particular 
measures within Member States – the evidence on the impacts of specific measures is 
limited. Where new measures have been introduced in a Member State for the 2007-
2013 programming period, or the targeting of a particular measure has changed, this 
makes the assessment more complex/problematic and in these situations the ex ante 
evaluations, the Strategic Environmental Assessments and the CMEF indicators are 
more heavily relied upon, together with the expert judgement derived from interviews 
with case study respondents. In light of this, the case studies have only been able to 
provide limited information on quantifying the additional impacts of compulsory 
modulation on RDP measures, and they have had to rely instead on more qualitative 
judgements. 
 
The lack of readily available data on the distribution of Pillar 2 measures by farm type 
or size in many Member States makes any detailed analysis of the financial winners 
and losers from compulsory modulation difficult. An attempt was made to do this in 
some details in France and England, but in other Member States only the use of expert 
judgement was possible.  
Monetisation of Public Goods  
Although monetisation of public goods is not possible with the tools available for this 
study, it is the object of research and should enhance the appreciation of public goods 
as an objective of public policy, and as having economic as well as environmental 
value in the pursuit of regional development objectives. 
Specific issue relating to the UK 
In the UK in particular, it is difficult to disentangle the impacts of compulsory 
modulation from the impacts of voluntary modulation, beyond a consideration of their 
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relative weight in financial terms, particularly as modulation in one form or another 
has been in operation since 2000. However, there are also benefits associated with this 
situation, as the use of voluntary modulation is accompanied by clear reporting 
requirements, which require Member States to set out what the funds are to be used 
for and to assess the impacts of the use of additional Pillar 2 funds. For this reason, 
alongside the fact that this policy mechanism has been in use for seven years, more 
analysis has been undertaken in the UK on the impacts of modulation that in any other 
Member State. 
 
One of the key issues relating to the use of indicators within the study is the accuracy 
with which we can attribute values to the indicators in different years and under 
different scenarios and the implications that this then has for any analysis based on 
these figures.  
 
The main source of published data is in relation to the Baseline Scenario. These data 
comprises the values attributed by Member States to the output, result and impact 
indicators as part of the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF), 
although they will not provide information on all indicators proposed. These data, by 
their very nature, are projections, rather than actual values, and given the fact that 
they will be used as a means of evaluating the RDPs, are likely to have been 
developed with this in mind. As such, they are likely to have some margin of error 
associated with them, and should probably be treated as a slight underestimate of the 
likely actual situation in 2013.  
 
The other indicator values, however – for the counterfactual situation and for the 
Health Check Scenario – have to be derived, either through models or expert 
judgement from the indicator values established for the Baseline Scenario. This adds 
an additional margin of error to these calculations and will limit the accuracy with 
which any impacts of compulsory modulation can be assessed. The process was made 
transparent in order to make sure that the results highlight the margin of error 
associated with them and hence the degree of accuracy of any subsequent analysis.  
 
In relation to the impacts of the modulated funds through Pillar 2, for many Member 
States it is difficult to disaggregate the impact of the modulated funds from the impact 
of the measures more generally, beyond making broad judgements in relation to the 
proportion of modulated funds allocated to a particular measure. In some cases, it is 
possible to see what would or would not have happened in the absence of the 
modulated funds, but this has not been possible in all cases.  
 
In addition, the fact that the 2007-13 RDPs have only recently been approved means 
that it is difficult to assess the impacts of modulation on these programmes, beyond 
making assumptions based on the implementation and evaluation of similar measures 
in the previous programming period.  
 
The lack of availability of data on the distribution of Pillar 2 measures by farm type or 
size makes any detailed analysis of the financial winners and losers from compulsory 
modulation difficult. An was made to do this in some detail in France and England 
through the case studies, but in other Member States only the use of expert judgement 
was possible.  
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Box 2.2 Overview and limitations to the modelling methodology 
1. Empirical information about the impact of modulation and especially the impact of second 
pillar measures is very scarce. Therefore, ex post information hardly exists. 
2. Public goods are not included in the modelling, although they are an important part of the 
second pillar.  
3. Environmental impacts are difficult to generalize as the impacts vary locally. 
4. Pillar 2 is a complex measures with different impacts, depending on how they are 
implemented. Therefore, only a stylized approach for each measure can be implemented, 
and the approach taken includes grouping the measures. This approach is summarized in 
Table 2.14, which also serves as an overview of the use of the modelling within the 
methodology. 
5. Lack of empirical information about deadweight. 
6. Transaction costs have not been addressed 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 40 
3 ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION AND BUDGET EFFECTS 
3.1 Issues  
In this chapter, the redistribution effects of modulation are examined in relation to 
both the reductions of direct payments in the first pillar and the redistribution of the 
modulation funds to rural development measures in the second pillar. In particular, the 
chapter focuses on the extent to which the redistribution of funds through modulation 
changes the distribution of support between Member States and affects national 
budgets due to the co-financing requirements of Pillar 2 budgets.  
 
The nature of the redistribution of support that is brought about by modulation is 
fundamental to the analysis of all subsequent study themes. To enable a detailed 
understanding of these redistribution effects, the Budget Model has been developed, 
which consists of budget data relating to Direct Payments (DP) and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 2007-2013 for the EU-27 
accompanied by a set of calculation rules for the transfer of funds between the two 
funds. By using the Budget Model, detailed breakdowns of budgets and changes in 
the budget due to modulation in the Baseline and the Health Check Scenario can be 
presented. Specifically, the Budget Model can provide information on: 
• the re-distribution of support between Member States; and 
• the effect of modulation on national budgets due to the requirement of co-
financing. 
 
In conjunction with information derived from the FES model, the case study reports, 
and the telephone questionnaires, the Budget Model can also help to answer questions 
on the: 
• re-distribution of support between farms; 
• re-distribution of support between regions; 
• co-financing capacities of Member States.  
Plan of this chapter 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 a summary of the chapter is 
given. In Section 3.3 the initial situation of the Direct Payments (DP) and EAFRD 
budget for the period 2007-2013 is discussed. In Section 3.4 the focus is on changes 
in the DP and EAFRD budget due to compulsory modulation in the Baseline 
Scenario, followed by a sensitivity analysis of the Baseline Scenario in Section 3.5. 
Then, in Section 3.6 changes in the DP and EAFRD budget due to modulation in the 
Health Check Scenario are presented, followed by a sensitivity analysis of the Health 
Check Scenario in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Summary 
In the Baseline Scenario, compulsory modulation (CM) of 5% in the period 2007-
2013 results in a reduction of 8.2 billion euro of the Direct Payments (DP) budget for 
the EU-15 as a whole (Table 3.1). For the individual EU-15 Member States, this 
implies a reduction of the overall DP budget of between 1-4%. The addition of the 
modulation funds to the EAFRD budget for the EU-15 increases this budget by nearly 
20%. However, the increase in the EAFRD budget varies significantly between 
individual EU-15 Member States, mainly depending on the relative shares of DP and 
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EAFRD in the total budget, which is in turn affected by the allocation criteria15 
determining the proportion of the total EU core EAFRD budget received by individual 
Member States. As a result, countries where EAFRD constitutes a relatively small 
proportion of the total budget, like Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, face an 
increase in their EAFRD budget of 56-94%, whereas countries where the EAFRD 
constitutes a high share of the total budget, like Austria and Finland, show only an 
increase of about 6%. In addition, as a result of the ‘return key’, some countries lose 
from the redistribution of modulation funds: these Member States are mainly located 
in North Western Europe, Finland being the exception. Countries that benefit from the 
redistribution are located in S. Europe. It is important to note that the addition of 8.2 
billion euro of modulation funds to the EAFRD budget also results in an increase of 
7.2 billion euro of national co-financing as well as 7.2 billion euro of private funding. 
This means that, overall, the total budget available for P2 in the EU-15 increases by 
14%. 
Table 3.1 DP, EAFRD and P2 budget in the Baseline and Health Check Scenario in the EU-15, 
2007-2013 
 Baseline scenario Health Check 
scenario 
Health Check Scenario relative 
to Baseline Scenario 
 billion 
euro 
% billion euro billion euro % 
DP budget before 
modulation 254.4  254.4   
modulation P1 8.2  13.3 5.1 63 
DP budget 246.2  241.1 -5.1 -2 
decrease DP budget due 
to modulation 
 3    
EAFRD budget before 
modulation 42.8  42.8   
modulation available for 
P2 8.2  13.3 5.1 63 
EAFRD budget  50.9  56.1 5.1 10 
increase EAFRD budget 
due to modulation  19    
P2 budget 166.5  179.8 13.3 8 
Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
In the Health Check Scenario, modulation in the period 2009-2012 results in an 
additional reduction of 5.1 billion euro of the DP budget for the EU-15 as a whole 
(Table 3.1). As a consequence, the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 for the EU-15 
increases by 5.1 billion euro relative to the Baseline Scenario (+10%). If Voluntary 
Modulation (VM) funds in the UK and Portugal are deducted, the net increase of the 
EAFRD budget 2007-2013 amounts to 4.4 billion euro. As in the Baseline Scenario, 
the increase in the EAFRD budget for the individual EU-15 Member States largely 
varies, mainly depending on the shares of DP and EAFRD in the total budget. The 
addition of an additional 4.4 billion euro of modulation funds in the Health Check 
Scenario to the EAFRD budget results in an increase of 3.7 billion euro of national 
co-financing and 5.2 billion euro of private funding. On the whole, the total budget 
available for P2 in the EU-15 increases by 8%. 
                                                 
15
 Article 69 of Council Regulation 1698/2005 sets out the allocation criteria for the EAFRD budget 
between Member States, which consider: past performance (allocations under the 2000-2006 
programming period), amounts reserved for Convergence regions; and additional amounts relating to 
specific situations and needs based on objective criteria (not defined). 
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3.3 Initial situation DP and EAFRD budget 2007-2013 
The total EU budget for direct payments (DP) of the first pillar and the EAFRD 
budget for the second pillar of the CAP in the EU-27 for the period 2007-2013 
amounts to 375 billion euro (Table 3.2). From this total budget, three quarters (286 
billion euro) are allocated to DP and one quarter (88 billion euro) for EAFRD. Quite a 
large difference in the share of DP and the EAFRD in the total budget can be 
observed between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States; In the EU-15 less than one fifth 
of the total budget is allocated to the second pillar, in the NMS12 the second pillar 
budget amounts to almost 50%. Individual Member States, however, deviate quite 
significantly from this average picture. Within the EU-15 Member States, the share of 
the EAFRD budget of the second pillar in the total budget is about 6-10% in 
Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and France; it is about one quarter in 
Italy, Sweden and Luxembourg, one third in Finland and nearly 50% in Austria and 
Portugal. Within the NMS12 Member States, the share of EAFRD in the total budget 
varies from 37% in Hungary to 79% in Malta. This share of EAFRD within the total 
budget is in fact the main indicator of the magnitude of the impact of modulation on 
Pillar 2. 
 
In the case study report of Germany reference is made to a substitution effect of 
funds. The national public budget for the RDPs of the Länder in the period 2007-2013 
is considerably lower than the budget available for the period 2000-2006. This cut in 
the national public budget has partly been compensated by CM funds.  
3.4 Baseline Scenario 
3.4.1 Changes in the DP budget 2007-2013 as a result of compulsory modulation 
Under current legislation, compulsory modulation amounts to 5% of the DP in the 
years 2007-2013, with a franchise of 5000 euro per farm. In this period, compulsory 
modulation is only applied in the EU-15 Member States. As a result of the phasing in 
of the direct payments in the NMS12, the EU-10 Member States are only subject to 
compulsory modulation at the end of the period 2007-2013, and BG and RO only as 
of 2016 at earliest. Therefore, in our analysis of the redistribution effects of 
modulation we only focus on the EU-15. 
 
In the DP budget 2007-2013, funds raised due to compulsory modulation (CM) have 
already been deducted. The total decrease in the DP budget due to compulsory 
modulation amounts to nearly 8.2 billion euro in the EU-15 in the period 2007-2013 
(Table 3.3). Although the absolute reduction of the DP in the individual Member 
States varies from 10 million euro in Luxembourg to 2.3 billion euro in France, the 
relative reduction of the DP is rather small and quite similar in the EU-15 Member 
States: it ranges from 1% in Greece to 4% in Denmark, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the UK. If, however, VM in the UK and Portugal is taken into 
account, the effect is significantly larger. For example in the period 2007-2013 VM 
funds amount to about 2.5 billion euro in the UK, which reduces the DP budget by a 
further 10% , while VM rates in Portugal in 2008-2012 raise a further 205 million 
euro, equivalent to an additional 5% of the Portuguese DP budget. 
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Table 3.2 Share of the budget for Direct Payments (DP) of the first pillar and the EAFRD budget 


























Denmark 7646 7201 94 445 6 
United Kingdom 2) 29737 27827 94 1910 6 
Netherlands 6433 5946 92 487 8 
Belgium 4681 4262 91 419 9 
France 64865 58423 90 6442 10 
Germany 48340 40307 83 8033 17 
Spain 39768 32680 82 7088 18 
Ireland 11723 9383 80 2340 20 
Greece 18187 14480 80 3707 20 
Italy 35224 26973 77 8251 23 
Sweden 7157 5331 74 1826 26 
Luxembourg 349 259 74 90 26 
Finland 6038 3958 66 2080 34 
Austria 9116 5205 57 3911 43 
Portugal 3) 7925 4007 51 3918 49 
EU-15 297188 246242 83 50946 17 
      
Hungary 10298 6493 63 3806 37 
Czech Republic 7316 4500 62 2816 38 
Cyprus 379 217 57 163 43 
Poland 28269 15039 53 13230 47 
Lithuania 3611 1868 52 1743 48 
Slovak Republic 3892 1923 49 1969 51 
Bulgaria 5098 2489 49 2609 51 
Slovenia 1612 712 44 900 56 
Latvia 1767 725 41 1041 59 
Estonia 1209 494 41 715 59 
Romania 13524 5502 41 8023 59 
Malta 97 20 21 77 79 
EU-12 77072 39982 52 37092 48 
EU-27 374260 286224 76 88038 24 
1)The total budget for DP is less than the total budget for the first pillar as it excludes expenditure for export 
subsidies and market interventions.2)The EAFRD budget for the UK is exclusive VM funds. These funds amount to 
2532 mio euro in the period 2007-2013.3). We do not know yet whether the EAFRD budget given here for 
Portugal includes VM.  
Source: Budget DP from Council Regulation 1782/2003 (consolidated version - August 5, 2006) and Agra Europe 
(2007), ‘Threat of DP cuts rises as NMS accede’, Agra Europe Weekly, January 12; Budget second pillar from EC 
(2007), EU support for rural development 2007-2013; Pre-allocated funding under Heading 2 ‘Natural 
Resources‘ of the Financial Framework, Brussels: European Commission; adaptation LEI. 
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Table 3.3 Changes in the DP and EAFRD budget due to compulsory modulation in the EU-15, 2007-2013 












(million euro)  
Decrease budget 




























France 64865 2275 60698 4 4622 1820 39 -455 -0.7 
United 
Kingdom 29737 1156 28983 4 985 925 94 -231 -0.8 
Germany 48340 1478 41785 4 6703 1330 20 -148 -0.3 
Ireland 11723 283 9666 3 2114 226 11 -57 -0.5 
Denmark 7646 265 7466 4 233 212 91 -53 -0.7 
Netherlands 6433 204 6150 3 312 175 56 -30 -0.5 
Belgium 4681 132 4394 3 313 105 34 -26 -0.6 
Sweden 7157 181 5512 3 1669 156 9 -25 -0.3 
Luxem-
bourg 349 10 269 4 82 8 10 -2 -0.6 
Finland 6038 100 4058 2 1959 121 6 21 0.3 
Italy 35224 705 27678 3 7411 840 11 135 0.4 
Greece 18187 207 14687 1 3350 358 11 151 0.8 
Austria 9116 103 5308 2 3650 262 7 159 1.7 
Portugal 7925 83 4090 2 3610 308 9 225 2.8 
Spain 39768 981 33661 3 5772 1316 23 335 0.8 
EU-15 297188 8161 254403 3 42785 8161 19 0 0.0 
Source: Budget DP from Council Regulation 1782/2003 (consolidated version - August 5, 2006) and Agra Europe (2007), ‘Threat of SFP cuts rises as NMS accede’, Agra Europe Weekly, 
January 12; Modulation from Agra Informa Ltd (2007), CAP Monitor 23.02.2007; Budget second pillar from EC (2007), EU support for rural development 2007-2013; Pre-allocated funding 
under Heading 2 ‘Natural Resources‘ of the Financial Framework, Brussels: European Commission; Modulation and % return from Agra Informa Ltd (2007), CAP Monitor 23.02.2007; 
adaption LEI. 
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Table 3.4 5% compulsory modulation and increase EAFRD budget second pillar in the EU-15 Member States, 2007-2013  
 Modulation DP 
p.a. 
(million euro) 
















(million euro)  
 As % of 
national budget 















United Kingdom 1) 165 80 132 925 1910 6 985 94 
Denmark 38 80 30 212 445 6 233 91 
Netherlands 29 86 25 175 487 8 312 56 
France 325 80 260 1820 6442 10 4622 39 
Belgium 19 80 15 105 419 9 313 34 
Spain 140 134 188 1316 7088 18 5772 23 
Germany 211 90 190 1330 8033 17 6703 20 
Italy 101 119 120 840 8251 24 7411 11 
Ireland 40 80 32 226 2340 20 2114 11 
Greece 30 173 51 358 3707 20 3350 11 
Luxembourg 1 80 1 8 90 26 82 10 
Sweden 26 86 22 156 1826 26 1669 9 
Portugal 12 372 44 308 3918 50 3610 9 
Austria 15 255 37 262 3911 43 3650 7 
Finland 14 121 17 121 2080 34 1959 6 
EU-15 1166  1166 8161 50946  42785 19 
1) The EAFRD budget for the UK is exclusive of voluntary modulation (VM) funds. These funds amount to 2532 mio euro in the period 2007-2013. 
Source: Budget second pillar from EC (2007), EU support for rural development 2007-2013; Pre-allocated funding under Heading 2 ‘Natural Resources’ of the Financial Framework, 
Brussels: European Commission; Modulation and % return from Agra Informa Ltd (2007), CAP Monitor 23.02.2007; adaptation LEI. 
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3.4.2 Changes in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 as a result of compulsory 
modulation 
Each Member State receives at least 80% of the modulation funds they generate (90% 
for Germany). The distribution of the remaining modulation funds is calculated by 
using a ‘return key’ depending on agricultural area, agricultural employment and 
GDP/capita. On the whole, Member States in North-West Europe (Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK) have a return key of 80-90%, so they do not get back all the modulation funds 
deducted from the first pillar (Table 3.4). The southern Member States, as well as 
Austria and Finland have a return key of more than 100%. Portugal (375%) and 
Austria (253%) benefit from the highest return keys. CM funds were automatically 
added to the EAFRD budget 2007-2013. Due to these funds, the EAFRD budget for 
the EU-15 for the period 2007-2013 increased by nearly one fifth from 43 billion euro 
to the current 51 billion euro. However, the increases in the budgets for individual 
Member States varies considerably, mainly depending on the return key and the initial 
distribution of the budget over the DP and EAFRD. As a result of this, Member States 
with a relatively small share of the EAFRD in the total budget tend to experience the 
highest increases, whereas Member States with a relatively high share of EAFRD in 
the budget tend to have a more moderate increase. The UK, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, France and Belgium, which have a share of 6-10% of EAFRD in the 
total budget, therefore, face an increase in the EAFRD budget of 34-94%. Spain and 
Germany, with a share of about 18% of EAFRD in the total budget, have about the 
same increase as the EU-15 average. All other Member States, with a share of one 
fifth or more of EAFRD in the total budget, show an increase of 11% or less in the 
EAFRD budget due to compulsory modulation.  
 
For the UK, the addition of 2.5 billion euro of VM funds to the EAFRD budget 2007-
2013 results in an increase of the core EAFRD budget (excluding compulsory 
modulation funds – 1 billion euro – of 250%, which is considerably above the 94% 
increase due to CM funds). 
3.4.3  ‘Winners’ and ‘losers’ due to compulsory modulation  
The level of the return key determines whether a Member States gains or loses from 
compulsory modulation: a key above 100% implies that a Member States receives 
more funds for the EAFRD budget than its modulated funds from the DP, whereas the 
opposite applies for a return key below 100%. France (455 million euro), the UK (231 
million euro) and Germany (148 million euro) suffer from the largest losses; Italy 
(135 million euro), Greece (151 million euro), Austria (159 million euro), Portugal 
(225 million euro) and Spain (335 million euro) benefit most from modulation (Table 
3.3). Nevertheless, the redistribution of the modulated funds of the DP hardly affects 
Member States’ total budget for DP and EAFRD for the period 2007-2013: increases 
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Calculation of the increase in the second pillar budget due to modulation funds 
The total budget of the second pillar consists of five components (Figure3.1): 
(1)  a contribution of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); 
(2) modulation funds; 
(3)  national co-financing from national public funds; 
(4)  national top-up; 
(5)  private funds. 
The total public budget consists of the first four components. EU-co-financing rates vary per axis from 
the second pillar and per convergence status (Table 3.5).  
 
Modulation funds have to be co-financed by national public funds from the Member States. In addition, 
modulation funds generate also private funds, as for some rural development measures a maximum 
share of subsidies is used. As co-financing rates and the maximum shares of subsidies may vary per 
rural development measure, a calculation of the generation of national public funds and private funds 
due to modulation is made per measure (Table 3.6). It could be said that the higher the national co-
financing rate, the higher the increase in the public budget for the second pillar due to modulation. 
Moreover, the higher the share of the private funds in the total budget, the higher the increase in the 
total budget for the second pillar due to modulation. 
 
Assumptions on the distribution of the CM funds over rural development measures are specified in 
Table 3.7. 




Table 3.5 Maximum EU co-financing rates of the second pillar, 2007-2013 (%) 










Wider rural development 
75 50 
LEADER Axis 80 55 
Source: European Commission (2006), The EU Rural Development Policy 2007-2013; Brussels, DG for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Fact Sheet. 
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Table 3.6 Example of the calculation of the increase in the total budget for the second pillar due 
to compulsory modulation per measure 
 Formula Increase in 
euro 
Increase in EARDF budget due 
to compulsory modulation 
1 euro CM 1 
Increase in national public 
budget 
(co-financing rate national Member State1) / co-
financing rate EU) * 1 euro CM 
1 
Increase in total public budget 
second pillar 
(100 / co-financing rate EU) * 1 euro CM 2 
Increase in private budget (PR/PU2)) * (100 / co-financing rate EU) * 1 euro 
CM 
0.66 
Increase in total budget per 
measure 
(1 + PR/PU) * (100 / co-financing rate EU) * 1 
euro CM 
2.66 
1) In this example the co-financing rate EU Member State is 50%; 2) the ratio of private and public expenditure 
PR/PU in this example is 1/3. 
Table 3.7 Assumptions for the distribution of modulation funds over the EAFRD budget 






funds raised under the 
Health Check Scenario 
Additional modulation 
funds raised under the 
Health Check Scenario 
Voluntary modulation 
Finland and England 
(UK): 
All funds are spent on 
measure 214 
All countries: targeted at 
New Challenges: 
Measures 123, 125, 213, 
224, 225, 226, 312, 322: 
each 3%;  
Measures: 216, 221, 223, 
311, 323: each 6%; 
Measure 121: 16%; 
Measure 214: 28% 
Finland and England 
(UK): 
All funds are spent on 
measure 214 
Portugal: 
50% is spent on Axis 1 (70% 
on measures 111, 121 and 
123; 30% on measure 125);  
50% is spent on Axis 2 
(proportionally to EAFRD 
budget 2007-2013) 
All other countries: 
Modulation funds are 
spent proportionally to 
EAFRD budget 2007-
2013 
 All other countries: 
Modulation funds are 
spent proportionally to 
EAFRD budget 2007-
2013 
Northern Ireland (UK) and 
Scotland (UK): 
Voluntary modulation funds 
are spent proportionally to 
EAFRD budget 2007-2013 
   England (UK): 
10% is spent on Axis 1 
(measures 111, 121, 123 and 
124) 1; 
80% is spent on measure 
2142; 
10% is spent on Axis 3 
(proportionally to EAFRD 
budget 2007-2013)3 
   Wales (UK): 
80% is spent on Axis 2 
(proportionally to EAFRD 
budget 2007-2013) 
20% is spent on Axis 1, 3 
and 4 (proportionally to 
EAFRD budget 2007-2013) 
1) No national co-financing, 2) With national co-financing, 3) No national co-financing 
3.4.4 Increase in the second pillar budget due to modulation funds  
The addition of 8 billion euro of CM funds to the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 in the 
EU-15 implies an increase of 7 billion euro of national co-financing and also 7 billion 
euro of private funding (Table 3.8). For the EU-15 as a whole, the P2 budget 2007-
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2013 increased by 14% relative to the P2 budget without CM funds. This increase is 
smaller than the increase of 19% in the EAFRD budget, as national co-financing for 
the EU-15 as a whole is less than 50%. 
 
When we look at the increase in the P2 budget for the individual Member States, then 
we see the same picture as with regard to the increase in EAFRD due to CM funds. 
The increase in the P2 budget is highest in Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, the 
UK and France, and lowest in Portugal, Austria and Finland. Due to the inclusion of 
VM funds in the P2 budget for the UK, the share of the P2 budget induced by CM 
funds is underestimated in Table 3.8. If the VM funds and their associated national 
co-financing and private funds were to be excluded, then the increase in the P2 budget 
due to CM funds would have been about 50%. 
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis in the Baseline Scenario 
3.5.1 Budget changes 2007-2013 with 20% compulsory modulation 
Application of 20% CM (i.e. 3% in 2006 and 20% in the years 2007-2012) generates 
over 29 billion euro of CM funds in the period 2007-2013 in the EU-15, which results 
in a decrease in the DP budget 2007-2013 by about 8%. Greece (-4%) and Finland (-
6%) are affected the least and the UK, France, Germany and Belgium (all -10%) the 
most. 
 
The addition of 20% CM funds to the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 for the EU-15 
means an increase of over 40% relative to the current EAFRD budget. Again, the 
effect varies among Member States. In the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France the EAFRD budget doubles, in Spain and Germany the increase amounts 
to one third to one half, whereas the increase in the remaining countries is one quarter 
or less. 
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Table 3.8 Increase P2 budget due to 5% compulsory modulation in EU-15 Member States, 2007-





































Denmark 1250 212 184 200 595 48 
Belgium 3561 105 183 598 885 25 
France 19315 1820 1554 1224 4598 24 
Netherlands 2411 175 175 223 573 24 
United Kingdom 1) 10607 925 1001 246 2171 20 
Spain 30784 1316 1236 1993 4545 15 
Germany 26211 1330 854 1331 3515 13 
Greece 6574 358 132 144 634 10 
Italy 25193 840 850 714 2405 10 
Sweden 5447 156 179 129 465 9 
Luxembourg 663 8 24 20 52 8 
Ireland 6050 226 189 21 437 7 
Portugal 8977 308 83 163 554 6 
Austria 11659 262 262 193 717 6 
Finland 7790 121 311 0 432 6 
EU-15 166494 8161 7218 7199 22578 14 
1) Including Voluntary Modulation Funds. Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
3.5.2 Franchise of 0 and 10,000 euro 
A franchise of 0 euro implies that all farms that receive DP having their payment 
reduced by 5%. For the EU-15, the DP budget 2007-2013 would be 1% smaller than 
the DP budget with a franchise of 5,000 euro. On the other hand, when using a 
franchise of 10,000 euro, the DP budget 2007-2013 would be 1% larger than the DP 
budget with a franchise of 5000 euro. Application of the 0 euro franchise results in an 
increase in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 of a further 6% for the EU-15 as a whole. 
In Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Greece, the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 
would increase by a further 11-13%, whereas it would increase by only a few 
percentage points in Finland and Portugal. The application of a 10,000 euro franchise 
would result in a decrease in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 by 3% in the EU-15. The 
decrease varies from 10% in Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium to 1% in Finland 
and Portugal. 
3.5.3 Consequences of sensitivity analyses for levels of national co-financing  
Changes in the EARFD budget 2007-2013 have consequences for the required 
amounts of national co-financing. As with the core EAFRD budget 2007-2013 for the 
EU-15, the amount of national co-financing would increase by 40% with a CM rate of 
20% (Table 3.9). In particular, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France would 
be faced with a doubling of the amount of national co-financing. Application of a 0 
euro franchise would result in a rise by 6% of the overall amount of national co-
financing required in the EU-15, whereas an application of a 10,000 euro franchise 
would result in a decrease by 3%. 
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National co-financing (mio euro) National co-financing as 
share of national co-
financing at 5% CM (%) 














Denmark 46 386 962 435 347 250 113 90 
Netherlands 50 487 993 552 437 204 113 90 
Belgium 63 726 1451 809 654 200 111 90 
France 46 5502 10441 5871 5164 190 107 94 
United 
Kingdom 50 4389 7482 4548 4239 170 104 97 
Germany 39 5160 7679 5387 4983 149 104 97 
Spain 48 6657 8890 7213 6386 134 108 96 
Ireland 46 1959 2491 2084 1884 127 106 96 
Sweden 53 2092 2624 2146 2046 125 103 98 
Luxembourg 76 278 345 286 272 124 103 98 
Italy 50 8354 10289 8856 8175 123 106 98 
Greece 27 1371 1562 1527 1329 114 111 97 
Finland 69 4603 5215 4709 4525 113 102 98 
Austria 50 3911 4266 4024 3845 109 103 98 
Portugal 21 1055 1126 1074 1048 107 102 99 
EU-15 47 46928 65815 49522 45332 140 106 97 
Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
3.6 Health Check Scenario 
Changes in the DP budget 2007-2013 under the Health Check Scenario 
Under the Health Check scenario, the modulation funds raised consist of two 
elements. Firstly, the CM funds 2007-2013 as described under the baseline scenario, 
and secondly an additional element according to the higher modulation rates in the 
years 2009-2012, a proportion of which are linked to the level of DP received. In the 
EU-15, modulation funds under the Health Check Scenario amount to over 13 billion 
euros in the period 2007-2013, which means an increase of more than 5 billion euro 
over and above those raised through CM (Table 3.10). For the EU-15, the Health 
Check Scenario results in an additional decrease of the DP budget 2007-2013 of 2%. 
The DP budget in Germany shows the highest decrease (3%). Those Member States 
with a large proportion of farms receiving high levels of DPs (such as Germany and 
the UK, are affected to a greater extent.  
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Germany 40307 1478 2639 1161 2.9 
United Kingdom 1) 27827 1156 1863 707 
2.5 
(0) 
France 58423 2275 3576 1301 2.2 
Belgium 4262 132 225 93 2.2 
Denmark 7201 265 419 155 2.1 
Sweden 5331 181 288 107 2.0 
Italy 26973 705 1218 514 1.9 
Netherlands 5946 204 317 113 1.9 
Luxembourg 259 10 15 5 1.9 
Spain 32680 981 1513 532 1.6 
Portugal 1) 4007 83 145 62 
1.5 
(0) 
Austria 5205 103 182 79 1.5 
Ireland 9383 283 424 141 1.5 
Finland 3958 100 154 53 1.3 
Greece 14480 207 321 115 0.8 
EU-15 246242 8161 13299 5138 2.1 
1) Changes in the DP budget are given here to compare the decrease in the DP budget due to modulation in 
Health Check Scenario among Member States. However, as the decrease in DP in Health Check will be 
compensated by a deduction in VM funds from the DP budget, the DP budget 2007-2013 in the UK and Portugal is 
the same in Baseline Scenario and in Health Check Scenario 
Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
3.6.1 Changes in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 under Health Check Scenario 
The additional part of modulation funds raised in 2009-2012 is not subject to a 
‘return’ key. This implies that the ‘return’ key increases for Member States with a 
‘return’ key at 5% CM of less that 100, and that the ‘return’ key decreases for 
Member States with a ‘return’ key at 5% CM of over 100 (Table 3.11). The Health 
Check Scenario results in an increase in the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 by 10% for 
the EU-15. This increase varies among Member States: in the UK and Denmark the 
EAFRD budget increases by about one third, whereas in Greece, Finland, Austria and 
Portugal the increase is limited to a few percents.  
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Denmark 419 366 80 87 445 6 599 35 
Netherlands 317 288 86 91 487 8 599 23 
Belgium 225 198 80 88 419 9 512 22 
France 3576 3121 80 87 6442 10 7743 20 
Germany 2639 2491 90 94 8033 17 9194 14 
Spain 1513 1848 134 122 7088 18 7621 8 
Italy 1218 1354 119 111 8251 23 8764 6 
Ireland 424 368 80 87 2340 20 2481 6 
Sweden 288 263 86 91 1826 26 1932 6 
Luxem-
bourg 15 13 80 87 90 26 95 5 
Greece 321 473 173 147 3707 20 3822 3 
Finland 154 174 121 114 2080 34 2133 3 
Austria 182 341 255 187 3911 43 3990 2 
Portugal 1) 145 370 372 256 3918 49 
3980 
(3918) 2 
EU-15 13299 13299   50946  56084 10 
1) Changes in the EAFRD budget are given here to compare the increase in the EAFRD budget due to modulation 
in Health Check Scenario among Member States. However, as the increase in EAFRD due to modulation in Health 
Check Scenario will be compensated by a deduction in VM funds from the EAFRD budget, the EAFRD budget 
2007-2013 in the UK and Portugal is the same in the Baseline Scenario and Health Check Scenario Source: 
Budget Model (LEI). 
3.6.2 Increase in the second pillar budget in the Health Check Scenario  
The addition of 4.4 billion euro (excluding UK and Portuguese additional modulation 
funds) of additional modulation funds to the EAFRD budget 2007-2013 in the EU-15 
implies an increase of 3.7 billion euro of national co-financing and 5.2 billion euro of 
private funding (Table 3.12). For the EU-15 as a whole, the P2 budget 2007-2013 
increases by 7% relative to the P2 budget with CM funds. This increase is smaller 
than the increase by 10% in the EAFRD budget, as national co-financing for the EU-
15 as a whole is less than 50%.  
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Table 3.12 Increase P2 budget in the Health Check Scenario (EU-15), 2007-2013 (million euro) 










































Denmark 1725 155 138 182 475 28 
France 22957 1301 1095 1245 3641 16 
Netherlands 2817 113 113 180 406 14 
Belgium 4117 93 133 330 555 13 
Germany 29851 1161 736 1743 3640 12 
Sweden 5828 107 120 155 382 7 
Italy 26642 514 514 421 1449 5 
Luxembourg 695 5 14 13 32 5 
Spain 32260 532 465 479 1476 5 
Ireland 6337 141 73 72 286 5 
Greece 6786 115 41 56 211 3 
Finland 7987 53 108 35 197 2 
Austria 11953 79 79 136 293 2 
United Kingdom 10869 0 75 187 263 2 
Portugal 8960 0 -1 -17 -17 0 
EU-15 179783 4369 3703 5218 13290 7 
Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
When we look at the increase in the P2 budget for the individual Member States, then 
we see by and large the same picture as with regard to the increase in EAFRD. The 
increase in the P2 budget is highest in Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands and 
France, and lowest in Austria, Greece and Finland. Due to the fact that any increase in 
CM funds has to be offset by an equivalent decrease in VM funds, the P2 budget for 
Portugal more or less remains unchanged, whereas the P2 budget for the UK rises by 
2%. This is due to the fact that under the Health Check scenario, the additional PM 
funds have not been allocated to the same RDP measures as current VM funds, and 
some of the funds to which these additional funds have been allocated receive 
different rates of co-financing and potentially require the contribution of private funds 
(for example, in the UK (England), VM funds are currently focused predominantly on 
the agri-environment measure, whereas under the Health Check scenario for this 
study, the additional funds have been allocated in a standard way across a range of 
measures across the axes). 
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis in the Health Check Scenario 
A proportional distribution of the additional PM funds over the RDP measures rather 
than a targeted use towards New Challenges results in some minor changes in the P2 
budget 2007-2013 for the EU. The amount of national co-financing increases by about 
270 million euro and that of private funds decreases by 1 billion euro (Table 3.13). 
However, the total increase in the P2 budget 2007-2013 in the EU-15 of 7% relative 
to the P2 budget with CM funds is more or less the same as in the Health Check 
scenario. 
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3.7.1 Changes in national co-financing 
The increase in the required budget of national co-financing ranges from 30% in 
Austria to 86% in Denmark if the additional funds are targeted at the New Challenges 
(Table 3.13). Due to the requirement for VM rates to be reduced as CM rates increase, 
the additional national co-financing in the UK increases only by 8% and that in 
Portugal decreases by 1%. In the case of a proportional distribution of the additional 
funds over RDP measures, in most Member States the required national co-financing 
is more or less similar or slightly above that in the case of targeting at New 
Challenges. However, for Ireland, Belgium and Finland the requested national co-
financing is considerably higher. Obviously, in these countries the national co-
financing rates of the New Challenges measures are below those of the current RDP 
measures. 
 
Table 3.13 Sensitivity analysis of national co-financing of the EAFRD budget and the Health 
Check Scenario (EU-15), 2007-2013 
  National co-financing (mio euro) National co-financing as share 
of national 



































Germany 39 854 736 746 86 87 
Denmark 46 184 138 134 75 73 
Belgium 63 183 133 161 73 88 
France 46 1554 1095 1111 70 71 
Sweden 53 179 120 122 67 68 
Netherlands 50 175 113 113 65 65 
Italy 50 850 514 520 60 61 
Luxembourg 76 24 14 15 58 61 
Ireland 46 189 73 118 39 63 
Spain 48 1236 465 500 38 40 
Finland 69 311 108 137 35 44 
Greece 27 132 41 42 31 32 
Austria 50 262 79 79 30 30 
United 
Kingdom 50 1001 75 176 8 18 
Portugal 21 83 -1 0 -1 0 
EU-15 47 7218 3703 3976 51 55 
Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
From the case studies we have some information whether Member States are prepared 
to provide additional national co-financing for the RDP in the case of additional 
modulation. It seems that France, Germany and the Netherlands are against the 
proposal and that they are in favour of a revised article 69. By using article 69 no 
national co-financing is needed. On the other hand, the UK and Portugal, who apply 
VM, welcome the proposals for additional modulation. The position of Finland is yet 
unclear. In the German case study report, it is suggested that the current national top 
ups could be used as national co-financing for additional modulation. This would 
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imply that additional modulation only increases the EAFRD budget without induced 
increases in national co-financing and private funding. 
3.7.2 No national co-financing of additional modulation funds  
When no national co-financing of additional modulation funds is given, the P2 budget 
2007-2013 for the EU-15 increases by 3% (Table 3.14). 
Table 3.14 Sensitivity analysis increase P2 budget in Health Check Scenario and no national co-
financing (EU-15), 2007-2013 (million euro) 






















Belgium 3759 93 0 105 198 5 
Denmark 1497 155 0 92 247 16 
Germany 28356 1161 0 984 2145 8 
Greece 6729 115 0 40 155 2 
Spain 31559 532 0 243 775 2 
France 21252 1301 0 636 1937 9 
Ireland 6228 141 0 36 177 3 
Italy 25906 514 0 199 713 3 
Luxembourg 671 5 0 4 8 1 
Netherlands 2614 113 0 90 203 8 
Austria 11806 79 0 68 147 1 
Portugal 8895 0 -17 -66 -83 -1 
Finland 7859 53 0 16 69 1 
Sweden 5628 107 0 75 181 3 
United Kingdom 9764 0 -590 -253 -842 -9 
EU-15 172524 4369 -606 2267 6030 3 
Source: Budget Model (LEI). 
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4 EFFECTS ON FARM STRUCTURE AND THE AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 
4.1 Issues  
This chapter considers the effects of reducing Pillar 1 direct payments, and the 
redistribution of the modulation funds to rural development measures in the second 
pillar, on farm structures and the agricultural sector. The focus of this study theme 
includes an analysis of how modulation affects farm structures, the size distribution of 
farms across regions, Member States and the EU-27 as a whole and any changes in 
farm specialisation that occur. In addition, the study explores the effects of 
modulation on the agricultural sector including the growth and/or decline of 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities as well as the effects along the production 
and market chain and possible effects on consumers.  
4.2 Summary 
According to the FES model the net change in the number of farms in the EU-15 
Member States under both the Baseline Scenario and the Health Check Scenario is 
negligible. This finding is backed up by information from the case studies, where 
experts indicated that they anticipated very few changes in the farm structure 
indicators to result from compulsory modulation under the levels considered in this 
study. They did, however, suggest that there might be some small changes in farm 
structure at the local level. 
 
The overall production effect due to modulation under the Health Check Scenario is 
positive for primary agriculture in the EU-15 (0.45%) and EU-27 (0.4%). The impact 
for EU-15 is larger than for the EU-27 as modulation only applies to the NMS for the 
last year of the 2007-2013 financial programming period in the EU-10 and afterwards 
for BG and RO. 
 
Reducing the first pillar has a slightly negative impact on production due to the fact 
that part of the payments are still coupled in some countries in the baseline scenario 
and due to the fact that decoupled payments have minor production effects. The pillar 
2 measures, especially physical capital investments in Axis 1, have a larger and 
positive effects so the net effect on production is positive. When broken down by 
product type, it can be seen that the net production effect is slightly positive for all 
broad groups of products except for cereals, where there is an overall small decline in 
production experienced. This effect, however, is largely due a few specific cereals 
(e.g. Durum wheat) which continue to receive an element of coupled support. 
 
The models indicate that, under the Health Check Scenario, compulsory modulation 
leads to slightly lower consumer prices for primary agricultural products. The main 
group of measures that causes this result is the physical capital investments as these 
are likely to increase productivity and thereby lower costs.  
4.3 Impact on farm structure 
Any analysis of the effects of modulation on farms structures has to be set within the 
context of significant trends in structural change that are brought about by non-policy 
drivers. For example, the past twenty years has witnessed a decline in the overall 
number of farms accompanied by an increase in the overall size of farm holdings. 
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These trends are fairly consistent between different Member States, with most of the 
case study countries identifying average annual decreases in farm numbers of between 
2-3%. This trend is predicted to continue, with a 25% decrease in the number of farms 
anticipated between 2003 and 2020, with a rate of decrease of around 2.5% per year 
in the EU-15 and 4 % per year in the EU-10 (as developed in the Scenar 2020 
project16). Key drivers affecting these trends include market drivers, such as the level 
of commodity prices, or changes in policy support, such as the decoupling of support 
payments from production.  
 
Amidst these drivers of structural change, compulsory modulation, especially at 
relatively low levels, is unlikely to have a significant impact upon farm structural 
change. However, as modulation rates increase, its role in driving structural change 
may increase, particularly for those holdings experiencing an overall decline in their 
Pillar 1 payments, and as a result of increased funding availability for Pillar 2 
measures, such as early retirement, or support for young farmers which are focused at 
facilitating structural change and the improved efficiency of farm holdings. On the 
other hand, increased levels of investment in Axis 2 measures, such as the LFA and 
the agri-environment measures, may serve to slow down structural change as these 
measures may help to keep a proportion of smaller holdings, particularly extensive 
livestock holdings, in business which might otherwise have been abandoned or 
amalgamated into larger, more profitable holdings.  
 
From the budget model it is possible to derive the proportion of modulated funds that 
might be allocated to different rural development measures, which gives some 
indication of the proportional impact that modulation is likely to have. In relation to 
Axis 1 measures, within which the early retirement, farm modernisation and 
infrastructure measures sit, the contribution of modulated funds ranges from up to 
10% of the total Axis 1 budget in GR, IT, LU, AT, PT, SW and IE, between 10-20% 
of the budget in DE, ES, and EI, and over 20% in BE, DK, FR, NL. 
 
The FES model is designed to analyse the potential changes in the number of farms 
over time (Table 4.1). According to the FES model, changes in number of farms in the 
EU-15 Member States as a result of reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments under both 
the Baseline Scenario and the Health Check Scenario are negligible. The highest 
decreases are in Denmark (-0.6%), Germany and Sweden (both -0.1%). The very few 
farm businesses that are terminated altogether do so for financial reasons. It has not 
been possible to model the impact that the increased funding available for Pillar 2 
measures might have on farm structures and the model can also not account for what 
happens to the land of the farms that have stopped. 
 
Given these negligible changes in the number of farms in both scenarios, we do not 
present changes in the other farm structure indicators based on the FES model, as 





                                                 
16
 ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/reports/scenar2020/index_en.htm 
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Table 4.1 Number of farms as a result of reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments under the 





















3,032,485 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
These results are backed up by the findings from the case studies. Table 4.2 sets out a 
synthesis of the answers given of the impact of modulation of P1 and P2 on a number 
of farm structure indicators in the EU-15 case study countries. For five out of the nine 
indicators, it was thought that these would not change due to modulation in P1 and 
P2. For the remaining four indicators, minor decreases or increases are expected. It 
should be noted, however, that it is not straightforward to isolate the impact of direct 
payments or individual RDP measures on farm structure indicators from the impacts 
of other drivers, let alone assess the impact of a small change in the budget for direct 
payments or the RDP measures on farm structure. In addition, some case study 
experts indicated that modulation might lead to changes in farm structures at the local 
level, but that these were unlikely to be perceived at national level. 
Table 4.2 Synthesis of the possible impact of compulsory modulation of P1 and P2 on farm 
structure indicators in the EU-15 case study countries (FI, FR, PT UK) 
Indicator Impact P1 Impact P2 P1+P2 
Utilized agricultural area (UAA) (ha) 0 0 0 
Share of arable area, permanent grass and 
permanent crops in UAA (%) 
0 0 0 
Number of farms minor (-) 0 0 
Average farm size (ha) minor plus 0 minor plus 
Average farm size (ESU) 0 – minor plus 0 – minor plus 0 – minor plus 
Agricultural labour force (AWU) minor (-) minor plus 0 
Composition of farming types (% of total) 0 0 0 
Organic land as % of UAA 0 0 0 
Organic production as % of total 
agricultural production 
0 0 0 
Source: Case study reports, adaptation LEI. 
In certain situations, however, especially where the reductions in Pillar 1 payments 
affect farming sectors that are struggling in terms of financial viability, it may be that 
compulsory modulation exacerbates existing impacts of market forces which drive 
structural change. For example, the Finnish, French and UK case studies suggest that 
the reduction of Pillar 1 payments could reduce the proportion of agricultural land 
under extensive arable cropping, although the extent to which this is actually due to 
compulsory modulation or higher commodity prices is unclear. The case study expert 
in Portugal also highlights this issue, indicating that reductions on Pillar 1 payments 
as a result of compulsory modulation predominantly affect those medium sized, 
extensive farms that are becoming increasingly financially unviable, and as such may 
exacerbate the parallel trends being experienced in certain regions of Portugal of land 
abandonment on the one hand and farm expansion on the other. The potential for 
modulation to accelerate these twin trends of increases in farm size on the one hand, 
and land abandonment on the other, is an issue which is also highlighted in the case 
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study reports for Poland and Slovenia. This may also be the case within the beef and 
sheep sectors in the UK, sectors which derive a relatively high proportion of their 
incomes from direct payments and are sectors that are facing significant economic 
difficulties currently.  
 
The impact of the increased funding available within Pillar 2 as a result of modulation 
is less straightforward to determine. The early retirement measure is the sole measure 
with an explicit objective of achieving significant structural change of the transferred 
holding. However, this measure, used in 9 of the EU-15 Member States, only 
accounts for 1.5% of total public funds allocated to the 2007-13 RDPs, ranging from 
under 0.5% in DK, DE, FR and IT to 5.2% in GR and 7.7% in IE.  Other measures 
that aim to improve the efficiency or factor productivity of farms, such as the farm 
modernisation measure and the measure to improve farm infrastructure, can also 
indirectly influence restructuring. Conversely, measures within Axis 2, such as the 
LFA and the agri-environment measure, may slow down structural change by 
providing payments for extensive land management practices, which may serve to 
allow farm businesses to continue, which might otherwise have ceased to operate, 
with the land either being abandoned or amalgamated into larger holdings. 
  
The literature review showed that there is little information about the effects of Pillar 
2 measures on restructuring per se. In relation to the early retirement measure, under 
the 2000-2006 programming period, the highest levels of adoption of this measure 
were ‘in areas of least need’ and that the structural effect arising from the measure 
were similar to those which would have occurred anyway. The literature review also 
shows that the early retirement measure led to an increase in farm size, notably in ES, 
GR, PT and DE.  
 
Interestingly, the majority of the case studies suggest that, in relation to Pillar 2 
measures, it is the farm modernisation and the infrastructure measures that are likely 
to have the greatest impact on farms structures, possibly due to the fact that there is a 
significant proportion of the RDP budget allocated towards these measures (9% and 
7% respectively). The Slovenian case study also refers to the role that training could 
play in shifting more traditional management practices to more market-oriented 
production. The budget model showed a slight emphasis on the measures in Axis 1, 
despite this, the case studies have shown that the additional modulation funds for 
these measures will not have any real net effect on farm structures.  
 
Under the Health Check Scenario, although the early retirement measure will not be 
the focus of additional funds, it is unlikely that any significantly different impacts will 
be noted, given the minimal effect of this measure under the baseline scenario. 
Additional funding focused on Axis 2 measures – such as the LFA and agri-
environment measures – could serve to further slow down structural changes amongst 
smaller extensive grassland farms. However, if funds are focused on the farm 
modernisation measure, then – depending on what these are used for – they may 
facilitate further re-structuring. It was not possible to ascertain the extent to which 
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4.4 Impact on the agricultural sector  
Both the economic models (LEITAP and CAPRI) show that modulation, under the 
baseline scenario, has an overall positive, albeit small, production effect, although 
there are some differences between regions and products. This effect increases under 
the Health Check scenario. LEITAP suggests that the overall production effect under 
the Health Check scenario is positive for primary agriculture, with an overall increase 
in production of almost 0.4% compared to no modulation (see Figure 4.1). In addition 
to the overall impact of modulation under the Health Check scenario, both Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 also distinguish the impact of various groups of second pillar measures, the 
impact of the whole second pillar and the impact of reducing the first pillar. The 
impact of the second pillar on production is positive (0.47%) while reducing first 
pillar payments as a small negative production effect (-0.06%). The negative 
production effect of reducing first pillar payments is limited as payments are 
decoupled. Second pillar payments, especially Axis 1 measures, increase production 
due to a higher productivity growth and due to co-financing that increases the total 
subsidy budget available strongly. The positive production effect of modulation is 
primarily due to the impact of physical capital investments, which aim to increase 
productivity, thereby lowering costs and prices. Lower prices, in turn, slightly 
increase demand and competitiveness, both of which lead to increased production. 
Part of the explanation for the large impact of these measures is that a large share of 
the second pillar money (~25%) is spent on these measures, and hence a greater 
proportion of modulation funds will also be allocated to them. The same productivity 
impact can be expected as a result of investment in the human capital investments; 
however, the impact is lower as less money is distributed to these measures (~8%). 
The production impact of the LFA and agri-environment measures is slightly positive 
due to the fact that these payments keep some areas in production.  
 
Figure 4.1 EU-27 production volume of primary agriculture – 5% / 13% modulation (% change 












LFA Agri-Env Regional 2nd Pillar 1st Pillar Modulation
  5 percent   13 percent
 
Source: LEITAP 
Looking at the increased rates of modulation under the Health Check scenario 
compared to the no modulation scenario, Figure 4.2 shows that the impact for EU-15 
is larger (0.45 % increase) than for the EU-27 (0.4% increase) as modulation only 
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applies to the NMS (excluding Romania and Bulgaria) from 2012, while it is in place 
for the EU-15 for the whole 2007-13 period.  
 
Figure 4.2 Production volume of primary agriculture – EU-15 / EU-27 (% change of the Health 


















The impact is measured in 2013, assuming the application of modulation over the 
2007-2013 period. If one extends the period, the dynamic effects with regard to 
physical and human capital will mean that the impact, relative to the baseline 
scenario, becomes larger over time. This is because the effects are cumulative, in 
other words productivity gains in one year remain more or less constant over time17, 
and every year adds a new productivity gain. The effect of reducing Pillar 1 direct 
payments and, for example, LFA payments remains more or less the same as they are 
income payments. 
                                                 
17
 It declines over time due to depreciation. 
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Figure 4.3 Impact of deadweight loss on EU-27 production volume of primary agriculture (% 








Human Capital Physical Capital LFA Agri-Env Regional 2nd Pillar 1st Pillar Modulation
13% Modulation w ith cofinancing 13% Modulation w ith 25% deadw eight loss
 
Source: LEITAP 
The deadweight loss or crowding out effect reduces impact of pillar 2 measures on 
production more or less proportionally (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.4 Impact of co-financing on estimated EU-27 production volume of primary agriculture 








Human Capital Physical Capital LFA Agri-Env Regional 2nd Pillar 1st Pillar Modulation
13% Modulation w ith cofinancing 13% Modulation w ith no cofinancing
 
Source: LEITAP 
The co-financing requirements have a relatively large impact on the impact of pillar 2 
measures on production (see Figure 4.4). The overall impact of modulation reduces 
from 0.4% to about 0.2% 
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Using the CAPRI model, the impacts on production can be computed on a more 
disaggregated level for regions and products. This section presents and discusses the 
results of the “Health Check” scenario (Health Check) with 13% tiered modulation 
(additional second pillar funds allocated to “New Challenges”) against a baseline with 
zero modulation. In addition, several partial implementations of the Health Check 
scenario are presented, with the purpose to decompose the total effects and better 
illustrate how the results arise. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the difference (%) in production of important primary product 
groupings for the EU-27 in the scenarios compared with the baseline. A first 
conclusion is that agricultural production generally is higher in the Health Check 
scenario (last column) than in the baseline, but that the effects are rather small and 
different across products and regions. The right-hand column shows the total effect of 
reducing the first pillar and introducing all second pillar measures, compared with the 
baseline scenario. The other columns show simulations including only the reduction 
of the first pillar in conjunction with the introduction of a single group of second 
pillar measures. 
 
The first column (from left) of Table 4.3 shows the effect of reducing Pillar 1 
payments, but not changing any Pillar 2 payments. As expected, reducing first pillar 
support generally reduces production, but the effect is mostly minor. The reduction is 
partly due to the continued existence of a few coupled direct payments (e.g. durum 
wheat and pulses), and partly due to the weak production effect of Single Farm 
Payments in CAPRI (analysed in detail elsewhere). Potatoes form another exception. 
In the baseline, potatoes were not included in the single payment scheme, and were 
therefore becoming more profitable relative to other crops following modulation. Of 
the animal sectors, only beef and sheep and goats are negatively affected 
 
The second and third columns show the combined effect (also relative to the baseline 
scenario) of reducing Pillar 1 direct payments and introducing Pillar 2 human (second 
column) and physical capital (third column) investment measures (groups 01 and 02), 
which enter CAPRI via LEITAP. These measures increase productivity, as described 
above, and are an important driver of model results. The simulations suggest that the 
effect of both measures are to increase production, but that the physical capital 
investments have a stronger effect, more than sufficient to counteract the effect of 
reducing P1 for all products except for durum wheat and pulses, and for fodder. The 
particular reverse reaction of fodder to productivity growth is due to increased 
efficiency in animal feeding as a consequence of the technical progress, so that less 
roughage is required albeit beef production increases. 
 
The fourth and fifth columns show the production effects of reducing the first pillar 
and increasing the LFA and Natura 2000 measures. The LFA measures are fairly 
decoupled, and only a very weak production effect can be seen at the aggregate level 
of EU-27. The Natura 2000 measure is modelled as requiring extensive management 
practices, and this also shows in the results, where production decreases. However, 
the amount of money allocated to the measure is small, and thus the effect on 
production is small. 
 
The sixth column shows the result of reducing P1 and introducing the Pillar 2 agri-
environment measure (AEM, group 05). The implementation of this measure involves 
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a range of management requirements, many of which require the use of more 
extensive production techniques, especially for the cropping sectors. The AEM 
payments for beef producing farms was, based on the case study results, modelled as 
partly directed towards support for grazing animals as suckler cows and sheep and 
goats, where it contributes to maintaining production in some areas. Therefore, that 
measure causes a reduction of production for crops, but has a small positive effect 
(compare third to first column) on the production of beef.  
 
The seventh column shows the effect of first pillar reductions and other groups of 
second pillar measures not elsewhere accounted for. They were included for 
completeness, but the reader may verify that their influence in general is smaller than 
that of other groups of measures. 
 
Table 4.3 Production results for EU-27 (% difference to baseline scenario) in selected 
simulations. 
Product P1 only P1+lab P1+cap P1+lfa P1+n2k P1+age P1+reg P1+all 
Cereals -0,11 -0,03 0,19 -0,10 -0,16 -0,17 -0,10 0,17 
 - Soft wheat -0,07 0,01 0,24 -0,06 -0,10 -0,10 -0,05 0,26 
 - Durum wheat -1,22 -1,03 -0,69 -1,21 -1,53 -1,64 -1,21 -1,20 
 - Rye and meslin -0,12 -0,08 0,08 -0,11 -0,17 -0,18 -0,12 0,03 
 - Barley -0,13 -0,04 0,16 -0,11 -0,20 -0,16 -0,12 0,17 
 - Oats -0,09 0,00 0,11 -0,08 -0,15 -0,26 -0,09 -0,02 
 - Grain maize -0,07 -0,01 0,20 -0,07 -0,09 -0,13 -0,07 0,18 
 - Other cereals -0,11 0,00 0,43 -0,09 -0,23 -0,24 -0,10 0,35 
 - Paddy rice -0,03 0,02 0,14 -0,04 -0,03 -0,04 -0,03 0,19 
Oilseeds -0,25 -0,13 0,19 -0,24 -0,32 -0,35 -0,25 0,17 
 - Rape seed -0,28 -0,17 0,19 -0,27 -0,34 -0,42 -0,27 0,11 
 - Sunflower seed -0,22 -0,11 0,16 -0,20 -0,28 -0,26 -0,22 0,20 
 - Soya seed -0,16 0,02 0,34 -0,13 -0,21 -0,19 -0,15 0,47 
Other arable field crops 0,02 0,08 0,27 0,02 0,01 -0,04 0,03 0,25 
 - Pulses -1,15 -1,23 -1,43 -1,10 -1,25 -1,26 -1,14 -1,80 
 - Potatoes 0,14 0,14 0,16 0,14 0,14 0,10 0,14 0,12 
 - Sugar beet 0,00 0,11 0,41 0,00 -0,01 -0,08 0,01 0,43 
Veg. and Perm. crops 0,00 0,06 0,20 0,00 -0,01 -0,03 0,01 0,21 
Fodder 0,00 -0,04 -0,13 0,01 -0,02 -0,05 -0,01 -0,25 
Meat -0,01 0,08 0,32 -0,01 -0,02 0,01 0,00 0,42 
 - Beef -0,10 0,02 0,22 -0,10 -0,10 0,01 -0,08 0,43 
 - Pork meat 0,01 0,10 0,38 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,47 
 - Sheep and goat meat -0,07 0,01 0,16 -0,07 -0,08 -0,02 -0,06 0,32 
 - Poultry meat 0,01 0,08 0,28 0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,32 
Other Animal products -0,02 -0,01 0,00 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 -0,02 0,02 
 - Cow and buffalo milk 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 - Sheep and goat milk -0,16 -0,05 0,17 -0,16 -0,17 -0,11 -0,15 0,34 
 - Eggs 0,00 0,04 0,16 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,19 
P1 = reduction of the first pillar, lab = labour investments, cap = physical capital investments, lfa = Less 
Favoured Area support, n2k = Natura 2000, age = agri-environment schemes, reg = regional support, P2 = all 
second pillar measures. Source: CAPRI 
The change in cereals production may be further divided into a change in area under 
production and a change in yield. This is set out in Table 4.4, where also the effects of 
the two most important groups of measures are shown separately. The table shows 
that the area of some cereals decreases whereas others increase. As mentioned above, 
a part of the explanation for a reduced area under cereal production is that some P1 
payments, especially for durum wheat, are more strongly linked to production, and 
therefore modulation has a stronger effect on those cereals. 
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Table 4.4 Decomposition of cereals production into yield and acreages for EU-27 (percent change 
relative to baseline scenario) 
  P1 only P1+cap P1+age P1+P2 
Product Hectares Yield Hectares Yield Hectares Yield Hectares Yield 
Cereals 
-0,11 0,00 -0,08 0,26 0,10 -0,26 0,17 0,01 
 - Soft wheat 
-0,07 0,00 -0,04 0,28 0,10 -0,20 0,16 0,10 
 - Durum wheat 
-1,23 0,01 -0,93 0,24 -0,90 -0,74 -0,49 -0,72 
 - Rye and Meslin 
-0,10 -0,02 -0,15 0,23 0,03 -0,21 0,04 -0,01 
 - Barley 
-0,08 -0,05 -0,07 0,23 0,30 -0,46 0,35 -0,18 
 - Oats 
-0,04 -0,05 -0,02 0,13 0,31 -0,57 0,34 -0,36 
 - Grain Maize 
-0,06 -0,01 -0,04 0,24 -0,02 -0,12 0,03 0,15 
 - Other cereals 
-0,11 0,00 0,09 0,34 -0,01 -0,23 0,23 0,11 
 - Paddy rice 
-0,11 0,08 -0,10 0,25 -0,17 0,13 -0,17 0,37 
P1 = first pillar, cap = physical capital investments, age = agri-environment schemes, P2 = second pillar. Source: 
CAPRI 
The mechanism behind the change in yields is more complex. Table 4.3 shows only 
average yields for EU-27. Behind the change in average yield a range of factors are at 
play. Most important are: 
a) technical progress, i.e. via investments in human and physical capital: 
productivity increases for a given input use;  
b) extensive land use, i.e. in order to receive support under certain P2 measures: 
producers are required to adhere to certain management prescriptions, which 
may constrain production, for example introducing non-productive buffer 
strips, reducing levels of inputs, or reducing stocking levels; and 
c) changes in regional weights, i.e. even if yields change in no single region: it 
may be that some regions with low yields expand production whereas some 
regions with high yields decrease production, and thus their weights in the 
average change. 
In all cases, a combination of those three effects are present, and it is not possible, 
within the scope of this study, to pursue each of them – for each cereal – across all 
regions. Nevertheless, one can say that, in general, capital investments support an 
increase in yields, whereas requirements to extensify cause them to decrease. 
 
Of all broad agricultural sectors, the meat sectors are the most strongly influenced by 
modulation in terms of production, with an increase of 0.42 % versus the baseline. Of 
particular interest is the production of beef meat, because of its importance for the 
environment, both in positive ways in terms of provision of e.g. grazed landscapes 
and biotopes and negative externalities as potential ammonia emissions and nitrate 
pressures. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the concentration of beef production, indexed by kg beef / utilizable 
agricultural area, in the EU. One can see that important beef producing areas are 
located in Germany, northern Italy, Belgium, France, UK, Ireland, Spain, Austria and 
Slovenia, whereas by the selected measure, beef production is less intensive in the 
eastern members of the union with Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. 
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Figure 4.5 Beef meat production intensity in the baseline, measured as kg beef/ha UAA. Darker 
regions mean greater production.  
 
Source: Simulations with CAPRI 
 
The effect of modulation on beef production depends on several factors, of which the 
most important ones are: 
• Is beef production based on suckler cows or bull fattening? 
• Are there coupled direct payments (to suckler cows, special premiums, and 
slaughter premiums) that get reduced with modulation?  
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Figure 4.6 Change in beef production in Health Check scenario compared with the baseline.  
 
Simulation results from the partial equilibrium model CAPRI. The map shows the relative difference in 
beef production between the Health Check and the baseline scenarios for 2013. 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the relative change in beef production in the Health Check scenario 
versus baseline. Green colours indicate an increase and red a decrease, whereas 
yellow denotes an approximate status quo. If we look at some of the most intensive 
beef producing regions mentioned above, we see for example that production 
increases in all of Germany, France, Italy, Ireland and most of Spain, whereas it 
decreases in some parts of Belgium, in the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden. The 
regional changes in beef production depend on several interacting forces: Technical 
progress resulting from increased second pillar spending tend to increase production 
(in particular in Germany, but to some extent everywhere), and the combination of 
somewhat increased total EU production and inelastic demand results in lower beef 
prices (everywhere), causing some reallocation of production among regions. 
 
The direct payments of the first pillar and the allocation of second pillar budget 
interact with the production structure to determine the result of each region. Key 
drivers are coupled payments (slaughter premia and suckler cow payments) and 
young animal prices and feed. A few examples are helpful. In the Netherlands, there 
are no coupled suckler cow payments in the baseline whereas there are slaughter 
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premia. Modulation in combination with lower beef prices thus causes slaughtering to 
decrease a bit, whereas suckler cows are not directly affected (lower meat output per 
animal). In a second round of effects, suckler cows decrease in other countries with 
coupled payments, like Spain, which tend to make fodder, young cows, heifers and 
young bulls cheaper. The net effect turns out to be an increase in the suckler cow 
herd. Since suckler cows generally produce less meat than animals in an intensive 
fattening system, total meat production decreases. The opposite mechanism is at play 
in Spain and Germany. 
 
France is a special case. The many coupled payments would suggest that production 
would be negatively affected by modulation, especially as a large proportion of meat 
comes from suckler cows. Nevertheless, the RD programme seems to be designed in 
such a way that it benefits both suckler cows (via support for grazing animals) and 
bulls (via support to mixed farms, some of which have bulls). On the balance it seems 
that the net result considering modulation, second pillar, lower beef prices and extra 
technical progress is a slight production increase, albeit smaller than that in Spain or 
Germany. 
 
Note that in the Health Check scenario with “New Challenges”, the French RD 
programme (presumably) directs much of the additional modulation funds towards 
agri-environment payments and in particular towards suckler cows. In a sensitivity 
analysis (“Spend additional funds proportional to existing programmes”) the largest 
share was instead directed to LFA measures, which have a rather weak production 
effect. In that simulation (not shown), the suckler cow herd in many French regions 
decreased more strongly.  
 
The example of beef production shows the range of factors in play when attempting to 
assess the impact of modulation on a particular sector, the sensitivity of certain 
assumptions (for example, the productivity response to support under Axis 1 of the 
EAFRD), and the significant variations that may occur between Member States and 
regions. 
 
4.5 Consumer prices 
Also the consumers will be affected by any changes in farm structures, since it 
(normally) should show through changes in consumer prices. In comparison with the 
baseline scenario, LEITAP shows that modulation under the Health Check scenario 
leads to lower consumer prices for primary agricultural products by almost 0.7% for 
the EU-15 and slightly less for the EU-27 for the period 2007-2013 (see Figure 4.7). It 
is the physical capital investment measures under Pillar 2 that are the main cause of 
this result, as they increase productivity and lower costs over the period. The impact 
of income payments for LFA and agri-environment measures have a slightly negative 
impact on prices as, in a competitive environment, part of the income payments leak 
away to consumers and other sectors. The impact of LFA is larger than for the agri-
environment measure, as the latter provides compensation payments for additional 
costs, whereas in the case of LFA these are primarily income payments. Reducing 
first pillar money has the opposite impact. 
 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 70 
Figure 4.7 Consumer price of primary agriculture at 5% and 13% modulation rates (% change 
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5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MODULATION 
5.1 Competitiveness of the Agricultural Sector 
5.1.1 Issues 
The specific issues associated with the impact of modulation on the competitiveness 
of the agricultural sector are the extent to which modulation affects the 
competitiveness and value added of the EU agri-food sectors at national and regional 
levels. In particular, this theme considers the degree to which the additional funds 
available for investments in physical capital or human capital under Pillar 2 measures 
will impact upon competitiveness, but also how the reduction of Pillar 1 might 
influence competitiveness.  
5.1.2 Summary  
Outputs from the economic models suggest that increased rates of modulation under 
the Health Check scenario have a small overall net positive impact on the 
competitiveness of both the agricultural sector, and of rural areas, compared with the 
baseline scenario. The impact on agricultural value added is also very slightly 
positive. This is the case even without taking into account the contribution that the 
anticipated positive impacts on public goods and environment might make, which it 
has not possible to quantify as part of this analysis. The growth of value added as a 
result of modulation is highest in the primary agriculture, services and processed food 
sectors. Conversely, the impact on the energy and industry sectors is much more 
limited. 
 
The positive impact is mainly caused by the impacts of the availability of additional 
funds for Pillar 2 measures, particularly the dynamic impact of measures that increase 
productivity of production factors, such as human and physical capital measures in 
Axis 1. The economic modelling results are backed up by the case studies, and the 
figures for the agricultural sector are similar to those estimated by the Member States 
in relation to the GVA CMEF Impact Indicator. Measures within Axis 3 also 
contribute to this positive effect; however, due to the fact that these measures are 
implemented mainly outside the agricultural sector, they increase productivity in other 
sectors.  
 
Under the Health Check scenario, net exports also increase for all products except for 
dairy products. In essence the entire net trade effect comes from the availability of 
additional funds for the human and physical capital measures, mainly within Axis 1, 
since these are assumed to increase productivity. All other Pillar 2 measures show the 
opposite effect, however the overall net effect is positive. 
 
As a result partly of the additional technical change facilitated through Axis 1, but 
also through additional funds becoming available for other sectors than agriculture, 
the models show that increased rates of compulsory modulation lead to less distortion 
in the economy, and a concomitant welfare gain.  
5.1.3 Measuring Competitiveness 
The term “competitiveness” has no single generally accepted definition, and is laden 
with potentially different connotations. One possible definition is “being able to 
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compete”. With that definition, the analysis of production (showing a slight overall 
increase) is a good measure of competitiveness. However, production may increase 
for many reasons, which may or may not relate to internal properties of the sector 
studied. In order to see if the sector itself has undergone some change that puts it in a 
better competitive position on the market, a more refined measure is required.  
 
At the national or European level, the main factors influencing the competitiveness of 
agriculture and of agro-food firms are as follows: the natural resources (land, climate, 
water) and the human resources (training of farmers); technological progress (in 
relation with the level of investment in research and development); the productivity of 
production factors (labour, land, livestock); the characteristics of the final product; the 
fiscal and monetary regulations (interest rates, taxation of income, controlling 
inflation); the strategies of investments; the trade policies (tariffs, quotas, etc.); the 
agricultural policies (subsidies and market regulation). 
 
At international level, competitiveness depends on a variety of factors, including the 
exchange rate, the cost of international transport and trade preferences between states. 
In some cases, the exchange rate is influenced by the measures adopted by 
governments. Thus, the devaluation of the currency of a country relative to its 
competitors (as is currently the case of the U.S. dollar against the euro) results in an 
improvement of the competitiveness of products exported. Imported products are, 
however, more expensive. Therefore, and all things being equal, local producers of 
these goods become more competitive. Local consumers on the other hand will not be 
able to afford imported goods.  
The case studies show that for the most part key factors affecting competitiveness are 
of general socio-economic character: skilled labour, farm debts, labour cost, land 
price, specialisation, research support, infrastructure, proximity to markets, exchange 
rates, increasing scales of production (agrarian structure). Also agricultural policy is 
mentioned as a key factor as is production limits (quotas), albeit in just one case each. 
Modulation is assumed to influence these factors to a rather small extent, even though 
especially some measures in pillar 2 are expected to positively influence some of 
them (labour skills).  
Most of these are not possible to quantify with the models used in this study. One 
possible measure is Gross Value Added (GVA) at market prices. This would reflect 
the sector’s possibility to attract capital, land and labour by its own virtue, based on 
market returns, without relying on subsidies or protection. Competitiveness defined in 
this way has certain drawbacks. It considers a substitution of fixed for variable inputs 
as a gain. Unfortunately, CAPRI only maintains a single set of producer prices, which 
includes the effect of all market and border protection measures, albeit the revenues 
stemming from direct subsidies can be isolated and subtracted. Furthermore, it is 
strongly influenced by price changes. In fact, defined this way, competitiveness 
becomes nothing more than agricultural income (Modified Gross Value Added - 
MGVA) minus transfers (subsidies). Nevertheless, GVA is the measure of 
competitiveness that is most readily able to be computed within this study. Sectoral 
GVA is an output from LEITAP and shows the impact on all sectors, whereas CAPRI 
gives detail on GVA changes for agricultural products.  
 
The case studies use no specific definition of competitiveness but a number of issues 
related to competitiveness are put forward: economic efficiency, economic 
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performance, production capacity, development of new markets, diversification 
activities and human capital. A related issue that is put forward concerns the effects 
on commodity prices. 
 
Another aspect of competitiveness is the capability of the EU to compete on world 
markets. A simple measure of this, similar to production, is net trade. Net trade is, in 
contrast to gross value added, strongly correlated with coupled support, and it also 
depends on demand inside the EU, which is arguably not an important aspect of the 
agricultural sector per se. Nevertheless, net trade can contribute to a fuller picture of 
the competitiveness of the agricultural sectors. From LEITAP we retrieve the volumes 
of export and import, and CAPRI gives net trade of certain commodities. 
 
In relation to Pillar 2, the measures that are most likely to improve the 
competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sectors are those that sit within Axis 
1, particularly those that enable investments in new technologies and physical 
infrastructure to be made, as well as those that focus on improving human capital, 
thereby helping to rationalise production processes, investigate new and sustainable 
market opportunities and to improve the quality of products. This view is supported 
by the result of the case studies.  
 
The analysis within this chapter is derived primarily from the economic models, with 
some information provided from the CMEF indicators for the case study countries, 
which serves to reinforce the outputs from the models. Also the result of the case 
studies has been incorporated in this chapter. 
5.1.4 Gross Value Added 
The growth of value added under the Health Check scenario is limited, but positive. 
The growth is highest for primary agriculture (0.14%), the focus of the majority of 
expenditure under both Axis 1 and Axis 2 within Pillar 2 (see Figure 5.1). The food 
processing sector gains from lower primary agricultural input prices and some Axis 3 
money focused, for example, at diversification and improving rural infrastructure. The 
growth in valued added of services is also noticeable. This is caused by a productivity 
increase due to Axis 3 spending, particularly the impact that these can have in 
stimulating tourism, but support for broader farm diversification activities may also 
give positive effects, as highlighted in the French and UK case studies The impact on 
the energy and industry sectors is limited. Only the energy sector would experience a 
negative effect since the investments in physical and human capital will save energy. 
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Figure 5.1 Sectoral value added growth (% change Health Check scenario relative to no 
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Source: LEITAP 
Table 5.1 shows the net impact of modulation under the Health Check scenario for 
GVA (excluding direct payments) per broad production sector, taking average values 
per hectare or head in EU-27, computed as market revenues minus variable costs. The 
left-hand column shows GVA in the baseline, and the remaining columns show the 
difference under different simulations  
Table 5.1 Gross value added per hectare or head for different agricultural sectors for EU-27. 
Value in baseline and change (∆ euro/ha or head) in simulations under Health Check scenario vs. 
baseline. 
Sector GVA in baseline P1 only P1+cap P1+age P1+P2 
Cereals 178,24 0,50 0,06 1,54 1,20 
Oilseeds 273,87 0,42 1,11 0,97 1,95 
Other arable crops 836,20 0,99 1,49 2,11 2,99 
Vegetables and Permanent crops 5182,54 0,39 -4,55 -0,85 -5,20 
Fodder activities 15,85 0,11 -0,80 0,55 -0,47 
All cattle activities 279,19 1,76 1,72 -0,22 -0,38 
Beef meat activities -15,40 2,60 2,29 0,27 -0,08 
Other animals 54,37 0,02 -0,16 -0,11 -0,30 
The first data column from the left shows baseline value. The remaining columns show the percentage difference to 
the baseline in simulations implying “only decreasing P1 payments”, “decreasing P1 and increasing Physical 
Capital Investments”, “decreasing P1 and increasing agri-environment payments” and “decreasing P1 and 
increasing the full set of P2 measures”. Source: Simulations with CAPRI. 
Under the Health Check scenario, the changes in GVA per hectare or head in most 
cases are small compared to the GVA in the baseline. For “Beef meat activities”, 
GVA in the baseline is negative. The two main reasons for the negative GVA are that 
(1) this group of activities includes suckler cows, which in most instances are not 
profitable without direct support, and also that (2) the raising of suckler cow calves 
for input use in meat and milk production are not included in “Beef meat activities” 
and thus only a part of the production chain is captured. The line labelled “All cattle 
activities” includes the raising of calves and intermediate (recruitment) heifers, as 
well as dairy cows, which results in a positive GVA. One must keep in mind that 
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GVA is the difference between the two large positions sales revenues and variable 
costs, and it can be a small share of total revenues. 
 
The column labelled “P1 only” shows the effect of reducing first pillar direct 
payments. For almost all activities this effect implies a higher GVA, due to reduced 
production and thus higher prices. The case studies show that the reduction of Pillar 1 
is likely to have only limited effects on the production and prices of commodities. The 
French case study emphasises that other factors are of greater importance for the 
development of the commodity prices: increased food demand and purchasing power 
in emerging markets, low world production (specially Oceania), low global stocks, 
decline in production for some commodities, increased production of biofuels and 
scarcity of supply which encourages speculation on commodity markets. If the degree 
of uncertainty regarding such broad factors that also influence agricultural prices, 
GVA and competitiveness, then the comparative static results of the simulations with 
CAPRI are arguably relatively insignificant.  
 
The column labelled “P1+cap” shows the effect of the introduction of additional 
funding for the physical investment measure. In all sectors yields increase and input 
requirements decrease (although this is not visible in the table). As a consequence, 
production tends to increase, and thus prices drop. As a net effect, GVA increases 
compared to “P1 only” for most sectors and decreases for vegetables and permanent 
crops and fodder. For cereals, the price and technical progress effects cancel out. The 
introduction of additional money for the agri-environment measure in “P1+age” has 
generally the opposite effect, due to the fact that the outcome of this measure is 
generally either to maintain or decrease production. Extensified production implies 
less input costs and higher price on the market. The generalised way of treating 
environmental payments in the CAPRI model obscures some faces of reality. A 
detailed overview of the implementation of all measures, including the AEM is 
available in Annex 1, but the basic assumption is that some of the AEM leads to 
extensification. 
 
The last column “P1+P2” shows the effect of all first and second pillar measures. The 
net effect is a small gain in GVA for cereals, oilseeds and other arable crops, and a 
decrease for animal husbandry, fodder and permanent crops. It is interesting to note 
that GVA decreases in more protected sectors as meat and permanent crops whereas it 
increases for less protected sectors. This is (mainly) due to the balance between lower 
costs (due to technical progress) and lower prices (due to expansion on a limited 
market). Market prices react (fall) less in sectors that can easily expand exports or 
where imports are important in the baseline, i.e. where total demand is more elastic. 
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Figure 5.2 Difference in GVA per hectare under the Health Check scenario relative to baseline 
(EUR/ha UAA) 
 
Simulation results from the partial equilibrium model CAPRI. The map shows the difference in Gross 
Value Added per UAA between the Health Check and the baseline scenarios for 2013. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the difference in GVA per hectare across all sectors in each region 
and in Health Check relative to the baseline. In the map, the yellow class contains 
regions where GVA remains close to the baseline value. In red regions GVA 
decreases, whereas it increases in the green regions. The change in modified gross 
value added (MGVA) depends mainly upon the following factors: 
• Increased productivity due to the investment subsidies 
• Reduced cost due to increased productivity 
• Decreased product prices due to increased production 
 
The figure shows that for most regions, GVA increases or remains constant. The most 
negative impact is found in the Netherlands. It is due to less technical progress in that 
region (communicated from LEITAP to CAPRI via the model link). A comparison 
with, for example, Germany reveals that technical change due to the investments in 
human and physical capital in NL is only about 1/10 of that in DE, and this is the 
major explanation for the difference between those countries. The indirect effects of 
technical progress in terms of lower product prices spread easily across borders, so 
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that improved productivity in DE lowers the beef prices also in NL, whereas technical 
progress per se does not spread as easily – for example, NL does not benefit from 
more modern farm machinery or skilled labour than DE. 
 
Some Member States, notably Italy, contain some regions with increased GVA 
(southern Italy) and some with decreased GVA (northern Italy). The regional 
differences in this case, as well as in the cases of UK, Ireland and Slovenia, is due to 
the relative specialization meat production, indicated by Figure 4.5 showing beef meat 
production per ha UAA. The EU meat markets are more isolated from the rest of the 
world, and thus the price formation depends strongly on European supply and 
demand. The increase in supply following the productivity gains therefore results in a 
stronger price drop for meat products than for less protected arable crops. 
Consequently, animal sectors suffer from a “price scissor” when output prices drop 
more than input prices, and thus regions specialized in meat production in Member 
States with less strong technical progress may see GVA decrease. In practice, of 
course, in the regions with potentially falling GVA/hectare, where the maintenance of 
grazing by livestock is a priority, authorities may choose to increase incentives under 
the LFA or other measures in order to maintain livestock numbers utilising additional 
funds available as a result of modulation 
 
For the new Member States, the lack of change depends on the combination of (1) 
lower first pillar payments to start with (2) lower modulation rates, (3) lower public 
and private co-financing, and (4) a different distribution of spending across the axes 
of P2. 
 
The CMEF indicators also indicate that Pillar 2 measures as a whole will contribute to 
an increase in GVA. The result indicator measuring the increase in gross value added 
in supported holdings/enterprises in agriculture/forestry, and the economic impact 
indicators on economic growth (measured as net additional value added expressed in 
PPS) and labour productivity (measured as change in gross value added per full-time 
equivalent), could be used to explore whether the use of compulsory modulation 
(CM) funds in the second pillar, under the baseline scenario, is anticipated to affect 
the competitiveness of the agricultural sector.  
 
On the whole, according to the RDPs in the case study countries, it is expected that 
support for Pillar 2 measures will increase GVA in supported holdings in 
agriculture/forestry by 0.05-3% p.a. The anticipated contribution of CM funds to this 
increase varies from 5% in Portugal to 31% in the Netherlands.  
 
5.1.5 Effects on trade 
Due to the enhanced funding available for physical and human capital investments 
within Pillar 2, the quantity of exports will increase with between 2,5% and 3% in the 
Health Check Scenario (Figures 5.3). The impact of physical capital investments is 
larger as a larger part of the money is spent on this measure (~25%). The main 
underlying reason is that the investments increases productivity and thus lower prices 
relative to the prices of foreign producers. Reducing Pillar 1 payments has a small 
negative effect. Lower prices of EU products relative to foreign products lead also to 
a decrease in the quantity of imports. (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). 
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Figure 5.3 EU-27 quantity of exports in primary agriculture – 5% / 13% modulation (% change 
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Figure 5.4 EU-27 quantity of imports in primary agriculture – 5% / 13% modulation (% change 
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Source: LEITAP 
Table 5.2. shows the impact of modulation on net trade for a range of different 
primary and processed commodities under the Health Check scenario, compared with 
the baseline, and shows the percentage change under different simulations. 
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Table 5.2 Net trade in different primary and processed commodities. Baseline value in 1000 t and 
other simulations as percent difference to baseline. 
Product group Baseline P1 only P2+cap P2+age P1+P2 
Cereals 18 134 -0,50 2,41 -1,38 2,18 
Oilseeds -19 488 0,01 0,40 -0,20 0,27 
Other arable field crops -1 879 0,41 0,88 -0,09 0,60 
Vegetables and Permanent crops -14 310 -0,01 0,50 -0,07 0,56 
Meat 748 -0,12 7,69 0,40 10,05 
Other Animal products 540 -0,01 0,69 -0,06 0,81 
Dairy products -255 -0,13 -1,60 -0,09 -1,97 
Oils -5 273 -0,13 0,12 -0,22 0,07 
Oil cakes -25 513 0,12 1,09 -0,41 0,84 
Secondary products -6 672 0,00 0,53 -0,15 0,46 
P1 = first pillar, cap = Physical capital investments, age = agri-environment schemes, P2 = second pillar. 
Source: CAPRI 
Net exports increase for all products except for dairy products. Note that with 
conventional computations, a negative percentage change of a negative net trade 
position implies a less negative net trade in the simulation, as this is equivalent to a 
net import. Since net trade is the difference of two large terms (supply and demand in 
the EU), small production and demand changes result in relatively large net trade 
effects, sometimes in the range of several percentage points. 
 
Since the agricultural sector itself is a major user of agricultural products, technical 
progress impacts on the market balance by reducing demand as well as increasing 
supply. For cereals, we saw in Chapter 4 that gross production increased slightly 
under the Health Check scenario. Feed demand within the EU decreases even more 
(as a result of technical progress), and thus a clearly positive net trade effect results. 
The only situation where net exports do not increase is with regard to dairy products 
(a decrease by 1.41 percent). A closer look at the underlying data reveals that 
production actually increases slightly, but that human demand also increases, and 
since net trade is a very small share of total production on average across all products, 
this is sufficient to result in a 1.27% improvement in net exports. The tiny change in 
human demand is difficult to track. It may be due to the increased purchasing power 
of the consumers connected to the increased GDP following the 2003 CAP reform, 
communicated from LEITAP to CAPRI and applied as a shock to the consumer 
budget constraint. 
 
The columns of the table contain the effects in different simulation experiments. In 
essence the entire net trade effect comes from technical progress (due to human and 
physical capital investments). More specifically, the decomposition in the table shows 
that reducing the first pillar payments has a small negative effect on net trade, capital 
investments have clear positive effects, and agri-environment payments have a small 
negative effect except for meat (grazing by animals is supported). 
 
5.1.6 Welfare effects 
The Health Check Scenario leads to a welfare gain measured by equivalent variation 
(EV) of 4 billion USD for the EU-15 without taking into account the welfare 
contribution due to the provision of public goods. 80% of this is caused by the 
increased level of technological change due to the increased availability of funding for 
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Pillar 2 measures that encourage investments in physical and human capital within the 
agricultural sector (Axis 1) and regional investments outside the agricultural sector 
(Figure 5.5). The allocative efficiency effect is positive in relation to reductions of 
first pillar direct payments, due to the fact that production factors move out of the 
distorted agricultural sector to less distorted sectors. It is also positive as a result of 
increasing the budget for the second pillar, as certain measures enhance structural 
change: factors leave the agricultural sector, due to technological progress, and move 
into the services sector, which is less distorted. The endowment effect (inflow or 
outflow of endowments) is determined by the inflow and outflow of agricultural land. 
It is negative in the case of reducing Pillar 1 as land is taken out of production in 
marginal areas. It is positive in relation to the increase in second pillar payments, as 
some measures – most notably LFA and agri-environment measures – can maintain 
land in production that might otherwise be abandoned. 
Figure 5.5 Welfare (Equivalent Variation, EU-15, million USD, change Health Check scenario 
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5.2 Effects on Farm Income and Farm Household Income 
5.2.1 Issues 
This section focuses on the impact of modulation on farm income and farm household 
income under both the baseline and the Health Check scenarios. Assessing the 
impacts of modulation on farm income and farm household income is not 
straightforward. While Pillar 1 direct payments have a direct income effect, this is not 
the case for the majority of Pillar 2 measures, and so the degree to which Pillar 2 
measures – those focused at the agricultural sector – are considered to have an income 
effect first needs to be established. Within this study, it has been assumed that 
expenditure under the LFA measures are pure income payments, that expenditure 
under human and physical capital measures has an income effect according to 
assumptions on investment rate returns, and that expenditure under the agri-
environment measure are considered to be income neutral.  
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In general, we assume that those farm types where Pillar 1 direct payments make up a 
high proportion of income are likely to experience a greater negative impact on 
overall farm incomes from reductions in Pillar 1 payments, and that this impact is 
likely to increase under the Health Check scenario as modulation rates increase. 
However, this impact should be mitigated to a certain extent by the additional 
availability of funds available through Pillar 2, which are augmented by additional 
national co-financing and private funds. The extent to which this takes place will 
depend on the ability of different farms to access funding from Pillar 2. It should also 
be noted that a proportion of funds will be redistributed away from the farming sector 
to non-farming beneficiaries.  
 
Data on the impacts on modulation on farm incomes and farm household income has 
been calculated based on both the FES (using FADN data), CAPRI and LEITAP 
models, and on information provided within the case study reports. 
5.2.2 Summary 
The impact of modulation on farm family income is unclear, with different economic 
models giving slightly differing results. According to FES, at the Member State level 
it would appear that aggregate farm household income declines very slightly as a 
result of modulation. Conversely, CAPRI and LEITAP indicate a slightly positive 
income effect. These overall results are likely to mask potentially more significant 
local and regional differences, particularly between farm types, whereby some type of 
farms/businesses are likely to benefit and some will lose out in terms of income.  
 
FES calculations indicate that, under the Health Check Scenario, the decrease in DP 
per farm in 2013 relative to the Baseline Scenario ranges from about 90 euro in 
Greece to about 2,000 euro in Denmark. Due to additional reductions in direct 
payments from Pillar 1 under the Health Check Scenario, Farm Income decreases in 
2013 by 0.7% per farm in Greece to over 6% in Denmark. When considering the 
redistribution of the additional modulation funds within Pillar 2, FES only takes 
account of the impact of human and physical investments, LFA and agri-environment 
schemes on Farm Income. Taking the situation in 2013, it appears that the additional 
input of money to the budget to these measures, even with associated national co-
financing, is on the whole insufficient to compensate for the income loss resulting 
from reductions in direct payments, except for Luxembourg. This result, however, is 
largely due to the fact that LFA measures are the only Pillar 2 measures modelled as 
pure income payments, and Luxembourg is unusual in having designated a large 
proportion of its UAA as LFA.  
 
A look at the income effects per farm type reveals that field cropping, grazing, milk 
and mixed farms are most affected: within these farm types there is both a large 
proportion of farms that experience an income loss and a large proportion that faces 
an income increase. Across the EU-15, grazing farms show the largest proportion of 
net winners from modulation, with 36% of farms experiencing an increase in farm 
income of over 0.5% – although this figure masks much higher proportions of grazing 
farms gaining in France (69%) and the UK (96%). Mixed and diary farms, on the 
other hand, tend to have the largest proportion of net losers, with 45% of farms 
experiencing a net decrease in farm income of more than 0.5% – again the figures are 
as high as 90% in Denmark and 88% in Ireland.  
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5.2.3 Findings from FES 
Changes in Direct Payments in Pillar 1 
In the EU-15, Direct Payments (DP) vary from about 3,200 euro per farm in Portugal 
to over 29,000 euro per farm in the UK in 2013 in the Baseline Scenario (Table 5.3). 
Without the rate of 5% compulsory modulation, DP per farm in 2013 would be 
higher, ranging on average from about 60 euro in Greece to about 1,500 euro in the 
UK. Under the Health Check Scenario, the decrease in DP per farm in 2013 relative to 
the Baseline Scenario ranges from about 90 euro in Greece to about 2,000 euro in 
Denmark. For Portugal and the UK it is assumed that voluntary modulation will be 
substituted by the additional modulation, and therefore DP per farm is hardly affected 
under the Health Check Scenario. The small increase in DP in the UK arises due to 
the franchise, which applies in the Health Check Scenario whereas it is not applicable 
in voluntary modulation. 
Table 5.3 Direct Payments of Pillar 1 per farm in the different scenarios in the EU-15 Member 
States, 2013 (euro) 
 Baseline (5% 
modulation) 
Change in Direct Payments relative to the Baseline 







Austria 9490 268 128 -803 -428 
Belgium 16675 663 176 -1989 -1062 
Denmark 27439 1261 240 -3696 -2041 
Finland 14413 518 172 -1555 -835 
France 24154 1055 187 -3177 -1702 
Germany 21292 908 180 -2811 -1786 
Greece 3493 57 33 -171 -91 
Ireland 11103 356 132 -1069 -570 
Italy 4851 149 36 -446 -268 
Luxembourg 19420 788 203 -2377 -1260 
Netherlands 13204 525 130 -1588 -832 
Portugal 3201 118 30 -293 -6 
Spain 5567 174 58 -515 -275 
Sweden 22029 1092 171 -2844 -1616 
UK 29246 1497 223 -4675 195 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
In most EU-15 regions, the decrease in direct payments in Pillar 1 under the Health 
Check Scenario relative to the Baseline Scenario varies between 5 and 10% (Figure 
5.6). However, the decrease is higher in regions with relatively large farms in Eastern 
Germany (about 11-13%) and lower in regions in Austria and Greece and several 
Spanish and Italian regions. As a result of the fact that under the Health Check 
Scenario voluntary modulation decreases with almost the same amount as compulsory 
modulation increases, hardly any change in amount of direct payments is experienced 
in most of the UK and Portuguese regions. The only change that can be experienced is 
due to the fact that under compulsory modulation the franchise is applicable. 
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Figure 5.6 Direct Payments of Pillar 1 per farm under the Health Check Scenario in the EU-15 
regions, 2013 (change in % relative to Baseline Scenario) 
 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Large variations in proportion DP in Farm Income among farm types and Member 
States 
A look at the proportion of DP in Farm Income under the Baseline Scenario reveals 
two striking issues (Table 5.4): 
1. the average proportion ranges from 16% per farm in Italy and the Netherlands 
to about 80% per farm in Sweden and Denmark; 
2. the proportion is considerably higher in field crops, grazing, milk and mixed 
farms than on pigs and poultry, permanent crops, wine and horticultural farms.  
 
It could be argued that the higher the proportion of DP in Farm Income, the greater 
the decrease in Farm Income under increasing rates 
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results that the impact of changes in the rate of compulsory modulation on farms in 
some Member States (Denmark, Sweden, UK, France, Ireland and Germany) and 
some farming types (field crops, grazing, milk and mixed farms) tends to be greater 
than others.  
Table 5.4 Proportion of Direct Payments of Pillar 1 in Farm Income per farm type under the 
Baseline Scenario in the EU-15 Member States, 2013 (%) 
 Field 
crops 







Denmark  193 - 62 106 33 12 - 2 82 
Sweden  144 92 48 132 37 - - 1 80 
UK  112 106 40 87 3 3 - 3 67 
France  92 80 54 77 20 7 3 1 58 
Ireland  80 77 29 64 - - - - 57 
Germany  92 86 43 80 26 2 3 2 56 
Finland  66 136 31 57 15 - - 1 46 
Luxembourg  - 67 36 62 - - 2 - 42 
Portugal  46 54 41 61 0 18 7 2 37 
Austria  44 38 22 39 18 2 14 - 28 
Greece  40 29 - 33 - 21 6 3 27 
Belgium  37 53 26 32 5 1 - 1 26 
Spain  40 39 26 35 4 17 3 0 23 
Italy  28 17 18 21 5 11 3 0 16 
Netherlands  34 77 34 34 3 0 - 0 16 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Changes in funds for Pillar 2 
FES only takes account of the impact of human and physical capital investments 
(measures 111, 112 and 121), LFA (measures 211 and 212) and agri-environment 
schemes (measure 214) on Farm Income. Additional modulation funds in the Health 
Check Scenario are spent on these measures in the same proportion as the EAFRD 
budget 2007-201318. Additional modulation funds spent on other rural development 
measures are not taken into account by FES, as it is assumed that these only have 
indirect effects on farm income or that these affect non-farm income in the rural 
economy. Funds spent on LFA are considered as direct income support; funds spent 
on agri-environment schemes are considered to be income neutral, whereas funds 
spent on investment subsidies result in an income increase according to assumptions 
on investment rate returns (see Chapter 2). 
 
Under the Health Check Scenario, the highest amounts of additional modulation funds 
for Pillar 2 are available per farm in Denmark, Germany, France and Sweden (about 
1,600 to 2,000 euro) in 2013 and the lowest in Greece (about 90 euro) (Table 5.5). In 
FES, these are spent on LFA measures, agri-environment schemes and investment 
measures in Axis 1. By doing so, in most countries a substantial part of the additional 
modulation funds are absorbed. Due to national co-financing and private funding, 
additional modulation funds for these measures increase, varying from about 60% in 
Greece to over 700% in Belgium. This high increase is the result of a relatively strong 
emphasis on investment subsidies in Pillar 2 in Belgium, which induce a high amount 
of private funding. 
                                                 
18
 By doing so, FES slightly differs from the application of the Health Check scenario by the other 
models, which spent additional modulation funds on the new challenges. 
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Austria 428 24 46 9 79 207 394 252 151 
Belgium 1062 4 30 39 73 91 627 5982 764 
Denmark 2041 1 46 9 56 40 1708 772 117 
Finland 835 40 32 7 79 334 944 58 104 
France 1702 31 15 22 67 940 450 1300 134 
Germany 1786 10 25 11 46 325 755 1247 184 
Greece 91 9 18 15 42 10 22 30 64 
Ireland 570 21 49 3 73 218 509 49 87 
Italy 268 6 23 19 49 35 120 202 174 
Luxembourg 1260 29 30 24 82 1447 1501 3691 542 
Netherlands 832 4 22 10 36 60 371 529 206 
Portugal 6 18 10 11 39 - - - - 
Spain 275 6 14 14 34 34 75 167 193 
Sweden 1616 14 54 12 81 497 1865 1162 170 
UK 2618  9 54 4 67 734 2587 592 90 
EU-15 566 15 25 14 54 196 319 449 175 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
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Changes in farm income  
Due to additional modulation of direct payments in Pillar 1 in the Health Check 
Scenario, Farm Income decreases in 2013 by 0.7% per farm in Greece to over 6% in 
Denmark relative to the Baseline Scenario (Table 5.6). It appears that the additional 
input of money to the budget for LFA measures, agri-environment schemes and 
investment subsidies is on the whole insufficient to compensate for the income loss 
per farm in 2013 due to modulation of direct payments under the Health Check 
Scenario, except for Luxembourg. In the UK also a positive effect can be perceived, 
resulting from the removal of the franchise and additional funds for LFA payments. 
The income loss per farm ranges from 0.3% in Austria to 3-4% in Denmark, Germany 
and Sweden. A number of reflections could be put forward for the interpretation of 
these findings: 
a. The reduction of direct payments due to modulation of Pillar 1 is considered 
as a direct income loss, whereas rural development measures in Pillar 2 are 
usually not given as direct income support, with the main exception of the 
LFA measure. The amount of received investment subsidies (measures 111, 
112 and 121) does not directly increase the Farm Income, since its nature is 
not an income payment. Moreover, the income effect of additional 
investments, due to the subsidies, is distributed over the time span of the 
investment. Table 5.6 only shows the income effect in 2013. The total effect of 
the investment subsidies on farm income is much higher (i.e. present net 
value). Furthermore the agri-environment measures are considered in FES to 
be income neutral. 
b. Modulation of Pillar 1 only effects farm income, whereas Pillar 2 is directed at 
both farming and non-farming activities in the rural economy. So part of the 
modulated funds from farms leaks away to non-farming activities in the rural 
economy. 
c. In Table 5.6, the focus is on the average farm in a country. Within countries, 
there is a variation around this average, so some farms will lose more than the 
average, while especially LFA farms are likely to win as the increase in LFA 
payments could be higher than the reduction of Pillar 1 funds made on these 
farms. 
d. The results for Luxembourg could be explained by the fact that the whole 
country is eligible for LFA payments, along with the high national co-
financing rate for this measure in this country (75%). In addition, there is a 
rather high rate of private funding for investment subsidies in this country. 
 
When we look at changes in farm income per farm in 2013 under the Health Check 
Scenario in the EU regions, then it appears that regions within countries are usually 
affected in a more or less similar way, except for France, Germany, Sweden and the 
UK (Figure 5.7). Regions in the N-W France lose relatively, whereas those in S-E 
France tend to benefit. In Germany, regions with large farms in the eastern part of the 
country lose. In Sweden, losing regions are located in the south. In the UK, Scotland, 
Wales and North-Ireland are the regions that experience the highest income gains.  
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 87 
 






Change due to (mio euro) Change due to (%) 












-393 206 86 -1.2 0.6 0.3 
Belgium 64541 
-1063 91 888 -1.6 0.1 1.4 
Denmark 33554 
-1554 42 85 -4.6 0.1 0.3 
Finland 31480 
-849 335 21 -2.7 1.1 0.1 
France 41929 
-1692 940 146 -4.0 2.2 0.3 
Germany 38125 
-1627 324 186 -4.3 0.9 0.5 
Greece 12829 
-91 10 3 -0.7 0.1 0.0 
Ireland 19334 
-580 218 6 -3.0 1.1 0.0 
Italy 30978 
-268 35 32 -0.9 0.1 0.1 
Luxembourg 46041 
-1282 1523 751 -2.8 3.3 1.6 
Netherlands 83195 
-872 56 108 -1.0 0.1 0.1 
Portugal 8572 
-7 0 0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Spain 24038 
-273 34 28 -1.1 0.1 0.1 
Sweden 27577 
-1394 495 24 -5.1 1.8 0.1 
UK 43780 199 701 23 0.5 1.6 0.1 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
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Figure 5.7 Changes in Farm Income per farm under the Health Check Scenario in the EU-15 
regions, 2013 (%) 
 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Changes in Farm Income according to farm size 
For analysing which farms benefit and which farms lose from modulation, we 
grouped farms according to changes in Farm Income under the Health Check Scenario 
into three types: farms with an increase in income above 0.5%, farms where income 
remained rather stable (change between -0.5 and +0.5%) and farms with an income 
decline above 0.5% in 2013. For the EU-15 as a whole, it appears that there is a 
tendency that the larger the farm size, the larger the proportion of farms that face an 
income loss (Figure 5.8). However, this trend does not apply to the group with the 
largest farm size, likely as a result of banded modulation. The proportion of farms that 
benefit from modulation is remarkably the same for all size groups, and fluctuates in a 
small range between 9 and 18%. When we look at the individual Member States, the 
Change in Farm Income 
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same trend can be perceived for the proportion of farms that face an income decline, 
although the absolute levels of the proportion rather differs among countries (Table 
5.8). The proportion of farms according to farm size that benefits from modulation 
rather varies among Member States (Table 5.7). It is moderate in Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain and relatively high in the UK. In the last 
country, many medium-sized farms are likely to benefit from the application of the 
franchise in the Health Check Scenario. In most countries, except for Belgium, 
Denmark and Portugal, the proportion of smaller sized farms that experience an 
income increase exceeds that of the larger sized farms. 
Figure 5.8 Changes in Farm Income under the Health Check Scenario according to farm size in 
























Increase: change in FFI>0.5%; stable: change in FFI between -0.5% and + 0.5%; decrease: change in FFI>-
0.5%. 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
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Table 5.7 Proportion of farms with an increase of over 0.5% in Farm Income under the Health 















Austria   44 20 9 9  
Belgium    24 20 20 32 
Denmark   3 3 6 5 4 
Finland   58 9 4 1  
France   50 50 31 15 7 
Germany   22 17 6 4 6 
Greece 8 7 4 2 1   
Ireland 70 61 21 14 6 2  
Italy  18 15 9 6 3 1 
Luxembourg    62 59 35  
Netherlands    14 2 2 2 
Portugal  0 0 0 1 3  
Spain 14 10 6 3 3 3 5 
Sweden   24 24 9 5  
UK   100 93 89 72 28 
EU-15 12 14 15 18 18 14 9 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Table 5.8 Proportion of farms with a decrease of over 0.5% in Farm Income under the Health 















Austria   21 41 62 42  
Belgium    45 58 51 30 
Denmark   75 91 88 90 85 
Finland   17 56 69 79  
France   24 28 51 61 42 
Germany   9 44 72 82 78 
Greece 3 8 27 49 58   
Ireland 7 19 62 71 79 87  
Italy  2 9 25 41 53 47 
Luxembourg    13 9 13  
Netherlands    32 58 67 24 
Portugal     0 18  
Spain 3 5 21 41 60 60 31 
Sweden   67 60 82 85 94 
UK    1 1 1 25 
EU-15 3 5 20 36 53 60 45 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Changes in Farm Income according to farm type 
An analysis of which farm types benefit and lose under the Health Check Scenario in 
the EU-15 in 2013, shows that Farm Income on horticultural, permanent cropping, 
pigs and poultry, and wine farms are hardly affected (Figure 5.9). We already noted 
before that the proportion of DP in Farm Income was rather small on these farm types 
(Table 5.4). Grazing and milk farms have the highest proportion of benefiting farms 
(25-35%), mainly due to increased LFA payments. About one fifth of mixed and field 
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cropping farms also experience an income increase. On the other hand, there is also a 
considerable proportion of field crops, grazing, milk and mixed farms that face an 
income decrease, varying from about one third for field crops and grazing farms to 
nearly 50% for milk and mixed farms. This average EU-15 picture can by and large 
also be perceived in the individual Member States (Table 5.9 and Table 5.10). The 
Health Check Scenario evidently results in a redistribution of funds within farm types 
rather than among farm types. 
Figure 5.9 Changes in Farm Income under the Health Check Scenario according to farm type in 
















































Increase: change in FFI>0.5%; stable: change in FFI between -0.5% and + 0.5%; decrease: change in FFI>-
0.5%. 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Table 5.9 Proportion of farms with an increase of over 0.5% in Farm Income under the Health 












Austria 11 25  38 21 13 21 10 
Belgium 21 15 31 29 14 35 21  
Denmark 4  5 4 5 4 2  
Finland 33 3 6 7 19  10  
France 23 69 8 42 30 21 18 10 
Germany 6 11 7 16 13 5 11 5 
Greece 13 3   4 0   
Ireland 2 41  21 2    
Italy 20 38 4 12 22 4 3 4 
Luxembourg  53  69 70   10 
Netherlands 5 15 1 3 6 1 4  
Portugal 0        
Spain 17 11 3 4 7 3 5 2 
Sweden 19 12 18 18 18  24  
UK 81 96 28 83 83 32 26  
EU-15 18 36 5 24 17 3 10 5 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 92 
 
Table 5.10 Proportion of farms with a decrease of over 0.5% in Farm Income under the Health 










Austria 74 48  21 56  27 18 
Belgium 65 74 4 57 66 2 11  
Denmark 88  12 96 90 22 70  
Finland 49 97  55 60  23  
France 67 23 3 54 63 8 39 8 
Germany 75 79 2 49 77 3 58 8 
Greece 21 33 2  30 10   
Ireland 77 43  52 88    
Italy 23 22 1 37 27 7 13 1 
Luxembourg  20  5 12    
Netherlands 65 39 1 93 64 1 9  
Portugal 0 1   0 0   
Spain 38 53 1 54 54 12 12 2 
Sweden 77 74  63 75  39  
UK 6 1 4 1 3 5 1  
EU-15 36 35 1 47 49 9 23 3 
Source: FES model, based on FADN data. 
5.2.4 Findings from CAPRI 
Section 5.1 analysed gross value added at producer prices. Adding the effect of 
changing premium payments results in the indicator of Modified Gross Value Added 
(MGVA), which reflects the return to the fixed costs capital, land and labour. CAPRI 
does not explicitly feature capital and labour, and the cost of land is accounted for by 
the dual value of the land constraint. Thus, MGVA is the best available basis for an 
income measure in CAPRI.  
 
Table 5.11 shows agricultural income on sector level (EU-27), and disaggregates the 
net results into different revenues and costs. The left-hand column of the table shows 
MGVA in million euro in the baseline, and the remaining columns the percent 
difference in four different scenarios to that baseline. The bottom row shows the net 
result, which turns out to be a small loss. The other rows of the table reveal how the 
result arises from Production value, Inputs and Premiums. In fact, all three positions 
decrease, but the decrease in revenue is such that the net result is an income loss. 
Given the discussion of the impact on production in Section 5.1, the result for income 
is not surprising. We have already seen that production increases for most products, 
with a general depression of prices as a result. For cereals, the price reduction (not 
shown) results from reduced feed demand due to technical progress in feeding. The 
production increase, which is partly due to technical progress, also manifests as an 





Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report – page 93 
Table 5.11 Modified gross value added at producer prices plus premiums in EU-27 in different 





P1 + cap 
(%) 
P1 + age 
(%) 
P1 + P2 
(%) 
Production value 393 163 0,05 -0,28 0,02 -0,42 
    Cereals 37 555 -0,04 -0,24 0,03 -0,23 
    Oilseeds 5 552 -0,15 -0,06 -0,16 -0,06 
    Other arable field crops 9 591 -0,05 -0,04 -0,02 -0,03 
    Vegetables and Permanent crops 84 268 0,02 -0,17 0,06 -0,16 
    All other crops 33 759 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,16 
    Fodder 21 506 0,06 -0,44 0,08 -0,58 
    Meat 74 425 0,11 -0,51 -0,01 -0,83 
    Other Animal products 57 642 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,03 
    Young animals 31 331 0,35 -1,38 -0,01 -2,50 
    All other income (EAA Output rest) 23 237 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
    Manure output 14 297 -0,07 -0,02 0,12 0,21 
Inputs 239 395 0,00 -0,46 -0,04 -0,69 
    Fertiliser 27 247 -0,07 -0,22 -0,15 -0,39 
    Feeding stuff 77 279 -0,06 -0,54 0,11 -0,51 
    Remonte 31 712 0,36 -1,40 -0,02 -2,53 
    Other inputs 103 158 -0,05 -0,17 -0,13 -0,33 
Premiums 49 210 -6,31 -6,31 -3,03 -2,07 
Gross value added at producer prices 
plus premiums 202 977 -1,44 -1,54 -0,65 -0,51 
P1 = first pillar, cap = physical capital investments, age = agri-environment schemes, P2 = second pillar. Source: 
CAPRI. 
What may be surprising is the decrease in premium receipts, given that the funds are 
transferred to the second pillar and topped up with co-financing. The explanation for 
the decreasing premium receipts is straightforward: only the three measures LFA, 
N2K and AE are accounted for directly in CAPRI, thus a major share of all second 
pillar payments are not considered in this accounting. This is a limitation of the study, 
but it is also important to keep in mind that the definition of the income statement in 
this form is focussing on gross value added, whereas the omitted measures mainly 
relate to either capital and labour investments or to non-farming activities. 
 
The cost saving for fertiliser is due to technical progress in input use, which 
counteracts the effect of somewhat higher fertiliser prices (not shown) that result from 
the boost of the general economy simulated in LEITAP. For feed stuffs, there are two 
main effects that result in lower costs. Firstly, there is lower demand for feed stuffs 
due to technical progress. This reduces the use as well as the prices. This is also 
reflected in reduced production values of some activities in the table (cereals, fodder). 
Secondly, the net effect of the second pillar on fodder production is a small 
production increase. This is partly caused by the linkage of some measures to grazing, 
working as a subsidy on fodder production, and partly (mainly) due to higher yields 
resulting from the technical progress, most of all in the vast European grassland areas. 
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Figure 5.10 Change in gross value added plus premiums per hectare in Health Check scenario 
versus baseline.  
 
Simulation results from the partial equilibrium model CAPRI. The map shows the relative difference in 
Gross Value Added plus premiums between the Health Check and the baseline scenarios for 2013. 
 
Figure 5.10 shows percentage change in total MGVA divided by UAA in all regions, 
to indicate the regional distribution of the income effects. Yellow colour indicates 
regions where there is approximately no change, darker shades of red denote larger 
losses in MGVA per hectare, and green shades denote increases. There are broadly 
speaking different classes of regions where income decreases: 
• In north-western Europe, due to a (general) redistribution FEOGA budget of the 
north-west towards EAFRD budget in the south 
• In beef producing regions, due to the more protected beef markets and coupled 
premiums 
• In the new Member States, because they are almost exclusively indirectly 
affected via the lower market prices 
In Sweden, Austria and in particular in Finland, the return of modulated money in the 
form of agri-environment measures (including co-financing and top-ups) is relatively 
large, and contributes to supporting agricultural income there by supporting the 
provision of environmental services. As noted in section 5.1.4, authorities in regions 
with farms experiencing a potential decline in income as measured by MGVA, may 
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increase payments for EAFRD measures in areas where the maintenance of specific 
farming practices or systems is a priority. 
 
5.2.5 Findings from LEITAP 
Simulations with the LEITAP model show that modulation of the First Pillar reduces 
agricultural income in the EU-27: by about 1% under 5% CM and by more than 2% 
under 13% CM (Figure 5.11). On the other hand, CM of the Second Pillar boosts 
agricultural income. This is mainly caused by compensatory payments in the scope of 
the LFA and agri-environment measures. Agricultural income effects of physical and 
human capital investments in Axis 1 are negligible, as the benefits of these measures 
are given to consumers by reduced prices. On the whole, modulation of the First and 
Second Pillar in the EU-27 is basically income neutral. 
 
Figure 5.11 EU-27 agricultural income growth in primary agriculture with 5% and 13% 












LFA Agri-Env Regional 2nd Pillar 1st Pillar Modulation
5 percent 13 percent
 
Source: LEITAP. 
Modulation funds raised in Pillar 1 are augmented by national co-financing and often 
also by private funds when they are used for the measures of the Second Pillar. In 
Figure 5.12 simulations are presented for situations with 0% national co-financing. As 
in this situation less funds become available for the measures of the Second Pillar, the 
income increase due to modulation of the Second Pillar is less than in the Health 
Check Scenario with 13% modulation. In the situation of an absence of national co-
financing, modulation of the First and Second Pillar even results in a decrease in 
agricultural income by over 1%. This simulation shows that national co-financing 
tends to have an important impact on the results of modulation on agricultural income.  
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Figure 5.12 Impact of co-financing on EU-27 agricultural income with 13% modulation, 2013 (% 












LFA Agri-Env Regional 2nd Pillar 1st Pillar Modulation
13% Modulation with cofinancing 13% Modulation with no cofinancing
 
Source: LEITAP. 
With 25% deadweight or crowding out effects of the second pillar investments, the 
very slight positive impact on agricultural income becomes reduced to less than half a 
percent for EU-27 (see Figure 5.13). 
 
Figure 5.13 Impact of deadweight or crowding out on EU-27 agricultural income with 13% 










LFA Agri-Env Regional 2nd Pillar 1st Pillar Modulation
13% Modulation with 0% deadweight 13% Modulation with 25% deadweight
 
Source: LEITAP. 
5.2.6 Findings from the case studies 
On the whole, experts consulted in the case studies expected a negative impact on 
farm income due to modulation of Pillar 1, and a zero to slightly positive impact on 
farm income due to the use of modulation funds in Pillar 2.  
 
Evidence from the case studies also sheds some light on the differential effects of 
reducing Pillar 1 payments on farms of different types and sizes. For example, the 
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Portuguese case study expert suggests that the greatest income effects are most likely 
to be experienced by medium-sized full-time farmers (i.e. those in receipt of between 
5,000-15,000 euro in direct payments), where P1 payments are a significant part of 
farm income. In the UK, it is the grazing livestock (beef & sheep) producers in 
lowland areas and the LFA which have the lowest incomes, and direct payments make 
up a high proportion of farm income. Reductions in Pillar 1 payments, therefore, have 
a disproportionate effect on the income of these producers. However, research has 
shown that even for these farms, reductions in Pillar 1 payments, even at a 25% 
modulation rate, has a minimal impact of farm income (no more than 1% reduction).  
 
The economic impact of CM in France depends primarily of the rate of reduction 
applied. Currently the average rate of P1 reduction is about 4% based on a 5% rate in 
combination with the franchise (cuts will be closer to 5% for larger farms in line with 
size of the Single Farm Payment). In 2006, P1 payments were on the average euro 
24,100 for all professional farms – or euro 12,000 per farm employee – representing 
82% of all direct aids and the equivalent of 74% of the income. 
 
The economic weight of P1 payments varies according to production type and region. 
In 2006 P1 payments exceeded income from other sources, for the following farm 
types and regions, respectively:  
 
• No. 13 (Specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops), No. 42 (Specialist cattle-
rearing and fattening), No. 43 (Cattle-dairying, rearing and fattening) and No. 
81 (Field crops, grazing livestock combined);  
• Auvergne, Centre, Ile de France, Lorraine, Midi-Pyrenees and Pays de la Loire. 
 
78% of professional farms are subject to P1 cuts, which in isolation cause a loss of 
euro 960 per farm or 2.9% of income (averaged over all French farms). Among the 
various types of production identified, the maximum decrease of income is 6.2% (or 
euro 1,830) for holdings of major crops. In all French regions, the impact is less than 
5% of the income, with a maximum average of 2,200 euro per farm in Ile de France. 
 
An analysis of the 2006 FADN data for France seems to indicate that only 56%19 of 
the collected modulation funds are redistributed to farms through the rural 
development measures under Pillar 2. This analysis does not concern the non-
professional farms; such holdings are numerous in France (nearly 40% of the total), 
but they produce just 5% of the national agricultural production. These small farms 
probably receive an even lower proportion of direct aids. 
 
The overall impact of modulation in France is estimated to be 328 million euro. 
Among the 342,800 professional farms, several categories can be distinguished 
according to the situation with regard to the financial impact of modulation.  
                                                 
19
 This percentage takes account of the fact that only 80% of modulated funds are returned to France, 
and of that amount a proportion does not go to farmers, whereas all of the original direct payments in 
Pillar 1 would have gone to them. (Source: Case study for France.) 
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Figure 5.14 Analytical Framework for assessing the redistributive effects of compulsory 
modulation between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 at the level of the beneficiary in France 
Unaffected  
o 63,800 holdings (19% of farms).  
o They retain all Pillar 1 direct payments, as 
these are below the euro 5,000 franchise.  
o They do not receive any Pillar 2 payments. 
o These farms are often specialised in wine, 
fruits and vegetables.  
o Comparatively to the other categories of 
farms discussed in this figure, they have a 
higher income per family work unit.  
o They have, on the average, 3.1 jobs and 15 
hectares. 
Outright winners  
o 9,900 holdings (3% of farms).  
o They receive Pillar 2 support even if they are 
not affected by the modulation of Pillar 1.  
o This category, with the ‘mixed’ category 
below, has a high proportion of ‘sheep and 
goats’ (80%) and ‘specialist cattle rearing and 
fattening’ (58%) farm types.  
Losers 
o 196,900 holdings (57% of farms). 
o 138,800 farms (40% of total farms) 
experience the reduction of Pillar 1 payments 
and receive nothing through Pillar 2.  
o 58,100 farms (17% of the total) have reduced 
Pillar 1 payments that are not compensated 
for by Pillar 2 receipts.  
o The proportion of ‘specialist cereals’ and 
mixed (cereals and beef production) farm 
types is very high.  
o These farms have, on the average, 96 acres, 
euro 34,200 of direct aid and euro 24,100 
income per family work unit.  
o The impact of modulation (with P2 realloca-
tion) corresponds to a 3% decrease of 
income. 
Net winners 
o 72,100 holdings (21% of farms).  
o They receive more from Pillar 2 than they 
lose through the modulation of Pillar 1 funds. 
o In common with the ‘winners’, this farm 
category has, on average, 96 acres, euro 
34,000 of direct aid (P1) and euro 24,100 of 
income per family work unit.  
o The impact of modulation (with P2 realloca-
tion) corresponds to a 5% increase in income. 
 
Source: Case study for France. 
The impact of modulation at the regional level in France is heavily dependent on 
agricultural specialisation. Thus, modulation is positive for regions (notably in 
mountain areas) specialised in extensive systems of cattle and sheep production. On 
the contrary, it is negative for regions with a high proportion of farms specialised in 
cereals.  
 
According to the French case study, there are clear redistribution effects of 
modulation. For example, the impact of modulation corresponds to -3% of the income 
(after reallocation) for the 53,100 big farms (over 100 ESU) from the category “losing 
farm”. These farms have, on average, 57,400 euro of direct aid (Pillar 1) and an 
income of 34,600 euro per family AWU. At the opposite, the modulation corresponds 
to +6% of the income (after reallocation) for the 51,300 small farms from the category 
“winning farm” (‘outright’ and ‘net’ combined). These units receive 13,600 euro of 
direct aids (Pillar 1) and have an income of 14,900 euro per family AWU. If the 
modulation plays in the direction of reducing income inequalities, the redistributive 
effect is low (with a uniform rate of 5% modulation).  
5.2.7 Concluding comments 
Experts consulted in the case studies expected a negative impact on farm income due 
to modulation of Pillar 1 and a zero to slightly positive impact on farm income due to 
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the use of modulation funds in Pillar 2. This expectation was confirmed by the 
findings from FES. However, whereas FES calculations show that the combined 
effect of a reduction of Direct Payments of Pillar 1 and an increased spending on 
Pillar 2 under the Health Check Scenario results in a small income loss for the 
average farm in all EU-15 countries, except for Luxembourg and the UK, CAPRI 
calculations show a slightly positive income effect for the EU-27 as a whole.  
 
Field cropping, grazing, milk and mixed farms tend to have the highest share of Direct 
Payments in their Farm Income. It appears that Farm Income shows the most changes 
on these farm types under the Health Check Scenario: both a large proportion of these 
farms face an income loss and a high proportion experience an income gain relative to 
the Baseline Scenario. The Health Check Scenario evidently results in a redistribution 
of funds within farm types rather than among farm types. 
 
In our analysis, we only focussed on the impact of modulation of the first and second 
pillar on farm income. It goes without saying that rural development measures could 
also directly or indirectly affect income of non-agricultural actors. This is especially 
the case for measures of Axis 3 and Axis 4 (the LEADER programme).  
5.3 Employment 
The availability of jobs is a crucial issue for the viability of rural areas. In the process 
of economic development, the structure of the economy changes: employment in 
agriculture shrinks and employment in the industry and services sector increases. As 
agricultural employment is predominantly located in rural areas, the loss of 
agricultural jobs in these areas could result in outmigration, unless there are other 
employment opportunities available, be it on- or off-farm. Policies could facilitate the 
creation of jobs in many ways, for example, by providing stable macro-economic 
conditions, road and other infrastructure, and investments in physical and human 
capital. The second pillar especially aims to enhance the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector and the viability of rural areas. As such, it is directed at 
accompanying the process of labour exodus from the agricultural sector, rather than 
reversing this trend. It hopes to contribute ‘to increase the agricultural productivity by 
promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural 
production and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, in particular 
labour’ as was formulated in the Treaty of Rome (1958). In the scope of the analysis 
of the impact of modulation on employment, it could be argued that the second pillar 
measures, on the one hand, try to improve the conditions for the workers still 
employed in agriculture and, on the other hand, try to improve the conditions for non-
agricultural employment in rural areas, either by means of support for diversification 
into non-agricultural activities on farms or by support for business creation, 
encouragement of tourism activities and LEADER. This last type of support could 
also result in the creation of jobs. Support under the first pillar never had as a primary 
objective to create jobs. However, the stabilising effect that the support has on farm 
income might very well have slowed down the exodus of labour from the agricultural 
sector.  
 
In this section the effects of modulation on employment will be analysed as the results 
of a decrease in Pillar 1 and the increase of measures in Pillar 2. Changes in the 
budget might lead to changes in sectoral and total employment, and to changes in the 
employment conditions in rural areas.  
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5.3.1 Issues 
Questions in this study theme relate to the impact of modulation on rural households’ 
on-farm and off-farm employment, job security, job creation and working conditions, 
while paying attention to possible sector employment effects.  
 
Employment creation and the sectoral structure of employment are shown here as 
changes in growth of employment, based on results of the LEITAP model. The ex-
ante evaluation of the CMEF indicators and the case-studies also give indications of 
the effect of modulation on job creation. Social conditions reflect the employment 
diversification, job security and working conditions in the agricultural sector, and the 
case-studies are the main source for the assessment. 
5.3.2 Summary 
Employment effects are conditioned by a complex set of factors such as labour 
productivity, market growth, unemployment, proximity to urban centres and strategy 
of the farmer. Isolating the effect of compulsory modulation on employment is 
therefore not straightforward. However, it is possible to make some inferences at a 
very general level. The results indicate that, while some changes in employment, both 
within agriculture and the services, energy and industry sectors, are experienced as a 
result of compulsory modulation, these changes are very minor. Overall, under the 
Health Check scenario, LEITAP shows that employment in the food processing and 
services sectors increases very slightly (0.02%) and decreases within the primary 
agriculture, the energy and industries sectors. The greatest decrease is experienced in 
the primary agriculture sector, although the reduction is still very small (-0.12%) 
across the EU-27.  
 
In relation to the agricultural sector, the main reason for this decrease stems from the 
reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments. This is then reinforced by the Pillar 2 
investments in physical capital (mainly Axis 1), some of which may encourage further 
structural change. Expert judgement from the case studies correlates with the model 
results. 
 
The models, CMEF indicators and case studies, all suggest that, under the Health 
Check Scenario, higher employment levels are likely to be experienced than would be 
the case with no modulation, as a result of the input of additional funds in Axis 2 and 
Axis 3 of the second pillar. However these do not outweigh the decreases seen as a 
result of reductions in Pillar 1 and the additional availability of funds for physical 
capital measures.  
 
Additional funds available under the LFA and agri-environment measures contribute 
to farm income and thereby the maintenance of employment in rural areas. In the case 
of agri-environment schemes, in many Member States positive employment effects 
could be experienced as a result of the use of additional contractors on farm, and the 
reallocation of existing on-farm labour, as well as to secondary and indirect 
employment benefits resulting from increased tourism and recreation.  
 
Axis 3 measures, as well as activities funded through the LEADER approach, all have 
the potential to increase employment in rural areas, largely outside the agricultural 
sector. While the impact of these measures on employment creation are small, given 
the limited resources allocated to these measures, however the impact may be locally 
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significant, and may help to leverage additional jobs, thereby contributing to a more 
diverse and secure job market in rural areas.  
 
At an aggregate level, increased levels of modulation appear to have a minor 
influence on social and working conditions and these are hard to measure. However, 
this may mask more significant local impacts, and the case-studies point to 
modulation having a positive effect, particularly as a result of investment in physical 
and human capital measures, for example improved on-farm infrastructure and 
increased availability of training. LEITAP also indicates that the physical investment 
measures (Axis 1) and land management incentives (Axis 2) can have a stabilising 
effect on employment. Investments related to diversification and service provision 
under Axis 3 can also contribute to a more secure job market.  
5.3.3 Sector and total employment 
The general trend with regard to employment in the agricultural sector is a long-term 
decline in the agricultural work force (about 3% p.a. in the EU-25), and composing 
only a small part of total employment (5% in the EU-15)20. The two case study 
countries in EU-10 experience either particularly high unemployment in the sector 
(PL) or a particularly low level of agricultural worker productivity (SI). Hidden 
unemployment in agriculture would be best handled through a strong pull-factor: the 
creation of jobs in other sectors so that people can leave agriculture. Those who 
remain in agriculture are likely to enlarge their farming enterprise and become more 
competitive. In this section we look at how modulation affects sectoral and total 
employment. 
 
The employment effects of compulsory modulation on the First and Second Pillar in 
primary agriculture is slightly negative: -0.04% under 5% CM and -0.12% under 13% 
CM (Table 5.12). Cutting first pillar funds reduces income in the agricultural sector, 
and therefore encourages some people to find a more profitable job outside 
agriculture. Increasing the second pillar has also a slightly negative impact on 
employment, in particular because physical capital investment (modernisation) saves 
labour. This phenomenon is further strengthened by the human capital investments 
that make people more attractive for employment outside agriculture. On the other 
hand, LFA and agri-environment measures tend to keep some labour inside 
agriculture. 
Table 5.12 Change in employment in primary agriculture in the EU-27, 2013 (% change relative 
to no modulation in 2013) 
 5% modulation 13 % modulation 
First Pillar -0.02 -0.04 
Second Pillar -0.03 -0.07 
Of which:   
Human Capital Measures -0.01 -0.02 
Physical Capital Measures -0.03 -0.09 
LFA Measures 0.01 0.03 
Agri-environment Measures 0.01 0.02 
Regional Measures 0.00 -0.01 
Total modulation First and Second Pillar -0.04 -0.12 
Source: Simulation with LEITAP. 
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 This is well documented in DG AGRI studies such as Scenar 2020. 
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The additional modulation in the Health Check scenario hardly affects the process of 
structural change, as shifts in employment from agriculture and industries to services 
are very small (Table 5.13). Modulation slightly increases GDP and this increase in 
income leads especially to more spending on services as the income elasticity for 
services is highest. Employment is increasing with 0.02% in services, which employ a 
large part of all people in the EU-27 economy. The impact of modulation on the 
processed food industry is negligible since the effects of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 
counterbalance each other. Reducing the first pillar increases input prices of primary 
agricultural products for the food industry, and therefore leads to higher prices and a 
bit of a loss in competitiveness and employment. Due to the increase in the second 
pillar, the processed food industry benefits from the lower input costs and improves 
its competitiveness, which leads to production and employment growth. The second 
pillar has a negative impact on the energy and industrial sectors as technological 
change reduces demand for inputs in (mainly) primary agriculture, and the increased 
GDP does not lead to a big increase in demand for products from the energy and 
industry sector. 
Table 5.13 Change in employment in the EU-27, 2013 (% change Health Check Scenario relative 
to no modulation in 2013) 
 First Pillar Second Pillar Total modulation First 
and Second Pillar 
Primary agriculture 
-0.04 -0.07 -0.12 
Processed 
-0.01 0.02 0.02 
Energy 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
Industries 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 
Services 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Source: Simulation with LEITAP. 
5.3.4  Findings from the case studies 
According to the experts’ judgements in the case study reports, it is likely that a rate 
of 5% compulsory modulation of direct payments in the first pillar has a marginally 
negative impact on employment and that the input of CM funds in the second pillar 
budget has a slightly positive impact on employment. However, it is rather difficult to 
quantify these impacts, as CM is intertwined with many other forces. The impacts are 
expected to be rather small as the size of the CM funds is generally considered to be 
very limited, both in relation to the total amount of direct payments and to the size of 
the second pillar budget. 
 
Some case studies report that the reduction in Pillar 1 has an insignificant impact on 
employment at a low CM rate (FI, PT), and that any impact would vary between the 
sectors (NL). The Central European countries have a different perspective: P1 cuts 
may affect the possibility to hire farm labour (PL) or may accelerate the decrease in 
farm labour (SI), and it is noted in France that these cuts may encourage farms to 
increase in size to achieve economies in scale with regard to labour input. Basically, 
however, the dynamics of supply, prices and technological progress have a stronger 
influence on employment than P1 cuts (FR, UK); and there is also a decrease in 
agricultural employment that can be associated with decoupling (DE). 
 
The case studies show that the net positive effects on employment of Pillar 2 
payments are either very small (FI, NL) or not likely (SI). Farms receiving P2 
payments generally have lower productivity, so therefore these payments reinforce 
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their viability (FR); they are also expected to favour the establishment of young 
farmers (FR). General effects in the rural economy are either neutral or slightly 
positive (FR), but to truly have an effect the current CM rates are insufficient to 
generate an adequate ‘return’ in terms of P2 payment levels (PT). It is considered, 
nevertheless, that Axis 3 measures are likely to have a positive effect on rural 
employment as a whole (UK), and is likely to slow down the outflow of young people 
from rural areas (SI) but that they could diminish unskilled, seasonal labour (PL). The 
employment possibilities brought about by P2 measures are noted in different ways 
according to the country. As with working conditions, the effects are anticipated to be 
potentially positive (FI), but difficult to measure (NL, DE). They could benefit labour 
intensive agricultural sectors (PT), and are likely to be associated with capital works 
(UK) and might potentially be associated with the tourism sector (UK). Reference is 
made to positive effects for basic services and infrastructure (PL); for micro-
enterprises in renewable energy (SI); and for nature conservation and tourism (SI). 
 
The economic impact CMEF-indicator on employment creation, measured in terms of 
net additional full-time equivalent jobs created, could be used to explore the effect of 
the use of compulsory modulation funds in the second pillar. Although not all case 
study countries set a specific target for this impact indicator in their RDPs, other 
countries give a detailed overview of the number of expected jobs created per 
measure. The expected number of additional jobs varies from 64 in Wales to 17,250 
in Portugal. Usually, measures from Axis 3 and Axis 4 contribute to this impact 
indicator. Given the overall moderate expected contribution of the RDP to this impact 
indicator on employment creation, it could be derived that the contribution of CM 
funds is even more moderate. If we apply the shares of the input induced by CM 
funds per RDP measure, the contribution of CM funds could be estimated to vary 
between about 5-30% of the target value of the impact indicator. As a way to 
emphasise the size of the impact, in the case of Portugal – which reports the highest 
target value for the number of created jobs – this would imply that CM funds are 
expected to create about 1,300 jobs in a total population of approximately 10 million. 
 
Employment conditions in rural areas 
Employment conditions are important for a viable rural area. Three aspects of this are 
being analysed here: job security, diversified job market and working conditions. Can 
modulation contribute to these issues? 
 
Pillar 2 measures are likely to have impacts in the following ways: cooperation for the 
development of new products, processes and technologies in the agricultural and food 
sector and in the forestry sector; and setting up of management and advisory services. 
In some cases these are associated with diversification, in particular with regard to 
tourism. P2 measures in the form of LFA, agri-environment and afforestation 
payments are by their nature linked to maintaining the viability of the agricultural 
sector. But, in general, opportunities for job creation are minor (no evidence 
reported), and are more likely to contribute to the preservation of existing jobs.  
 
Job security 
The issue of job security is elucidated by the case studies. Secure salaried jobs, in 
terms of labour on the farm, are not (or hardly) affected by modulation (FR). 
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Decoupling, recent price shifts, and bioenergy support are more relevant to the level 
of on-farm labour (DE). Therefore, any observable effects are unlikely (NL, UK, FI); 
and in some countries, resort to salaried labour is simply not frequent (FI, SI). With 
regard to the use of farm contractors, any change is unlikely or insignificant (FI, FR, 
NL, UK). A possible increase of farm contractors, however, was noted in PT as a way 
to replace permanent staff. For a country such as Slovenia, use of farm contractors is 
an infrequent practice at this time. 
 
The Pillar 2 measures that are likely to have the greatest positive impact on farm 
labour through their impact on the agricultural economy are agri-environment (1.5% 
increase in farm income in FI) and LFA payments (50% of P2 expenditure in FR; in 
these areas, many farms are unlikely to be viable without them).  
 
Family labour on-farm is not likely to feel any impact in some countries (FI, NL, 
UK), whereas in France there might be some shedding of family labour, and the 
implications are unclear in two other countries (PT, PL). Nevertheless, decline in on-
farm job security is likely to be countered by an increase in off-farm employment 
possibilities or by diversification (SI: into tourism). 
 
With regard to the impact on the rural economy as a whole, Pillar 2 favours adaptation 
to market requirements (FR); and job creation will also occur in the non-agricultural 
sector (PL). For instance, Axis 1 will have the greatest impact in Portugal because of 
needed technology and productivity improvements. P2 payment will have a positive 
impact in the rural economy through spin-off effects linked to particular AE measures 
that could also stimulate related activities such as tourism, and also the creation and 
marketing of agri products (UK). Livestock and energy crop measures under Axis 1 
have potential upstream effects (UK). Diversification measures are by their nature a 
positive contribution to the rural economy in general (PL, SI).  
 
With regard to working conditions, P2 measures should have a potentially positive 
effect (FI), but may be difficult to measure (NL, DE). Positive effects are particularly 
expected when farm modernisation is the result (FR) and when there is investment in 
new technologies and better equipment (PT, SI). These measures may lead to an 
increase in labour costs, but at the same time would provide improved safety and 
better working conditions (PL).  
5.4 Quality of Life in Rural Areas 
5.4.1 Issues 
This section considers the extent to which modulation has an impact on specific 
parameters affecting the quality of life in rural areas. It also considers possible effects 
on the links between agriculture and the other sectors of the rural economy with a 
view to the long-term viability of rural communities. 
5.4.2 Summary 
Overall the quality of life in rural areas is expected to benefit from increased levels of 
modulation, although it has not been possible to quantify this impact. The extent to 
which this is the case will differ across the EU-27 depending on the specific situation 
within a Member State, the level of CM, associated national co-financing, and the 
way in which the relevant measures are used. 
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At low levels of modulation, reductions in Pillar 1 would not appear to have any real 
impact on the quality of life in rural areas, as no significant effects in terms of farm 
restructuring or land abandonment are experienced. However, drawing mainly on 
evidence from the case studies, increases in expenditure in Pillar 2 do have a positive 
effect on quality of life by increasing the funding available for measures that promote 
innovation, create employment opportunities, improve access to services for the rural 
population or provide funding for activities that can improve the economic 
attractiveness of, and thereby encourage investment in, rural areas. Increased 
availability of funding for activities implemented under the LEADER approach can 
help to further increase capacity building, and strengthening co-operation within local 
areas, which alongside the social benefits, may also lead to economic and 
environmental benefits. Beyond Axis 3 and the LEADER approach, the LFA and the 
agri-environment measures stand out as having the potential to enhance the quality of 
life in rural areas in relation to their role in maintaining and enhancing the 
attractiveness of rural areas, and hence in attracting increased tourism. In addition, the 
case studies highlighted the value of these measures for keeping people in farming, 
which therefore constrains somewhat the trend towards outmigration.  
 
The models also indicate that increased rates of modulation under the Health Check 
scenario have a positive, albeit very small, impact on GDP growth, due to the 
increased availability of funds within Pillar 2. The effect is largely caused by those 
Axis 3 measures which are focused predominantly on investments outside of the 
agricultural sector, for example on the setting up of new businesses, improving rural 
services and promoting tourism 
5.4.3 Definition of Quality of Life 
Quality of life is a multi-dimensional concept concerned with the overall well-being 
in society. Quality of life in rural areas is derived from a range of different factors, 
which interact together to create the socio-economic and cultural conditions which 
allow people to have sufficient access to material resources as well as choose the 
lifestyle they want21 22. In relation to rural areas, the following factors tend to be 
considered as particularly significant in contributing to quality of life: 
 
• Levels of employment and the existence of employment opportunities for both 
genders; 
• Access to local services, such as transport, shops, schools, healthcare, 
childcare etc; 
• Housing availability; 
• Levels of income; 
• Levels of educational attainment; 
• Degree of social cohesion; and 
• Attractiveness of surroundings. 
 
                                                 
21
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006) ‘First 
European Quality of Life Survey: Urban-rural differences’,  ISBN 92-897-0960-X, Luxembourg, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006 
22
 Fahey, T., Nolan, B. and Whelan, C.T. 2003, Monitoring quality of life in Europe, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003 
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Support through the CAP, to farmers and rural areas more generally, can affect all 
these factors, with the exception perhaps of housing availability. The effect of 
compulsory modulation on employment is dealt with separately in Section 5.3. In this 
section, therefore, the key issues which are explored in relation to compulsory 
modulation are the provision of local services, general growth in the economy and 
income levels (using GDP as a proxy), human capital (particularly in relation to 
training and capacity building), the attractiveness of the local surroundings, and social 
cohesion. In addition, the interaction between agriculture, the structural changes that 
are being experienced within this sector and the wider economies of rural areas are 
explored. 
 
Evidence for this section is drawn predominantly from the eight case study reports, 
existing evaluation literature including mid term evaluations of the previous 
programming periods and ex ante evaluations for the 2007-13 RDPs, as well as trends 
in the CMEF indicators for the case study Member States where suitable information 
was provided. The models have been used to provide information on GDP and 
employment.  
 
Rural areas differ in terms of their socio-economic characteristics between and within 
Member States, and these characteristics change over time in response to economic 
and social drivers. For example, population densities differ significantly across the 
EU-2723 and rural communities are much more dispersed in some countries than 
others. This leads to structurally diverse rural economies across the EU-27, with 
different areas experiencing different issues with regard to remoteness, access to 
services and social cohesion, and the degree to which agriculture continues to play an 
important role in maintaining the viability of rural communities, and in the economy 
of rural areas. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some key trends against which the 
impacts of different policy interventions can be assessed.  
 
A European Quality of Life Survey24 found that rural areas in Europe are undergoing 
a transition as a result of rural restructuring. The economies of rural areas are 
becoming increasingly diverse, with agriculture as a primary sector no longer 
dominating in the majority of Member States. In many rural areas, sectors, such as 
business and financial services, public administration, education, health, training and 
tourism have gained in importance, bringing with them employment opportunities as 
well as in-migration, thereby contributing to maintaining the viability of rural 
communities.  
 
The key trends highlighted by the EQLS report show that areas which remain 
predominantly agricultural (for example much of Greece, Portugal, Ireland) are 
experiencing a loss of local employment as a result of increased mechanisation of 
primary agriculture and associated activities. In other areas, however, where 
agriculture is no longer so dominant, trends such as the outmigration of young people 
to urban areas, increased diversification of farms into other economic activities, the 
immigration by service classes, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor are 
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 For example, the average population density of France is four times lower than that of the 
Netherlands, and that of Finland is even lower. 
24
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006) ‘First 
European Quality of Life Survey: Urban-rural differences’,  ISBN 92-897-0960-X, Luxembourg, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006 
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becoming increasingly evident. A significant proportion of the rural population, 
particularly in more remote and isolated areas, continue to experience lack of 
employment opportunities and lack of services. These changes in the social fabric of 
rural areas can also lead to reductions in social capital and social cohesion, with 
people less willing, or with less time, to engage in community activities. These trends 
are also evident within the case studies. For example, the outmigration of younger 
people, is a key problem experienced in rural areas of Eastern Germany (particularly 
in relation to younger women), Poland and Slovenia, while higher rates of 
unemployment for women related to the lack of childcare facilities is highlighted in 
the French case study.  
 
One of the key findings from the EQLS was that the perceived quality of life in rural 
areas is lowest within the poorer Member States, and particularly in the New Member 
States.   
5.4.4 Impacts of reducing Pillar 1 payments 
It is unlikely that Pillar 1 payments, in general, have a significant impact on the 
quality of life in rural areas, as the way in which the payments are allocated means 
that the majority of the spend tends to benefit larger farms within richer regions, with 
lower unemployment rates and a higher than average population growth25 rather than 
peripheral regions where investment is most needed. Whilst this picture will have 
changed with decoupling, the broad distribution of Pillar 1 payments remains the 
same as it is based on historic receipts. 
 
However, where reductions in Pillar 1 payments directly influence structural change, 
drive intensification or increase labour productivity, this could lead to negative 
impacts on quality of life in rural areas.  
 
Particularly in remoter areas, and those of low population density where alternative 
employment opportunities are limited, if decreases in Pillar 1 payments lead to 
farmers leaving the sector, then this can have an adverse impact on the quality of life 
as a result of the need to move away from the area to find work. The land that remains 
often either becomes amalgamated into other holdings in the area or abandoned, both 
of which tend to lead to a reduction in on-farm employment opportunities and a 
reduced sense of community for those remaining in the sector. This can have a knock-
on effect on the provision of rural services, as there may be a reduction in the critical 
mass of economically active people who play a key role in justifying the maintenance 
of some services, such as schools or shops. These potential impacts were highlighted 
in both the Finnish and French case studies. In some, particularly less remote areas, 
however, the decline in the number of farmers does not necessarily mean a decrease 
in local services because they represent a small proportion of the population. In 
addition, the decline in the number of farms may encourage development in other 
ways, such as the conversion of old farm buildings into new houses or for tourism (as 
illustrated in the French case study).  
 
Land abandonment or the loss of agricultural land use may also negatively impact 
upon the quality of life in rural areas, depending on the nature of the land use that 
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 Shucksmith, M, Thomson, KJ, Roberts, D (eds) (2005) The CAP and the Regions – The Territorial 
Impact of the Common Agricultural Policy, Wallingford: CABI. 
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follows. The attractiveness of the landscape is an important component of quality of 
life, and can be a driver for the development of small-scale employment opportunities 
as well an important aspect of feelings of social well-being and cultural identity. For 
example, in Finland, surveys have shown that the open landscape provided by 
agriculture is valued as an important aspect of quality of life in rural communities, 
with the encroachment of forestry up to the boundaries of settlements viewed 
negatively. 
 
However, at low levels of CM, as demonstrated in previous chapters, structural 
changes are likely to be minimal, and therefore the impacts of reducing Pillar 1 
payments on the quality of life in rural areas will be minor. This is confirmed by all 
the case studies, and the modelling of impacts on GDP, as a proxy for overall 
economic growth, also show that reducing Pillar 1 payments, even under the Health 
Check Scenario have no negative impact upon GDP across the EU-27. Greater 
impacts may start to be experienced at higher levels of CM but this is difficult to 
establish at the current time due to the methodological problems inherent with 
modelling quality of life impacts and the absence of research investigating the impact 
of Pillar 1 payments on the quality of life in rural areas. 
5.4.5 Impacts of increased availability of funding within Pillar 2 
Within Pillar 2, whilst measures from all Axes have the potential to influence quality 
of life in rural areas, the Axis 3 measures have the specific overall objective of 
improving the quality of life in rural areas. These include Diversification into non-
agricultural activities (311); Support for business creation and development (312); 
Encouragement of tourism activities (313); Basic services for the economy and rural 
population (321); Village renewal and development (322); and Conservation and 
upgrading of the rural heritage (323). The main objective of these measures is to 
reverse trends towards economic and social decline and depopulation of the 
countryside. While some aim to promote innovation and to create employment 
opportunities, others aim to improve access to services for the rural population or to 
provide funding for activities that can improve the economic attractiveness of, and 
thereby encourage investment in, rural areas. In the majority of Member States, Axis 
3 measures do not comprise a large proportion of the RDP budget. Between them, 
these measures account for 12% of total public funding (EAFRD plus national co-
financing) planned for 2007-13 across the EU-27.  
 
The training measures within Axis 3 and the activities funded through the LEADER 
approach can also contribute to improving quality of life by increasing the level of 
community engagement and hence improving social cohesion through capacity 
building and involvement of local people in actions to meet their local needs. Taken 
together, however these measures only account for 6 % of planned expenditure across 
the EU-27.  
 
Beyond Axis 3 and the LEADER approach, the LFA and the agri-environment 
measures stand out as having the potential to enhance the quality of life in rural areas 
in relation to their role in maintaining and enhancing the attractiveness of rural areas. 
The LFA measures, by providing a basic area payment in areas experiencing natural 
handicaps, can help to maintain farmers in areas where the number of farmers might 
otherwise decline, thereby helping to maintain the viability of rural communities. The 
importance of the payments from the LFA measure for maintaining the viability of 
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farming is highlighted in the Polish and the French case study, and the role of Pillar 2 
measures in preventing abandonment and decreasing depopulation trends is 
highlighted in the Portuguese case study.  
 
In general, with the exception of the Netherlands and Germany, it is the New Member 
States that are planning to invest the highest proportion of funds into Axis 3 measures, 
with BG, CZ, EE, LV, MT and RO as well as NL and DE all planning to spend over 
20% of their RDP expenditure on Axis 3 measures. In contrast, eight out of the nine 
Member States who are planning to spend under 10 per cent of the total RDP budget 
on Axis 3 measures are from the EU-15 (BE, ES, IRE, FR, LU, AT, FI and the UK). 
Cyprus is the only NMS in this category. The planned budget for these measures 
tends to be fairly evenly split between measures. 
 
There is paucity of evidence from the evaluation literature on the impacts of Axis 3 
measures. Some information does exist, however, particularly in relation to the 
diversification, village renewal and the promotion of tourism measures, primarily 
relating to the 2000-2006 programming period. 
 
Information from the Mid Term Evaluations of the 2000-2006 programming period 26, 
showed that the village renewal measure has had some positive impacts on the quality 
of life. In France, investment has predominantly served to increase the tourism 
potential of remote rural areas, whereas in Germany positive impacts on living and 
working conditions have been reported as a result of funding being used to refurbish 
old buildings, improve traffic flows, provide support to village shops and build youth 
and meeting centres. In some Länder, the use of support to provide improved 
recreational facilities, or better access to existing amenities, also provided quality of 
life benefits. Tackling issues linked to remoteness was a priority for Member States 
such as Spain, France, Austria, Finland, and Italy. In Austria, this took the form of 
significant investment in the creation of access roads to farmland and improvements 
to housing conditions through water resource projects. Improvements in road 
infrastructure were also highlighted in Italy (Trento), leading to improved 
communication between farms. In contrast, the emphasis in Finland was on providing 
additional services, such as day-care for elderly people and children, and improved 
access to the natural environment.  
 
However, in those countries with a relatively high population density, and where 
support and facilities for rural communities is already relatively high (for example the 
Netherlands and Denmark), the additional benefit brought about by rural development 
funding in relation to rural services, for example on living conditions and the welfare 
of rural communities, was thought to bring about less additionality than that within 
poorer, remoter regions. Evidence of some (albeit unquantified) deadweight and 
displacement effects were also found in some cases, the latter particularly in relation 
to funding for rural tourism related activities. 
 
The benefits of the LEADER approach are difficult to quantify, but evaluations tend 
to emphasise the positive benefits on raising awareness, capacity building, and the 
strengthening of co-operation within local areas. The Portuguese case study highlights 
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 AGRA CEAS (2005) Synthesis of Rural Development Mid-Term Evaluations Lot I EAGGF 
Guarantee, Final Report for the European Commission. 
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the benefits brought about by the LEADER approach to deprived rural areas, 
particularly in relation to developing new skills, new ideas and new projects, for 
example to encourage and develop rural tourism. 
 
The Polish case study indicates that entry into the EU and the availability of CAP 
money has positively influenced the quality of life in rural areas. The availability of 
funding has stimulated rural development activities and helped to reduce rural 
deprivation, thereby encouraging more people to stay within rural areas rather than 
migrate out to the cities or abroad. The Slovenian case study also reported similar 
positive effects of rural development funding on the quality of life, particularly in 
terms of providing opportunities for increasing off-farm employment for the rural 
population. In the case studies for France and Portugal, the role of the LFA and agri-
environment measure in keeping people in farming is highlighted, which therefore 
constrains somewhat the trend towards outmigration.  
 
The availability of additional funds for these measures as a result of compulsory 
modulation, should, in principle, enhance these benefits by extending the potential 
number of projects and beneficiaries funded, thereby broadening the proportion of the 
population that can benefit. Overall, non-farming recipients of funds will be net 
beneficiaries as they will not have experienced any reduction of Pillar 1 payments.  
 
The CMEF indicators provide information on the degree of internet penetration and 
the number of tourists that spending through RDPs is anticipated to bring to rural 
areas. This shows, for example that the number of tourists in NL, DE (NRW and TH) 
are expected to increase through expenditure under measure 313 (encouragement of 
tourism activities). The lack of any benchmark information for these indicators means 
that it is not possible to assess the extent of this growth or determine the proportion 
that might be a result of compulsory modulation. We can assume, however, that 
compulsory modulation is responsible for a proportion of these anticipated increases, 
relative to the proportion of CM within the total RDP budget.  
 
Given that, within the UK and Finland, compulsory modulation funds are targeted 
specifically at the agri-environment measure, the additional benefits that are likely to 
be seen with respect to quality of life will relate to the extent to which these schemes 
are seen to be contributing to keeping land in production, thereby preventing land 
abandonment and hence the loss of population from rural areas, and increasing the 
attractiveness of rural areas by requiring certain land management practices, which in 
turn may also lead to positive secondary effects in terms of increased demand for 
recreation and tourism. This is difficult to quantify in any meaningful way, however. 
The benefits of the agri-environment, as well as the LFA measure for maintaining and 
enhancing the character of the landscape – and hence in attracting increased tourism 
to rural areas – is highlighted in the French case study. In some Member States, 
particularly evident in France, a combination of Axis 1 and Axis 3 measures have 
encouraged the development of tourism based on the promotion of local identity, 
particularly linked to locality food. This has the potential to have multiple benefits 
through enhancing cultural identity, improving social cohesion, providing small scale 
off-farm employment opportunities, as well as increasing the viability of farming 
enterprises. 
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The Slovenian case study expert suggested that, the capacity of farmers to take up 
rural development measures is a limiting factor on uptake of Axis 1 and Axis 2 
measures, and that, under an increased Pillar 2 budget, this would allow a larger 
proportion of the budget to be used to fund activity within the wider rural economy on 
activities that benefit rural populations as a whole, particularly through the measures 
322, 323 and use of the LEADER approach. 
 
It would appear that increased rates of modulation under the Health Check scenario, 
and the baseline scenario, also have a positive, albeit very small, impact on GDP 
growth (0.04% at rates of 13% modulation) (see Figure 5.15). GDP can be used as a 
somewhat crude proxy to reflect the material wellbeing across the EU and an increase 
in GDP can provide some indication of the potential improvement in the quality of 
life insofar as this relates to the growth in the economy overall. 
 
Reducing Pillar 1 payments appears to have no negative impact upon GDP, and so the 
positive result is entirely due to the increased availability of funds, and their 
associated national co-financing, within Pillar 2. The effect is mainly caused by the 
dynamic impact of those measures that increase the productivity of production factors 
within the agricultural sector and productivity more generally within the wider rural 
economy. A substantial element of this impact (almost half) is due to the ‘regional 
measures’, or those Axis 3 measures which are focused largely on investments outside 
of the agricultural sector, for example, on the setting up of new businesses, improving 
rural services and promoting tourism. Within the agriculture sector, the measures that 
make the largest contribution to this increase in GDP are those that provide an 
incentive to invest in physical capital (0.017%) and to a much lesser extent those 
relating to human capital investments (0.005%). If a 25% deadweight effect is 
assumed for expenditure under these measures, the increases in GDP are reduced 
proportionately (see Figure 5.16). 
 
Figure 5.15 EU-27 GDP growth – 5% / 13% modulation (% change of the Health Check scenario 
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Source: LEITAP. 
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Figure 5.16 Impact of crowding out on EU-27 GDP growth – 13% modulation and sensitivity (% 
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Source: LEITAP. 
The RDPs (CMEF-analysis) of most case study countries suggest that the 
programmes are expected to positively contribute to economic growth, in particular 
due to an above average growth in the number of businesses supported. In a few 
RDPs economic growth rates are quantified: usually they do not exceed 2%. Most of 
the case study countries also expect that the RDPs will have a positive impact on 
labour productivity, but do not specify this more precisely, apart from within a few 
cases where it is anticipated to vary between 1-2.5% per year. Due to the fact that 
measures within Pillar 2 are only anticipated to have a moderate impact on the 
economic impact indicators, the contribution of CM funds will also be moderate, 
contributing to between 5-30% of the target values of the impact indicators. In general 
the CMEF-results thus show a more positive outcome than the modelling. 
 
The majority of the case study experts, however, conclude that the levels of additional 
funding that are available for these measures at 5% modulation, even with national 
co-financing, are insufficient for any significant improvement in quality of life to be 
seen. Increasing CM to 20%, however, is likely to increase the benefits 
proportionately, by extending the number of projects that could be funded and hence 
the number of beneficiaries within rural areas. Based on the results above, one might 
also expect this investment to lead to a further slight increase in GDP. This would, 
however, depend on which measures Member States decided to allocate the additional 
funds to, and whether the current distribution of funding remained, or whether other 
priorities would prevail.  
 
Under the Health Check Scenario, given that the additional funds would be required 
to be focussed at addressing the ‘New Challenges’, it is likely that the majority of the 
additional funds will be focused on measures within Axis 1 and 2. This is likely to 
have benefits for the quality of life in rural areas in two distinct ways. First, the 
additional funds would improve the viability and competitiveness of farming, which 
will have quality of life benefits. This would be likely to be the case particularly in 
remoter areas where this would prevent land abandonment, and keep farmers on the 
land, thereby helping to maintain the viability of rural communities. Secondly the 
additional funds would encourage sustainable land management practices that 
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enhance the attractiveness of rural areas, which in turn may offer opportunities for 
developing niche products, encouraging tourism, and attracting inward investment, 
either on the basis of the quality of environment, or by developing a demand for new 
businesses linked to, for example, the provision of renewable energy. 
 
Overall, therefore, it can be concluded that CM is likely to lead to have a positive 
impact on the quality of life in rural areas, although the extent to which this is the case 
will differ across the EU-27 depending on the specific situation within a Member 
State, the level of CM, associated national co-financing, and the way in which the 
relevant measures are used. 
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6 ENVIRONMENT 
6.1 Issues 
The focus of this chapter is the examination of the extent to which modulation 
contributes to environmental protection and/or degradation. The assessment focuses 
on the effects of modulation on changes in land use and the risk of land abandonment, 
and on biodiversity and habitats, water quality and quantity, soil quality, landscape 
and climate change, in line with the environmental objectives of the EAFRD and the 
‘New Challenges’ as set out in the Commission’s Health Check proposals27. 
6.2 Summary 
Overall, the impacts of modulation on the environment are positive for all 
environmental parameters including biodiversity, water quality, soil quality, 
landscape and climate change. These positive impacts are the result of the availability 
of additional funds within Pillar 2 and relate to a whole range of measures across all 
four Axes. The extent of these impacts, however, is hard to quantify beyond general 
terms.  
 
The reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments do not appear to have had significant 
impacts on the environment. This is unsurprising, given that the impacts on 
agricultural producers (in terms of influencing factors of productivity, farm structure 
and income) of reducing Pillar 1 payments have been shown to be limited. The 
models show that there may be a small increase in land leaving agriculture as a result 
of reductions in Pillar 1 payments; however, these appear to have been more than 
compensated for by increases in the availability of funds within Pillar 2, particularly 
for the LFA and agri-environment measures. These impacts could, of course become 
more significant as the modulation rate increases and/or the franchise level changes.  
 
The availability of additional funds within Pillar 2, however, is likely to have a 
significant impact upon the environment across the EU-15, but particularly in Finland 
and the UK (England) where the additional funds have been specifically focused on 
the agri-environment measure. In all Member States, modulation can be seen to have 
a positive impact on the trends identified for the CMEF impact indicators relating to 
the area of HNV farmland, the farmland bird index, nutrient surplus and production of 
renewable energy. In relation to the CMEF result indicators, modulation, under the 
baseline scenario, is estimated to enable over 5 million hectares of land to be managed 
in ways that benefit biodiversity, 3 million hectares to be managed to help improve 
water quality and soil quality and 1 million hectares to be managed in ways that will 
help with climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. 
 
The results also suggest that the availability of additional funds for, in particular, the 
agri-environment and LFA measures is likely to retain slightly more land under 
agricultural management that would be the case without modulation. The models 
show that this land is more likely to be grassland, than cropped land. The CMEF 
impact indicators also show that a significant area of land is anticipated to be 
prevented from being abandoned over the 2007-13 programming period. While the 
proportions of land indicated by the models are very small (under 1% of all 
                                                 
27 COM(2008) 306 final, European Commission’s proposals for the Health Check of the Common Agricultural Policy, Brussels, 
20.5.2008 
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agricultural land), in reality, the effect could be much greater. It would certainly not 
be a uniform impact across the EU-15 and will depend crucially on local factors such 
as succession, land ownership, remoteness from markets etc. 
 
The results from CAPRI enable the potential environmental benefits of investment aid 
for farm modernisation and other Axis 1 measures to be seen, particularly in terms of 
reducing nutrient surpluses, pesticide use and greenhouse gas emissions. It is also 
clear from the case studies that a number of Member States are using these measures 
to improve the sustainability of the agricultural sector and limit its environmental 
footprint. Increased funding for these measures is likely to be leading to an increase in 
investments in infrastructure that improves waste management in water saving 
solutions/technologies; in renewable energy technologies and infrastructure; the 
development of community led projects for the production of renewable energy; and 
improvements in energy efficiency for local businesses. 
 
6.3 Analytical Approach 
A significant challenge for this analysis has been to explore the complexity of local 
environmental impacts of expenditure from Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 on the ground, 
understand how these relate to the variety of ways in which Member States have 
implemented their RDPs and to disentangle the extent to which modulated funds have 
contributed to these impacts.  
 
To achieve as comprehensive an assessment of the impacts of compulsory modulation 
on the environment as possible, the analysis first explores the impact on land use 
more generally, before turning to a consideration of each of the different 
environmental parameters in turn28, drawing on information gathered through a range 
of tools. This includes: 
 
• an assessment of the financial impacts of modulation on relevant EAFRD 
measures using the Budget Model;  
• an assessment of a suite of environmental indicators (including the CMEF 
indicators), using data generated through the modelling and non-modelling 
approaches as set out in Table 6.1; and 
• A more qualitative analysis of the relevant evidence, primarily using 
information from the eight case studies and existing evaluation literature. 
 
This chapter sets out in some detail the impact that compulsory modulation is likely to 
have under different rates of modulation for each of these issues systematically. 
Where possible, environmental impacts are assessed using both the modelling 
approach and non-modelling methods. However, given the range of actions that can 
be undertaken under rural development measures in individual Member States, and 
the complex nature and geographical specificity of the interactions between farm 
management and environmental outcomes, the use of the models in this regard has 
been somewhat limited and has led to a greater use of other sources of data, much of 
                                                 
28
 The environmental issues considered in the analysis are those that are covered by Council 
Regulation 1698/2005 and the associated Community Strategic Guidelines, namely biodiversity, water 
quality, water quantity, soil quality, landscape and climate (emissions).  These impacts are set within 
the context of land use change more generally. 
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which is qualitative in nature. The indicators and tools used to assess the impacts of 
modulation on each of the environmental issues are set out in Table 6.1. 
6.3.1 Data and analytical issues arising 
The environmental effects of a reduction in Pillar 1 payments will be indirect and 
result from any changes that modulation has brought about in terms of farm income, 
farm viability, levels of production, forward planning and related farm structural 
change, as discussed in earlier chapters. In particular, environmental impacts will 
arise from changes that have taken place in relation to land use, input use or stocking 
density as well as changes in relation to farm size and infrastructure. 
Possible Adjustments to Pillar 2 measures as a result of compulsory modulation 
The precise nature of the environmental impacts that are brought about through 
increased availability of funding in Pillar 2 will be directly related to a range of 
factors, including the measures on which the compulsory modulation funds have been 
focused, the priority and funding levels allocated to these measures within Member 
States’ Rural Development Programmes (RDPs), the design and implementation of 
the associated schemes at national/regional level; and the uptake, outcomes and 
effectiveness of implementation in relation to environmental priorities. It is, therefore, 
essential to have an understanding of the way schemes have been operated, mainly at 
the national and regional levels, for example in terms of their precise objectives, the 
types of management commitments that are required, any restrictions on entry 
imposed by eligibility criteria and so on. In addition it is also helpful to consider the 
differing ways in which measures may be adjusted in response to the availability of 
additional funds generated through compulsory modulation, as this may have 
implications for their implementation and environmental impact.  
 
If we take the agri-environment and LFA measures, for example, two measures which 
have a significant impact on the environment, a recent evaluation on the operation of 
the LFA measure across Europe29 showed that there was a strong path dependency in 
terms of the operation of the schemes. Neither the area covered by payments, or the 
eligibility criteria for the scheme, tend to change in response to changing budgetary 
availability. However, one way in which LFA schemes can respond to increased 
budgets is to raise the payment rate (to the maximum allowable under the 
regulations). The agri-environment measure, on the other hand, is far more elastic in 
terms of being able to respond to the availability of additional funds. Schemes can 
generally expand to cover a greater area of land, the types of farms and environmental 
obligations that are eligible for funding can be expanded and the payment rates can be 
increased (again, within the parameters set by the regulation). As a result of this, it is 
important to understand how agri-environment schemes are implemented in 
individual Member States in some detail, and how these have changed in response to 
the availability of additional funds, in order to effectively assess the environmental 
impact of compulsory modulation. 
                                                 
29
 IEEP (2006) An Evaluation of the Less Favoured Area Measure in the 25 Member States of the 
European Union. Report for DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
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Table 6.1 Environmental indicators and their potential for use within the study 
Environmental 
issue 
Relevant Indicators Modelling 
Approach 
Non-Modelling Approach Commentary 
Biodiversity: Aim: to estimate the degree to which RD measures are resulting in the maintenance and/or enhancement of biodiversity across the countryside.  
Relevant indicators: 
 
Population of Farmland Birds  CMEF Impact Indicator 
 
Viewed as a fairly good proxy for farmland 
biodiversity as a whole 
 High Nature Value Farmland and 
Forestry 
 CMEF Impact Indicator It is not yet possible to calculate the forestry 
element of this indicator  
 Proportion of UAA under Organic 
management 
FES IRENA 2005 indicator 
Uptake statistics 
 
 Arable intensity index CAPRI  Compares cropping intensity by measuring 
changes in yields 
 Grassland intensity index CAPRI  Compares cropping intensity by measuring 
changes in yields 
 Area of successful land management 
contributing to biodiversity and HNV 
farming  
 CMEF Result Indicator  
Water Quality: Aim: to estimate the degree to which RD measures are contributing to a reduced level of N and P concentrations (and hence eutrophication) in water bodies  
Relevant indicators: Gross Nutrient Balance  CMEF Impact Indicator  
 Nutrient Surplus per ha  CAPRI  Calculated as the difference between nutrient 
sources and sinks at soil level 
 Area of successful land management 
contributing to water quality 
 CMEF Result Indicator  
Water Quantity: Aim: to establish the extent to which water abstraction from both surface and ground water is sustainable, and the effect of RD measures is achieving 
sustainable water abstraction  
Relevant indicators: Volume of irrigation water used   
 Intensity of water use    
 Water abstraction rates for agriculture   
 Proportion of agricultural land that is 
irrigated 
  
Unable to assess the impact of RD measures on 
water quantity due to lack of EU level data1 and 
the lack of indicators specifically linked to RD 
measures. No relevant CMEF indicators  
There is also limited qualitative information from 
the case studies or evaluation literature. 
Soil Quality: Aim: to measure the extent of soil erosion and loss of organic matter taking place and the degree to which this is reduced through RD measures.  
Relevant indicators: Area of successful land management 
contributing to soil quality 
 CMEF Result Indicator 
 Land at risk of soil erosion   
There is a lack of data availability to demonstrate 
changes in soil erosion risk generally1, and little 
qualitative information linked to the impacts of RD 
measures from the case studies or evaluation 
literature.  
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Landscape: Aim: to estimate the extent to which the character of a particular landscape has been maintained, enhanced or has declined as a result of the use of RD measures.  
Relevant indicators: Landscape maintenance & 
enhancement 
 Uptake/anticipated uptake 
of landscape options within 
Agri-Environment Schemes 
in Case Study MSs 
IRENA 2005 Indicator 
It has not been possible to source detailed data on 
uptake of specific options at Member State level 
for this project 
 High Nature Value Farmland and 
Forestry 
 CMEF Impact Indicator Although there is a high correlation between the 
extent of HNV farmland and forestry and valued 
landscapes, the basis for this indicator is 
biodiversity, not landscape, so care needs to be 
taken in interpreting these results.  
Climate (emissions): Aim: to estimate the degree to which RD measures are contributing to GHG emission reductions and facilitating the adaptation of habitats and species 
to climate change 
Relevant indicators: Renewable energy production   CMEF Impact indicator  
 Area under successful land 
management contributing to climate 
change  
 CMEF Result Indicator  
 Carbon Sequestration  Uptake of the afforestation 
measure and relevant 
options within AE schemes  
It has not been possible to source detailed data on 
uptake of specific options at Member State level 
for this project  
1
 Conclusions of the EEA IRENA Indicator Report, 2005 
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Measuring the impacts of compulsory modulation 
The outcomes of measures on the environment, and hence the contribution of 
compulsory modulation, are difficult to quantify empirically. One cannot assume a 
simple linear relationship between environmental results and budgetary expenditure 
for a particular scheme, as impacts at the margin may be highly variable, especially 
where schemes include many options, or are altered in response to new funding. 
However, this has had to be assumed for the purpose of this analysis, in the absence of 
more detailed evidence of links between levels of expenditure and outcomes, on the 
basis that these sorts of comparisons can provide a general sense of the significance of 
the additional funds from compulsory modulation. Information from the case studies 
can also help to provide some elucidation.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, for the purposes of this study it has been determined that 
the majority of EU-15 Member States have combined the compulsory modulation 
funds and the core EAFRD budget and used them as one ‘pot’ of money. The 
contribution of compulsory modulation to specific measures is, therefore, proportional 
to their overall budgetary allocation. The exceptions to this are Finland and the UK 
(England), where the case studies have identified that the compulsory modulation 
funds have been effectively focused on one specific measure, the agri-environment 
measure. In these two cases, therefore, the environmental impacts of compulsory 
modulation can only be assessed in relation to this measure. 
 
Both Portugal and the UK are also applying voluntary modulation over the 2007-2013 
programming period. In the UK the majority of receipts generated from voluntary 
modulation (80 per cent) are co-financed nationally and are focused on the agri-
environment measure, with ten per cent allocated to Axis 1 measures to benefit the 
livestock sector, and ten per cent allocated across Axis 3. A proportion of those funds 
allocated to Axis 1 are aimed at providing environmental benefits, such as through 
grants to farmers for investing in waste minimisation and the establishment of energy 
crops. In Portugal, half of the funds generated through modulation are allocated to 
Axis 2, specifically the agri-environment measure. 
Indicators 
A range of indicators have been developed as proxies for measuring the impacts of 
agriculture on the environment across the EU3031. One of the key issues that recurs, 
however, is the availability of robust and consistent data from Member States to feed 
into these indicators. Even more difficult is linking the indicators to specific policy 
outcomes, including those from Pillar 1 direct payments, or specific measures within 
Pillar 2.  
 
The CMEF result and impact indicators can also help to give some indication on how 
the operation of measures are anticipated to impact upon a number of discrete 
environmental variables. It must be borne in mind, however, that the CMEF figures 
within the RDPs are only anticipated effects of the RDP measures, not actual results, 
and as such must be treated with caution. In addition, not only is the data relating to 
                                                 
30
 EEA (2005) Agriculture and the Environment in the EU-15 – the IRENA Indicator Report, No 
6/2005, European Environment Agency, Copenhagen.  
31
 OECD (2006) Environmental Indicators for Agriculture, Volume 4, OECD, Paris. 
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these indicators within the RDPs not consistently available for all Member States, but 
there is also a lack of baseline data against which to measure change in many cases.  
 
Evaluation Literature 
More broadly, there is a lack of quantitative data on the environmental impacts of 
specific measures, including the agri-environment measure32 and it is generally more 
problematic still to identify the actual outcomes of a particular measure, either 
because these outcomes are difficult to measure, causality is difficult to determine or 
because detailed monitoring programmes are not in place. The mid term evaluations 
of the 2000-2006 programming period provide some information on the effectiveness 
of some of the measures (particularly where there have been no changes in scheme 
design between programming periods) and the ex ante evaluations for the 2007-2013 
programming period, where these are publicly available, can give an indication of 
anticipated outcomes. 
6.3.2 Significance of Pillar 2 measures for the environment 
Pillar 2 is the main source of financial support to farmers for delivering many of 
Europe’s environmental priorities, including the halting of biodiversity loss by 2010, 
achieving good ecological status of water bodies as required through the Water 
Framework Directive, and has a significant contribution to make in helping 
agriculture adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change. It also has an 
important role to play in the protection of Europe’s soils and valued cultural 
landscapes. Improving the environment and the countryside through ‘encouraging 
farmers and forest holders to employ methods of land use compatible with the need to 
preserve the natural environment and landscape and protect and improve natural 
resources’ (preamble to Council Regulation 1698/2005) is the main focus of Axis 2. 
Measures from Axes 1 and 3 as well as the LEADER approach, can, however, also be 
used to achieve positive environmental outcomes if applied in appropriate ways. For 
example, the vocational training and information measure under Axis 1 can lead to 
improved skills in relation to nutrient management, and the farm modernisation 
measure can be used to provide grants for upgrading farm infrastructure, for example 
in relation to waste and nutrient management or renewable energy. An example from 
Axis 3 is the measure for the conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage, which 
can also be used to draw up management plans for Natura 2000 sites and to restore 
and upgrade sites of high nature value33 34. 
 
Member States have been obliged to operate agri-environment schemes since 1992, 
when the measure was made compulsory through the introduction of Council 
Regulation 2078/92. It remains the only compulsory measure and many of the 
schemes that are currently in operation, particularly in the EU-15 have developed and 
grown from these earlier schemes. Different Member States have taken different 
                                                 
32
 European Commission (2005) Agri-environment Measures - Overview on General Principles, Types 
of Measures, and Application, DG Agriculture, March 2005. 
33
 Keenleyside, C and Baldock, D (2006) Background Paper: The Relationship Between the CAP and 
Biodiversity, Outcome of the International Seminar ‘The Common Agricultural Policy, Warsaw, 7-8 
December 2006. 
34
 LUPG, Natuur en Milieu, WWF (2006), Rural Development Environmental Programming 
Guidelines: a Manual based on the finding of the Europe's Living Countryside Project, 
Brussels, 2006 
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approaches to the design of their schemes, and an overview of the priorities which 
they seek to address is set out for a selection of Member States in Table 6.2. This 
shows that, in some Member States, the agri-environment measure has been 
implemented in a very targeted way, restricting payments to certain geographical 
areas of high environmental value or certain habitat types which are deemed to be 
under threat. For example, in Portugal the agri-environment payments are prioritised 
within specific geographic regions (Integrated Territorial Interventions) which are 
based around Natura 2000 sites, and the Higher Level Stewardship scheme in England 
and Tir Gofal in Wales focus on targeted management to achieve specific outcomes in 
relation to biodiversity, cultural heritage and landscape. In other Member States, the 
schemes have been designed to have broad reach and achieve maximum coverage of 
the farmed landscape requiring farmers to undertake simple management across the 
whole farm (for example Finland and the Entry Level Stewardship scheme in 
England) or focused on particular farm systems, such as extensive grazing systems 
through the Prime Herbagère Agro-Environnementale (PHAE) in France. As a result, 
the environmental outcomes of the agri-environment measure will be a function of 
scheme design and type of options, as well as absolute levels of expenditure. Given 
the large proportion of the overall budget spent on this measure (approximately 20% 
of public funding), it is of particular relevance in assessing the environmental impact 
of the additional modulated funds within Pillar 2. 
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Table 6.2 Priorities for Agri-environment schemes in 19 EU Member States  




Biodiversity Water Soils Organic Genetic 
Diversity 
Other Objectives 
Austria       Promotion of extensive 
farming practices 
Belgium        Reducing the intensity of 
farming 
Denmark        
Finland1        
France1        
Germany        








    






    
  Encourage extensive 
production practices  
Greece        
Ireland       To produce quality food 
through extensive and 
environmentally friendly 
practices. 
Italy       adoption of integrated 
farming 
Netherlands1        
Portugal2        
Spain       Fire prevention;  
 
Sweden        
UK 
(England)2 
      Promotion of public 
access and understanding 





   
  
Hungary        
Poland1        
Slovak 
Republic 
   
   
 
Slovenia2        
Key:  = key priority  = secondary priority 
Source: OECD (2008) Environmental Performance of Agriculture in OECD Countries Since 1990 
1 OECD (2008), case studies and 2007-13 RDPs 
2 case studies and 2007-13 RDPs 
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6.4 Impacts of compulsory modulation on the environment 
6.4.1 Overall assessment 
In general, the findings suggest that the availability of additional resources in Pillar 2 
do have positive impacts upon the environment. The additional resources available for 
the agri-environment measure stand out as having a significant impact, mainly due to 
the level of expenditure allocated to this measure across the EU.   
 
Taking Axis 2 as a whole, however, the budget model shows that the increase in the 
availability of total funding for the Axis 2 element of Member States’ RDPs, as a 
result of compulsory modulation (including national co-financing), ranges from 7 per 
cent in Austria, Ireland and Portugal to 48 per cent in Denmark. The average increase 
in the budget for Axis 2 across all 15 Member States is 14 per cent. However, it 
should be noted that, as highlighted in the case studies for France and Germany, and 
the EU questionnaire for Belgium (Wallonia), the overall EAFRD allocation for the 
2007-13 programming periods is lower than that available in the previous period and 
as a result, the compulsory funds are viewed by many national authorities as making 
up for a proportion of this shortfall, rather than as additional funds. Nonetheless, the 
additional funds generated through compulsory modulation have led to a larger 
available budget than would otherwise have been the case.  
 
According to the case study, in the UK (England), compulsory and modulation funds 
have allowed for the introduction of Entry Level Stewardship and the growth of 
Higher Level Stewardship, two of the elements of their agri-environment scheme. 
Without these funds it would not be possible to operate Entry Level Stewardship and 
Higher Level Stewardship would have to be closed to new applicants. In Germany the 
agri-environment budget declined between the two programming periods, mainly as a 
result of the introduction of the axis minima requirements and the need to use funds 
for measures in other Axes. However, the compulsory modulation funds are thought 
to have prevented a more severe decrease in the resources devoted to the agri-
environment measure across the Länder. 
 
The CMEF result indicators provide figures to demonstrate the impact of compulsory 
modulation on the environment. Although these figures are open to some 
interpretation35, just looking at the anticipated area of farmland brought under 
successful environmental management through Axis 2 measures, we can see that 
compulsory modulation, under the baseline scenario, is anticipated to result in an 
additional 5 million hectares of land being managed in ways that benefit biodiversity, 
an additional 3 million hectares for water quality, 3 million hectares for soil quality 
and an additional 1 million hectares to help meet climate change objectives across the 
EU-15 than is likely to have been the case without the availability of this additional 
funding (see Table 6.3). These areas are likely to overlap with one another. In 
addition it would seem from these indicators that it is anticipated that Axis 2 measures 
will prevent over 3 million hectares of farmland being abandoned. 
                                                 
35
 The figures in Table 6.3 are provided to give an indicative picture of the effect that compulsory 
modulation has on land under successful management for a range of environmental parameters.  
Issues of accuracy with this data have been due to the different way in which Member States have 
recorded their data and/or interpreted the indicators.  It has not been possible to rectify these within 
the remit of this study.  
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Table 6.3 Result indicators – contribution of modulation to the anticipated area of UAA 






HNV Water quality Climate 
change 
Soil quality Avoidance of land 
abandonment 
BE N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
DK 236,976 236,976 236,976 236,976 236,976 
DE3 811,655 856,241 407,666 720,230 702,061 
IE N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
GR4 272,760 N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
ES3 1,092,008 492,802 330,307 390,603 456,167 
FR2 864,570 864,570 88,200 786,870 1,554,420 
IT3 303,124 232,187 204,213 285,283 235,227 
LU N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 9,600 
NL 14,400 N.d. 282 N.d. N.d. 
AT 196,000 182,000 84,000 231,000 175,000 
PT5  58,100 29,750 12,425 93,100 71,050 
FI N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
SE6 957,735 N.d. N.d. 90,000 108,000 
UK (Eng)1 480,000 288000 N.d. 288000 N.d. 
EU-15 5,287,328 3,182,526 1,364,069 3,122,061 3,548,500 
Target UAA 
for all Axis 2 
measures in 
EU-15 
29,274,390 20,172,409 9,190,094 21,365,688 22,781,022 
Source: Derived from unpublished Commission summary of CMEF indicator targets for EU-27 
N.d. = no data  
1 Target figures for UAA under successful management relate to England exclusively. 
2 France figures taken from Hexagone RDP (mainland) not overseas territories. 
3 Germany, Italy and Spain figures calculated from sum of regional targets. 
4 Greece figures refer to all agricultural and forestry area targeted by RDP. 
5 Portugal figures for Continent (mainland) only. UAA targets are presented as a range so figures in this table are 
based on averages. 
6 Swedish target for HNV is based on Axis 2 target of 30% of 2005 UAA.  
In relation to forestry, similar calculations can be made (with the same caveats as 
above). From Table 6.4 we can see that it is estimated that Axis 2 measures are 
anticipated to result in an additional 0.8 million hectares of forest area being managed 
in ways that benefit biodiversity, an additional 0.7 million hectares for water quality, 
0.7 million hectares for soil quality and an additional 0.7 million hectares to help meet 
climate change objectives across the EU-15 than is likely to have been the case 
without the availability of this additional funding. 
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BE N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
DK 102672 102672 102672 102672 102672 
DE 51976 54317 46358 18682 17454 
IE N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
GR N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
ES 317361 245765 262580 303063 156312 
FR N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
IT 55475 49362 51527 53677 49061 
LU N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
NL N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
AT 274680 274680 274680 274680 N.d. 
PT  N.d. 16450 16450 16450 N.d. 
FI N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
SE 6075 N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
UK (Eng)  N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. N.d. 
EU-15 808239 743246 754266 769224 325499 
Target forestry area 
for all Axis 2 
measures in EU-15 
6,998,235 6,998,235 6,998,235 6,998,235 6,998,235 
Source: Derived from unpublished Commission summary of CMEF indicator targets for EU-27 
N.d. = no data or forestry measures not implemented 
The CAPRI model can also be used to provide information on the potential impacts of 
modulation on several environmental indicators. Although the level of aggregation is 
coarse, and cannot provide full insights into the environmental effects of the second 
pillar, it is helpful in that it applies an identical methodology across all regions of the 
EU. As such these indicators are a valuable complement to the information deriving 
from the CMEF indicators, and the case study experts.  
 
Table 6.5 provides an overview of the results from CAPRI on a selection of 
indicators, showing the impact of an increase in modulation under the Health Check 
Scenario compared with the situation without modulation. The remaining columns 
demonstrate the breakdown of this overall result between the reduction of Pillar 1 
payments and the increase in availability of funding for various groups of Pillar 2 
measures. As follows: 
• “P1 only” shows the effect of reducing the first pillar. 
• “lab-P1” shows the effect of human capital investments relative to “P1 only”, 
i.e. attempts to isolate the effect of only the human capital investment measures. 
• “cap-P1” similarly isolates the effect of physical capital investments 
• “lfa-P1” similarly isolates the effect of LFA payments 
• “n2k-P1” similarly isolates the effect of Natura 2000 payments 
• “age-P1” similarly isolates the effect of agro-environment (AE) schemes 
• “reg-P1” similarly isolates the effect of “regional support” measures 
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Not all measures have a linear impact on the indicators, thus the sum of the last seven 
columns may deviate slightly from the total effect “∆ Health Check”. 
 
As with the CMEF indicators, this shows that overall, increased levels of modulation 
are having positive, albeit fairly small environmental effects. Under the Health Check 
Scenario, nutrient surpluses are slightly reduced, the intensity of production is 
reduced, and the global warming potential of both methane and nitrous oxide is 
reduced. These results are aggregated for the EU-27. In reality there will not be a 
uniform impact across the EU, and one would expect a range of impacts depending on 
the local agricultural situation. 
 
Table 6.5 Selected environmental indicators from CAPRI, for EU-27 in the Health Check 
scenario versus the zero modulation scenario, for 2013, various units and indices (absolute value 
in the reference scenario and percent difference for Health Check and selected simulations) 
  No modulation ∆HC P1 only lab-P1 cap-P1 lfa-P1 n2k-P1 age-P1 reg-P1 
Surplus N 63.02 -0,38 -0,06 -0,03 -0,10 0,00 -0,06 -0,13 0,00 
Surplus P 15.67 -0,45 -0,06 0,00 -0,06 0,00 -0,06 -0,19 0,00 
Surplus K 29.13 -0,48 -0,07 -0,03 -0,07 0,00 -0,10 -0,17 0,00 
Pesticides 85965 -0,66 -0,10 -0,03 -0,14 0,01 -0,11 -0,28 0,01 
Intensity Ar 1.00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Intensity Gr 1.00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Crop diversity 2.72 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GWP CH4 188796 -0,06 -0,10 0,00 -0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,09 0,00 
GWP N2O 523269 -0,27 -0,08 -0,02 -0,09 0,00 -0,04 -0,02 0,00 
Surplus N: Nitrate surplus at soil level (kg/ha)  
Surplus P: Phosphate surplus at soil level (kg/ha) 
Surplus K: Potassium surplus at soil level (kg/ha) 
Pesticides: Total spending on pesticides (1000 EUR)  
Intensity Ar: Laspeyres index of yields of arable crops using baseline areas as weights  
Intensity Gr: Laspeyres index of yields of grassland using baseline areas as weights  
Crop diversity: Diversity of cropping mix measured as entropy of crop shares in all regions.  
GWP CH4: Global warming potential of emitted methane in CO2 equivalents (1000 tons).  
GWP CH4: Global warming potential of emitted N2O in CO2 equivalents (1000 tons). 
6.4.2 Changes in Land Use 
Agriculture and forestry are the dominant land uses in Europe, accounting for 47 per 
cent and 31 per cent, respectively, of the territory of the EU-27 (CEC, 2006). The 
environmental impacts of these two land uses can be both positive (for example in 
relation to the provision of a range of goods and associated services, including varied 
cultural landscapes and a wide range of habitats and species adapted to varying levels 
of human disturbance), and negative (for example soil erosion, water pollution, loss of 
biodiversity and the degradation of landscapes). 
  
In terms of agricultural land use, approximately 60 per cent of all agricultural land is 
devoted to arable cropping, with just over 30 per cent as grassland and six per cent 
under permanent crops36. Extensive farming systems, mostly dominated by grazed 
semi-natural vegetation, tend to be richest in biodiversity, and biodiversity value 
generally decreases as the intensity of farming increases. Negative environmental 
impacts can also occur as a result of marginalisation and land abandonment. The risk 
of land abandonment is often greatest in areas of marginal productivity, for example 
Mediterranean regions and the mountainous regions of central and eastern Europe. 
                                                 
36
 CEC (2006) Rural Development in the European Union - Statistical and Economic Information - 
Report 2006. DG Agriculture, Brussels. 
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The maintenance of permanent pasture and forests are also important for soil and 
water quality, and for mitigating the effects of climate change, in terms of their role in 
sequestering carbon.  
 
Earlier chapters have shown that, under both the baseline and Health Check scenarios, 
the reductions in Pillar 1 payments are not thought to have significant impacts on farm 
incomes, productivity or farm structural change. As such, significant effects upon land 
use will not be experienced. Indeed, the majority of case study experts also highlight 
the fact that other factors are thought to be far more important in influencing changes 
in land or input use.  
 
However, it may be that, in certain situations, especially where the reductions in Pillar 
1 payments affect farming sectors that are struggling in terms of financial viability, 
compulsory modulation can exacerbate existing impacts of market forces which drive 
structural change (see Chapter 4). These structural changes may have environmental 
implications which can be both positive and negative.  
 
Anecdotally, the case study experts in France and the UK believe that reductions in 
Pillar 1 payments may lead to an increase in the area under the agri-environment 
measure, which would be positive from an environmental perspective. They argue 
that reduced direct payments may make agri-environment payments look more 
attractive, and in many cases may be seen as a means of recouping money lost 
through reductions in Pillar 1 payments. This could also be the case for schemes 
operating in other Member States, particularly those which have elements focusing on 
the maintenance of existing environmental value. 
 
The results from LEITAP show that under the Health Check Scenario, a greater 
proportion of land would be under production than is the case without compulsory 
modulation. The model indicates that compulsory modulation has a very small 
positive effect on land use, retaining some land under production across the EU-27 
that might otherwise have been abandoned or have moved into alternative land uses, 
such as forestry (Figure 6.1). While the reduction of Pillar 1 payments alone would be 
likely to see a small proportion of land go out of production, the increased availability 
of funding in Pillar 2, particularly in relation to the agri-environment and LFA 
measures, more than makes up for this.  
 
In practice, these results seem surprisingly small. Given the extent of implementation 
of agri-environment and the LFA measures, with schemes operating in all 27 Member 
States, one might anticipate greater effects on land use than those modelled; however 
the general orientation of response indicated through the modelling is certainly what 
we would expect to see in reality. 
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Figure 6.1 Agricultural land use – EU-15 / EU-27 (% change Health Check scenario relative to no 
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EU27 EU15
 
Source: LEITAP, 2008 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the influence of national co-financing on compulsory modulation 
receipts within Pillar 2 on these results. Without national co-financing, these figures 
indicate that, despite the positive effects of the LFA and agri-environment measures, 
land would continue to leave agricultural production. This highlights the importance 
of sufficient funds being allocated to such schemes to allow their coverage to be 
adequate to retain sufficient land of high nature and landscape value under 
agricultural use. 
Figure 6.2 Impact of co-financing on EU-27 land use of primary agriculture with 13% 
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Source: LEITAP, 2008 
LEITAP also suggests that compulsory modulation under the Health Check Scenario 
leads to a greater retention in the area of grassland than the area of arable land. Figure 
6.3 shows that under the Health Check Scenario, approximately 0.6% more grassland 
is retained in production than would be the case without compulsory modulation – 
largely due to Pillar 2 environmental measures – while the area under crops is reduced 
by 0.3%, largely as a result of the reductions in Pillar 1 payments. These losses are 
likely to be primarily from marginal arable areas. This effect is mainly influenced by 
payments made under the agri-environment, LFA and Natura 2000 measures, a 
greater proportion of which are focused on livestock systems than arable farmland. It 
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would appear to indicate that increased expenditure on such measures is helping to 
reduce grassland decline at the margins, although, as above, the impact is likely to be 
more significant in practice. 
 
Figure 6.3 EU-27 agricultural land use – Grassland / Cropland (% change Health Check scenario 
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Grassland Cropland
 
Source: LEITAP, 2008 
These findings are partially backed up by the limited information available on this 
topic within the case studies, the CMEF indicators and the evaluation literature. For 
example, evaluations of the agri-environment and LFA measures suggest that these 
measures have helped to maintain agricultural activity in marginal areas in some 
Member States. For the three case study Member States where information has been 
provided for the result indicator ‘area under successful management for the avoidance 
of marginalisation and land abandonment’ (see Table 6.6), it can be seen that the agri-
environment measure is anticipated to prevent over 7 million hectares of UAA being 
abandoned in France (14% of which can be attributed to compulsory modulation), 
compared with 115,000 hectares in Germany - North Rhine Westphalia (16% of 
which is due to modulation) and 13,200 hectares in Portugal (8% of which is due to 
modulation). 
 
In France and the UK it is thought that the additional funds available for the agri-
environment and LFA measure through modulation are likely to significantly increase 
the area of land under extensive grazing, although whether this will involve a shift of 
land use from arable to grassland is not reported. The case study experts in the UK 
and Finland also suggest that increased funding for the agri-environment measure will 
lead to an increase in the area of UAA under extensive arable crops, although again, 
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Table 6.6 CMEF Result Indicator for agri-environment measure: anticipated area of land on 
which land abandonment is to be avoided  
Agri-Environment (214) FR* PT DE-NRW 
Result 6    
ha avoidance m/l.a.  7,402,000 165,000 115,000 
% due to modulation 14 8 16 
Ha due to modulation 1,036,280 13,200 18,400 
Benchmark 27,590,940 3,679,590 1,523,747 
Total as % of benchmark 27 4 8 
Modulation as % of benchmark  4 0.3 1 
* The result indicators are for measures 211,212, 214 and 216 together. To be able to calculate the effect of 
modulation all were put under measure 214 with a modulation rate of 14%. 
6.4.3 Biodiversity 
Biodiversity across Europe continues to decline as a result of habitat degeneration, 
destruction and fragmentation, resulting particularly from agricultural intensification 
and increased irrigation, alongside built development and infrastructure. Reduced 
management and abandonment is also an issue in economically marginal areas, 
particularly those within which high nature value (HNV) farmland – low intensity 
farming systems associated with high levels of semi-natural vegetation – are to be 
found37. It has been estimated that 50 per cent of all species in Europe depend on 
agricultural habitats, including a number of endemic and threatened species38. Over 
40 per cent of European bird species have unfavourable conservation status39 and of 
the more common bird species, it is farmland and forest species in particular that have 
declined over the past 30 years.  
 
Against this backdrop, rural development measures, particularly those within Axis 2 
of the current EAFRD, provide payments to encourage sustainable farming and 
forestry practices in order to help maintain and enhance the biodiversity value of farm 
and forest land, and to help reverse the overall decline in farmland birds. We would 
expect, therefore, that increased funding for such measures, as a result of modulation 
would lead to: 
• An increase in the area of HNV farmland being maintained/ managed;  
• The continued maintenance of OR increase in overall levels of farmland 
biodiversity in the wider countryside (as measured through the population 
of farmland birds); 
• An increase in the area under organic cultivation, with associated 
biodiversity benefits; and 
• A greater proportion of Natura 2000 sites brought under favourable 
management. 
 
The key measures in this regard are the natural handicap measures (211, 212); agri-
environment (214); Natura 2000 (213); alongside the forestry measures, which 
                                                 
37
 EEA, 2004b. The State of Biological Diversity in the European Union. Malahide Conference: 
Biodiversity and the EU – Sustaining Life, Sustaining Livelihoods, 25-27 May 2004 (document 
MALAHIDE/INF2) 
38
 Kristensen, P. (2003) EEA core set of indicators: revised version April 2003. Technical report. EEA, 
Copenhagen. 
39
 EEA (2007) Europe’s Environment: The Fourth Assessment, European Environment Agency, 
Copenhagen. 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report (June 2009) – page 131  
 
 
encourage afforestation (221-223); forest-environment payments (225); Natura 2000 
(224); and restoring forestry potential after natural disasters (226). Between them the 
two natural handicap payment measures (LFA measures) and the agri-environment 
measure account for a 38% of total public funding for EAFRD for 2007-13.  
Environmental benefits of selected rural development measures 
The agri-environment measure is a critical means of achieving biodiversity benefits 
across the EU-27, and for the majority of Member States, the maintenance and 
enhancement of biodiversity, both within Natura 2000 areas and across the wider 
countryside, is a key objective of their agri-environment schemes. All but ten Member 
States (Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia and Spain) allocate over half their Axis 2 budget to the agri-environment 
measure. 
 
In general, evaluations of the agri-environment measure have shown that, overall, its 
implementation has achieved benefits for biodiversity40. Since agri-environment 
schemes tend to require reduced agrochemical inputs, extensification of production 
and the maintenance of existing low intensity systems, they can be expected to have 
positive impacts on biodiversity41 42. While the focus in most Member States tends to 
be on the maintenance of existing extensive grassland management rather than 
targeting more intensive farming systems, increasingly agri-environment schemes are 
introducing options for creating field margins and buffers strips within arable systems, 
which have significant benefits for biodiversity (for example, birds, small mammals, 
butterflies) as well as soil and water protection (see below).  Most Member States also 
use the agri-environment measure to encourage organic farming practices, providing 
incentives to cover conversion costs and in some cases to provide payments for the 
maintenance of these practices. Figures show that between 2000-2006 the area of land 
certified as organic and in conversion rose by 34% to over 7 million hectares43, with 
increases of over 450% experienced in many of the new Member States such as BG, 
PL, LT, LV and CY. It can be assumed that the majority of these increases are likely 
to have been funded through the agri-environment measure, either through SAPARD 
or the 2000-2006 Rural Development Regulation, although market forces also play a 
major role.   
 
Although not an explicit aim of the natural handicap measures, LFA schemes have 
been used to support extensive livestock based systems which, if appropriately 
managed, are crucial to the maintenance of species rich semi-natural pastures and the 
avoidance of land abandonment44. There is general consensus from evaluation studies 
that payments have contributed to continued agricultural land management in 
marginal areas but that the measure has been poorly targeted at need, for example 
                                                 
40
 See for example: CSL and CCRI (2008) A review of environmental benefits supplied by agri-
environment schemes, Report to the UK Land Use Policy Group, August 2008 and Oréade-Brèche 
(2005) Evaluation of Agri-Environmental Measures – Report for DG Agriculture. 
41
 EPEC (2004) Impact assessment of rural development programmes in view of post 2006 rural 
development policy, for DG Agriculture. 
42
 Kleijn, D et al (2006) Mixed biodiversity benefits of agri-environment schemes in five European 
countries, Ecology Letters 9. 
43
 Aberystwyth University  (2008)– Organic Farming Statistics accessible at: 
http://www.organic.aber.ac.uk/statistics/europe2008.shtml#europe%20land 
44
 IEEP (2006) An Evaluation of the Less Favoured Area Measure in the 25 Member States of the 
European Union. Report for DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
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where public goods are most apparent, and the risk of land abandonment is greatest45. 
Together the LFA measures account for approximately one third of the Axis 2 budget 
across the EU-27, ranging from under five per cent of the budget in Hungary and 
Denmark to over 50 per cent of the budget in Finland, Malta and Slovakia. A low 
level of expenditure is likely to be indicative of either a small proportion of the land 
designated as LFA, or a product of the eligibility criteria that restrict the number of 
beneficiaries who are eligible for the aid. 
 
The Natura 2000 measures provide support for the costs of undertaking appropriate 
management on agricultural and forestry Natura 2000 sites, in order to maintain or 
increase their biodiversity value. Expenditure on the two Natura 2000 measures is, 
however, rather low across the EU46, with many Member States either choosing not to 
use EU funding mechanisms to meet a substantial share of the cost of meeting Natura 
2000 obligations, or drawing on other EAFRD measures, particularly the agri-
environment measure, and to a lesser degree the forest-environment measure and the 
two non-productive investment measures. For example in Portugal, the bulk of agri-
environment expenditure is spent within geographical areas (Integrated Territorial 
Interventions), containing a high proportion of Natura 2000 areas. 
 
Seven measures within Axis 2 focus on encouraging the sustainable use of forestry 
land. While not a significant focus of many RDPs (14 per cent of Axis 2 budget for 
2007-13), these measures do comprise a significant proportion of the Axis 2 budget in 
some Member States, for example Spain (42 per cent) and Portugal (37 per cent). The 
environmental impact is, therefore, subject to considerable local variation. Whilst all 
forestry measures can result in benefits for biodiversity, they can also lead to 
biodiversity losses, depending on how the measures are implemented. The species of 
trees that are planted and the biodiversity value of the land on which any planting 
takes place are critical in this regard. If used appropriately, the targeted planting of 
appropriate tree species may help improve functional connectivity of habitats, and 
provide significant benefits for biodiversity. While there are examples of poor 
implementation of these measures in the previous programming period, which have 
been environmentally damaging, Member States are now required to ensure that 
afforestation is suited to local conditions and compatible with environmental 
requirements, particularly biodiversity. There are some reports, however, that this 
requirement is not always heeded in practice, for example Hungary intends to use 
these measures to create new plantations of non-native black locust trees, which, 
while having potentially positive benefits for soils, carbon sequestration and water 
quality, could have negative implications for biodiversity47.  
 
The ex ante evaluations from France, the UK (England) and the German Länder, also 
show that other Pillar 2 measures have the potential to bring about biodiversity 
benefits. The training and advice measures are particularly emphasised as is the 
                                                 
45
 IEEP (2006) An Evaluation of the Less Favoured Area Measure in the 25 Member States of the 
European Union. Report for DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
46
 Only 14  Member States have used the measure for Natura 2000 and Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) payments for agricultural land, and 11 have used Natura 2000 payments for forest, together 
accounting for 0.75% of total public funding to the EAFRD over the current programming period. 
47
 FERN (2008) Funding forests into the future? How the European Fund for Rural Development 
Affects Europe’s Forests. 
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LEADER approach where it is used to encourage community involvement in 
conservation work. 
Impact of Modulation on environmental outcomes 
The evidence from the CMEF Indicators, the case studies and where available, the 
models, shows that increased availability of funding within Pillar 2 from modulation 
generally enhances the benefits to biodiversity brought about by these measures. The 
greater the rate of modulation, the greater the benefit, depending on the precise nature 
of the land management practices that are incentivised.  
 
Two of the CMEF impact indicators are specifically related to biodiversity, namely 
‘reversing biodiversity decline’, as measured by the population of farmland birds and 
‘maintenance of HNV farmland and forestry’ (see Table 6.7). Most Member States 
either aim to maintain farmland birds at levels for a particular reference year (stated 
variously) or to increase levels (with targets generally in the region of 0.5%-2.5%), 
although this does mask some continued anticipation of decline. For example Finland 
anticipates a continued decline in farmland bird species reliant on arable areas or field 
margins over the programming period. Agri-environment is the key measure 
mentioned in reference to achieving targets set under this indicator, with LFA also 
playing a role in some Member States.  
 
In relation to the HNV farmland area48, most Member States either anticipate 
maintaining the existing area of HNV farmland or increasing the area slightly (where 
Member States have been able to make an estimate). The key measures for achieving 
this are considered to be the LFA measures primarily, followed by the agri-
environment measure. It should be noted, however, that Member States have taken 
quite different approaches to defining their baseline figures of HNV farmland, with 
some countries referring only to Natura 2000 areas, and others taking a much broader 
approach, and as a result, the targets set for this indicator need to be treated with some 
caution.  
 
For most Member States, the contribution of compulsory modulation funds to these 
targets is estimated as proportional to the share of the RDP budget made up from 
these funds and associated national co-financing (see Chapter 3). Under the baseline 
scenario this varies, therefore, between 5%-30% of the target values of the ecological 
impact indicators. In the case of the UK (England) and Finland, however, this 
contribution is only related to the proportion of the target achieved through the agri-
environment measure, as all compulsory modulation funds are targeted solely at this 
measure.  
                                                 
48
 No Member States have yet set out targets for measuring HNV forestry 
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Table 6.7 2013 Targets for biodiversity impact indicators in the case study Member States 
Indicator Percentage target Quantitative target Qualitative target 
Reversing 
biodiversity 







 2.28% increase 
(FI) 
 50% trend 
reversal (SI) 
 42000 ha (DE -BAV) 
 627500 ha covered = 24.4% of 
UAA (DE - NRW) 
 255200 ha (DE -THU) 
 2550 ha woodland area increase 
(WAL)  
 
 Maintenance (PT) 
 Maintain 2003 levels (FR) 
 Slow down until 2010, 
maintain thereafter (NL) 
 Decline reversed by 2010 
(UK -ENG) 
 Improve, no target (UK - 
SCO) 






 0.5%-2.5% (NI) 
 95% of HNV 
and 95% of 
Natura 2000 in 
favourable 
condition by 
2010 (UK - 
ENG) 
 Maintain current 
are of HNV 
(2% of UAA) 
(NL) 
 452500 ha covered = 17.6% of 
UAA (DE-NRW) 
 425000 ha split on several 
measures (PT) 
 Maintenance of 513500 ha by 
several measures and 
maintenance by other measures 
(DE - SAX-A) 
 +2700 ha (SI) 
 43500 ha (DE-THU) 
 350 ha of woodland and Natura 
2000 (UK-WAL) 
 4,2 Mha (= maintaining current) 
(FR) 
 590000 ha (PL) 
 Maintain tree diversity (FR) 
 In preparation (FI) 
 Maintain (UK - SCO) 
 Maintain and enhance HNV 
area (UK - WAL) 
 No serious target possible 
(DE -BAV) 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
The result indicator for the ‘area of agricultural land under successful management for 
biodiversity’ indicates that, overall the Axis 2 measures are anticipated to ensure that 
over 29 million hectares are brought under successful management for biodiversity, 
with approximately 5 million hectares of this attributable to modulation. More 
specifically, looking at the RDPs of the case study countries, the agri-environment 
measure is anticipated to ensure that over 15% of UAA is managed in ways that 
maintain and enhance its biodiversity value in two German Länder, the UK (England) 
and Portugal (see Table 6.8). The contribution of compulsory modulation is estimated 
to lead to an additional 0.5 million hectares of land being managed for biodiversity in 
France (2% of total UAA), and 0.6 million hectares in the UK (England) (7% of 
UAA) than would be the case without modulation. There is insufficient data provided 
for other measures in relation to this result indic
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Table 6.8 CMEF Result indicator for the agri-environment measure: anticipated area under 
successful management for biodiversity and HNV farmland  
Agri-Environment (214) FR* NL PT UK-E DE-BAV 
DE-
NRW 
Result 2       
ha HNV 4,117,000 96,000 590,000 2,000,000 1,036,500 290,000 
% due to modulation 14 19 8 31 10 16 
Ha due to modulation 576,380 18,240 47,200 620,000 103,650 46,400 
Benchmark (ha UAA) 27,590,940 1,958,060 3,679,590 8,716,179 3,264,724 1,523,747 
Total as % of benchmark 15 0.5 16 23 32 19 
Modulation as % of benchmark 2 0.9 1.23 7 3 3 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
* The result indicators are for measures 211,212, 214 and 216 together. To be able to calculate the effect of 
modulation all were put under measure 214 with a modulation rate of 13%. 
Results from CAPRI, in relation to the indicator “Intensity Ar” (see Table 6.5) capture 
how intensively land is managed, by weighing together all yield changes in all crops. 
The underlying assumption of this indicator is that lower yields reflect less pesticide 
and fertiliser use as well as the introduction of non-productive elements into the 
farming system, such as buffer strips and hedges. The indicator is thus broader than 
nitrate surplus or pesticide use. The results indicate that increased modulation will 
bring about a decrease in intensity for arable land of 0.19%, which is likely to be 
beneficial for biodiversity. The decomposition of these results reveals that the effect is 
primarily due to the agri-environment and Natura 2000 measures. 
 
With higher levels of compulsory modulation one would expect to see an increase in 
the level of biodiversity benefits that are achieved, as long as the additional funding is 
allocated to those measures that are key to achieving improvements in the biodiversity 
resource. It is difficult to ascertain what strategy individual Member States would take 
for using the additional funding, but it could lead to: 
 
• An increased area of UAA under existing agri-environment or forestry 
schemes; 
• A greater proportion of Natura 2000 areas brought into favourable 
management; 
• Revisions to agri-environment schemes made to include more demanding (and 
costly) management options, such as those encouraging the reversion of arable 
land to pasture, wetland creation, etc; 
• Higher payment rates for a number of measures (within the parameters 
prescribed through the regulation) to improve the financial attractiveness of 
extensive production at a time of potentially high commodity prices, as well as 
to avoid the risk of abandonment. 
 
6.4.4 Landscape  
The character of the landscape is derived from the interaction of a range of manmade 
and natural factors. The EU comprises a wide range of agricultural and forested 
landscapes reflecting a wide range of differences in bio- and geo-physical conditions, 
farm management practices and cultural heritage. Agriculture and forestry 
management practices play an important role in maintaining the character of 
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landscapes, but can also have a damaging influence as a result of homogenisation 
and/or neglect of feature management, as well as actual loss of whole landscapes. 
 
We would expect that increased funding in Pillar 2 would lead to: 
• an increase in the area of ‘valued’ landscapes that are maintained or enhanced; 
• a decrease in the decline in landscape character; and 
• an improvement in the condition of farmland features. 
 
The key measures that can influence landscape character include the two natural 
handicap measures (211, 212), the agri-environment measure (214), the afforestation 
measures (221; 222; 223), and the conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage 
measure (323) within Axis 3. 
 
Given that the character of a landscape is encapsulated by the interaction of a range of 
factors, including landscape features, habitat types and cultural aspects, it is difficult 
to find indicators that can act as proxies for these factors in combination and that 
reflect the complexity and multiple functions of the EU’s landscapes49. Instead, a 
range of indicators are needed that can examine the different parameters linked to 
land use that can impact upon the functionality, diversity and cultural characteristics 
of landscape.  
 
The majority of Member States include the protection of cultural landscapes as a key 
priority of their agri-environment schemes; however, there is very little evaluation 
literature that sets out how effective these schemes have been at achieving these aims. 
A recent evaluation of the agri-environment measure50, showed that it had a generally 
positive impact upon landscape, particularly in terms of maintaining, restoring and 
recreating landscape features, such as hedges, or small patches of woodland, by 
maintaining extensive grassland, reverting arable land to grassland, and maintaining 
or improving the habitat mosaic within a particular area; and by helping to prevent 
land abandonment in some cases, particularly important where farming systems are an 
integral part of the culture and identity of an area (this is particularly the case for 
marginal and upland farming systems across Europe which are also often of high 
nature value.  
 
The LFA measures are also important from a landscape perspective, by helping to 
support the continuation of farming activity in areas of high landscape value. The 
afforestation measures can also have beneficial impacts upon landscape, as long as 
planting is sensitive to the character of the surrounding landscape and native species 
are planted.  
 
The availability of additional funds through Pillar 2 as a result of compulsory 
modulation will help to enhance these benefits, by both improving and extending the 
implementation of such schemes. The figures in Table 6.3 on land abandonment 
show, for example, that approximately 22 million hectares of farmland are anticipated 
to be prevented from being abandoned as a result of Axis 2 measures over the 2007-
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13 programming period, of which 3.5 million hectares can be attributed to compulsory 
modulation.  
 
6.4.5 Water Quality 
The past 30 years have seen the levels of water pollution significantly reduced as a 
result of declines in nutrient surpluses in the majority of Member States51. However, 
while there has been a major drop in point source pollution, diffuse pollution, 
primarily from agriculture, continues to be a major issue in many areas, and many 
water courses continue to be of poor water quality, mainly as a result of nutrient 
enrichment and soil sediment deposition. The main causes of poor quality in surface 
water continue to emanate from nitrate and phosphate contamination as a result of 
agricultural management. In some Member States, particularly in the Baltic, North 
Sea and Mediterranean, pollution of coastal waters by nutrients is also a significant 
issue.   
 
In order to meet the requirements of the Water Framework Directive (requiring 
Member States to bring all water bodies into ‘Good Ecological Status’ by 2012), and 
the Nitrates Directive, Member States are increasingly making use of EAFRD 
measures to improve water quality, either through incentivising sustainable land 
management practices, particularly those that reduce nutrient leaching and soil 
erosion, or by funding investments in improved infrastructure, particularly in relation 
to waste water treatment. We would, therefore, expect that increased funding within 
Pillar 2 would lead to a decrease in the levels of nitrogen and phosphorous in surface 
and groundwater. Improving water quality is a key overarching priority of the 2007-
13 RDPs in a number of the case study Member States, for example Finland, France 
and Germany.  
 
The gross nutrient balance, or the nutrient surplus per hectare of agricultural land, is 
commonly used as a proxy to measure the nutrient pressure on water, and hence as an 
indicator of water quality. This measures the difference between the quantity of 
nutrient inputs entering the agricultural system and nutrient outputs leaving the 
system in the form of uptake by crops, pasture etc. The surplus is either stored in the 
soil or is washed out, with consequential risks for water quality (as well as soil 
fertility). 
 
The key Pillar 2 measures for helping to improve water quality are the agri-
environment measure, the afforestation measures from Axis 2 and the farm 
modernisation measure within Axis 1. Evaluations from the previous programming 
period suggest that the main benefits for resource protection are delivered through the 
agri-environment measure, with improvements being mainly a result of actions 
requiring reductions in inputs, cover crops, appropriate arable rotations, arable 
reversion to grassland and organic agriculture52 53 54 55. More recently, agri-
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environment scheme funding has been increasingly used to incentivise the 
introduction of buffer strips of varying widths alongside water courses, as they are 
seen as a key means of achieving a reduction in the pollution of water courses, and 
helping achieve the requirements of the Water Framework Directive56. Table 6.2 
shows that water quality features as a key objective of agri-environment schemes in 
the majority of Member States. This is backed up by information from the 2007-13 
RDPs and the targets provided for the CMEF indicators. 
 
Evidence from CAPRI, the CMEF indicators and the case studies all suggest that the 
additional funds generated through compulsory modulation are likely to have a 
positive impact on water quality, by either maintaining nutrient surpluses at 
sustainable levels, or reducing them across the EU-27. 
 
The results from CAPRI (Table 6.5) indicate that there will be a reduction in N-
surpluses (-0.46%), and use of pesticides (-0.76%) under the Health Check scenario. 
The results show that this is a result of both a reduction in first pillar payments as well 
as an increase in availability of funding for second pillar measures, in particular Axis 
1 physical investment measures to improve farm technology, and the Natura 2000 and 
agri-environment measures which contribute to reducing pesticides by requiring more 
extensive management practices.  
 
In Finland, for example, improving water quality is a key objective of the agri-
environment scheme. As this measure is the focus of all additional modulation funds, 
increased availability of funds could potentially allow for either greater uptake of the 
scheme (which is already very high), higher payment rates for existing options or 
potentially the introduction of new, more demanding, and higher cost options. In the 
Netherlands, the case study expert suggested that the additional resources made 
available for the agri-environment measure would have positive effects on the quality 
of water resources. As in Finland, compulsory modulation funds in the UK (England) 
are focused specifically on the agri-environment measure. Although it is too early to 
fully assess the impacts of Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) on water quality, early 
modelling indicates that the current approach of targeting action within priority 
catchments with pollution problems is effective, estimating average potential 
reductions in N losses of between 2.1 and 4.3% and of approximately 4% for P, based 
on levels of uptake of relevant management options in 2006/0757. As modulated funds 
(both compulsory and voluntary) makes up the majority of the budget for agri-
environment expenditure in the UK, the majority of such impacts can effectively be 
attributed to the funds generated through modulation. 
 
The use of the farm modernisation measure to provide funding for capital investment, 
alongside the use of other measures, such as the training and advice measures, also 
play a significant role in improving water quality. For example, the French case study 
indicates that in France, improvements in water quality are most likely to be brought 
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about through the use of the training measures, which are used to provide training 
programmes focused on efficient fertiliser use, and the farm modernisation measure, 
which can be used for the modernisation of livestock buildings, with the aim of 
reducing pollution. In Ireland, the Farm Waste Management Scheme provides 
investment aid for animal manure storage, winter housing for cattle and sheep, silage 
storage and equipment for spreading animal wastes, and in the UK (England), 
voluntary modulation has been specifically targeted at nutrient management in the 
livestock sector, which should have beneficial impacts on water quality. Sweden, 
Italy, Austria and the UK all also focus a proportion of their farm modernisation 
measures on improved manure storage and spreading. 
 
In relation to the CMEF impact indicator on water quality (see Table 6.9), where 
Member States have provided quantified baseline and target figures, these relate 
mainly to reductions in nitrogen surplus, with anticipated reductions ranging widely - 
from 4% in the Paris Basin to 70% in the south east region of France. It should be 
noted that the baseline figures for nitrogen surplus/ha vary significantly between 
Member States and regions within Member States, reflecting the different nature of 
farm practices across the EU-27. The extent to which the additional compulsory 
modulation receipts contribute to these reductions in nutrient surplus, will again be 
proportional to their contribution to the overall RDP budget (see Chapter 3).  
 
Table 6.9 Targets for the water quality impact indicator in the case study countries, 2013 






 0.5%-2.5% (NI) 
 13% = 55 kg N/ha 
(PL) 
 612500 ha covered = 
23.9% of UAA (NRW) 
 -4 kg N/ha (SI)  
 73500 ha (THU) 
 600 farms (WAL) 
 N-balance 46 kg/ha (FI) 
 Qualitative improvement 
(PT) 
 Qualitative improvement 
(DE -SAX-A) 
 Improve, no target (UK - 
SCO) 
 Improvement (UK - WAL) 
 Improvement (FR) 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
In relation to the result indicator relating to water quality for the case study Member 
States, again, it is the agri-environment scheme that is anticipated to contribute the 
most in terms of bringing land under appropriate management for achieving improved 
water quality. The proportion of UAA that it is anticipated will be brought under 
appropriate management for water quality varies from 45 percent in Germany 
(Bavaria), 14 per cent in the UK (England), and 12 per cent in Portugal (see Table 
6.10). In terms of the impact of compulsory modulation on this indicator, it is 
estimated to lead to an additional 0.5 million hectares of land being managed to bring 
about improvements in water quality in France (2% of total UAA), compared with 
only 34,000 hectares in Portugal (0.9% of total UAA) There is insufficient data 
provided for other measures in relation to this result indicator, to make analysis 
meaningful. 
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Table 6.10 CMEF Result Indicator for Agri-Environment measure: Area under successful 
management for water quality 






ha water quality 4,117,000 425,000 1,200,000 1,455,000 275,000 
% due to modulation 14 8 31 10 16 
Ha due to modulation  576,380 34,000 372,000 145,500 44,000 
Benchmark (UAA) 27,590,940 3,679,590 8,716,179 3,264,724 1,523,747 
Total as % of benchmark 15 12 14 45 18 
Modulation as % of benchmark 2 0.9 4 4 3 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
* The result indicators are for measures 211,212, 214 and 216 together. To be able to calculate the effect of 
modulation all were put under measure 214 with a modulation rate of 14%. 
As improving water quality is one of the challenges identified as part of the 
Commission’s Health Check proposals, we would expect to see improvements to 
water quality increase as additional modulation funds are made available under the 
Health Check scenario. This is illustrated by looking at the outputs of the nitrate 
surplus indictor from the CAPRI model, which is derived as a function of a range of 
factors, including yield, changes in cropping mix, the application of more efficient 
technologies, and changes in the use of different types of nutrients (i.e. manure versus 
agro chemical inputs). In general CAPRI shows that reductions in Pillar 1 payments 
lead to a slight increase in N-surplus, although this differs between regions. The 
availability of additional funds within Pillar 2 in contrast leads to a decrease in N-
surplus, both as a result of investments in human and physical capital (as a result of 
the development of more efficient technology and increased levels of awareness) as 
well as support for agri-environment and LFA measures. Overall, therefore, increases 
in compulsory modulation according to the Health Check scenario will lead to a slight 
decrease in nitrate surplus across the EU-27 (up to 1.3%). 
6.4.6 Water Quantity 
Estimates show that 50% of the EU population currently live in water stressed areas58, 
largely due to the increasingly unsustainable exploitation of water resources by 
abstraction, particularly for agricultural use. This is being exacerbated by climate 
change. The latest comparable figures available show that between 1990-1992 and 
2001-2003 water use for agriculture increased by an average of 10% (with much 
higher figures recorded for Greece and Portugal), compared to an overall decline in 
total water use of 9% 59.   
 
For environmental benefits to be experienced, increased funding in Pillar 2 would 
need to be focused on actions that lead to: 
• An increase in the sustainability of water abstraction from surface and ground 
water; and 
• a decrease in the volume of water used for irrigation 
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Indicators for measuring improvements in water management and water resource use 
are notoriously difficult to quantify at an EU level as data on available water 
resources at a national level are difficult to calculate, methods for calculating water 
use balances are complex and consistent methodologies for collecting data are often 
not used60 61. In addition there are no CMEF indicators that relate to water resource 
use. 
 
Axis 1 measures, particularly the farm modernisation measure, can be used to fund 
more efficient irrigation systems. However, it is unclear from the case studies, the 
extent to which different Member States have used this measure for this purpose, and 
therefore to calculate the contribution that compulsory modulation could be making to 
improve the sustainability of water usage. There are, however, individual examples of 
some Member States, most notably Portugal, using rural development measures to 
fund irrigation projects. In the current programming period, Portugal is using a 
significant proportion of its Axis 1 funds (18% of total Pillar 2 public expenditure) on 
irrigation projects, including the building of the Alqueva dam and supporting 
associated irrigation projects. The outcomes of this project are not available at the 
time of writing, however it can be estimated that eight per cent of the EU funds 
allocated to this project will be due to compulsory modulation, given that this is the 
proportion of the total EAFRD budget provided by modulated funds.  
6.4.7 Soil Quality 
Soil erosion by water and wind and declines in soil organic matter are the key factors 
affecting the quality of soils, along with compaction in a number of arable areas. Soil 
erosion affects over 17% of Europe’s land area and Southern and Eastern Member 
States experience the most severe risk62 63. Soil erosion is exacerbated by cultivation 
techniques, and in general, land used to grow arable and permanent crops is more at 
risk than permanent pasture due to the levels of vegetative cover. However intensive 
production, both within grazing and arable systems, particularly on steep slopes and 
fragile soils, will lead to increased risk of soil erosion.  
 
While the protection of soils is a fundamental element of the cross-compliance 
requirements of Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition, a number of 
measures within rural development programmes are also focused on improving the 
quality of the soil resource. As a result, we would expect that increased funding 
within Pillar 2, as a result of modulation would lead to: 
• reduced levels of soil erosion; 
• reduced levels of soil compaction; and 
• to a lesser extent, increased levels of soil organic matter; 
 
The main measures that tend to be used for improving soil quality include the agri-
environment measure (214), and the afforestation measures (221, 222, 223). 
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There is a lack of information on the impact of Axis 2 measures on soil quality within 
the evaluation literature, although findings from the recent DG Agri project on the 
conservation of agricultural soils (SoCo) may shed further light on this. Two reports 
state that soil quality has improved and soil erosion been reduced due to the 
implementation of the agri-environment measure, although in many cases data was 
insufficient to make a full assessment and no quantitative assessments had been 
undertaken6465. This is despite the fact that improving soil quality is a key objective of 
the agri-environment measure and a priority for agri-environment schemes in many 
Member States, particularly as a means of decreasing water pollution through 
increasing infiltration capacity and reducing run-off. The types of options that are 
likely to provide these sorts of benefits are similar to those that are used to improve 
water quality and include the creation of buffer strips, conversion of arable to pasture, 
overwintered stubbles, and cover crops. The production methods associated with 
organic farming, particularly techniques such as minimum tillage, are also beneficial 
to soil quality, which in turn can lead to significant benefits for biodiversity. 
 
The presence of trees and woodlands can also help to protect soils and reduce soil 
erosion as the maintenance of a complex root structure can improve the stability of 
soils66. A number of RDPs have used the afforestation measures with the specific aim 
of improving soil quality and reducing soil erosion.  
 
There is no CMEF impact indicator that relates to soil quality, and the CMEF result 
indicator relating to soil quality has not been completed for many of the case study 
Member States. However, most of the information provided relates to the anticipated 
impact of the agri-environment measure (see Table 6.11). This shows that a relatively 
high area of agricultural land is anticipated to be managed in a way that will provide 
benefits for soils as a result of this measure – 45% of UAA in Germany (Bavaria), 
17% in Germany (North Rhine Westphalia), 14% in the UK (England) and France, 
and 13% in the Netherlands. A crude estimate, based on the proportion of the RDP 
budget made up of modulated funds, indicates that compulsory modulation, under the 
baseline scenario, may lead to an additional 0.5 million hectares of land under 
management that contributes to improved soil quality in France (2% of total UAA), 
compared with 38,400 hectares in Portugal (1% of total UAA) There is insufficient 
data provided for other measures in relation to this result indicator, to make analysis 
meaningful. 
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Table 6.11 CMEF Result Indicator for Agri-Environment measure: Area under successful 
management for soil quality 
Agri-Environment (214) FR* PT UK – E DE-BAV DE-NRW 
Result 5 
ha soil quality  3,747,000 480,000 1,200,000 1,475,000 255,000 
% due to modulation 14 8 31 10 16 
Ha due to modulation 524,580 38,400 372,000 147,500 40,800 
Benchmark (ha UAA) 27,590,940 3,679,590 8,716,179 3,264,724 1,523,747 
Total as % of benchmark 14 13 14 45 17 
Modulation as % of benchmark 2 1 4 4 3 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
* The result indicators are for measures 211,212, 214 and 216 together. To be able to calculate the effect of 
modulation all were put under measure 214 with a modulation rate of 14%. 
6.4.8 Climate Change 
Europe’s temperature has risen faster in the last 100 years than the global average 
(0.95°C compared to 0.7°C globally). Some impacts are already becoming apparent, 
including more frequent droughts in the south and increased incidence of flooding and 
storms in the north and west. Climate change will undoubtedly affect the productivity 
of agriculture and forestry, and will impact on soil quality and structure, as well as the 
distribution and proliferation of pests and diseases. Agriculture contributes to global 
warming mainly through: 
• The production of nitrous (N2O) gases in mineral fertiliser production; 
• The production of methane (CH4) in the stomachs of ruminants; and 
• The use of fossil fuels for machinery and drying. 
 
The EU agriculture sector is responsible for 9 per cent of EU greenhouse gas 
emissions, but some habitats and production systems, for example woodland, peat 
land and permanent grassland, can also act as carbon sinks, by facilitating carbon 
sequestration and provide sources for renewable energy through the growing of 
biomass crops. In addition agriculture and forestry have an important role to play in 
facilitating the adaptation of biodiversity to climate change. 
 
Many of the measures used within the 2007-13 RDPs, across all Axes, are likely to 
promote activities and management practices that will contribute towards climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Alongside the production of bioenergy, a large 
proportion of the mitigation potential of agriculture arises from soil carbon 
sequestration67. Forestry also plays an important role in this regard. In relation to 
adaptation, one of the key roles for agriculture and forestry land use is in ensuring 
management practices that will increase habitat resilience and develop the functional 
connectivity of habitats and features. Measures focused on developing infrastructure 
for the production of renewable energy, both on and off farm are also important in 
terms of addressing the challenges of climate change. As a result, we would expect 
that increased funding in Pillar 2, brought about through modulation, would lead to: 
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• A reduction in GHG emissions, including: 
o reductions in CO2 emissions through: biomass production (crops and 
wood); investments in renewable energy infrastructure for on farm use; 
investments in community renewables; 
o reductions in nitrous oxide emission as a result of reduced input use 
and improvements in nitrogen management; 
o reductions in methane emissions, as a result of improved livestock 
housing; 
• The maintenance or increase in the capacity of soils to sequester carbon; 
• An increase in the capacity of the land to be able to adapt to climate change 
through: 
o improving the resilience of habitats to climate change; 
o helping develop the functional connectivity of habitats and features. 
 
The most relevant rural development measures that can help achieve climate 
objectives are to be found across all four Axes of Pillar 2 and include the farm 
modernisation measure (121), measures for training and advice (for example 111, 114 
and 331), the agri-environment measure (214), the afforestation measures (221; 222), 
and Axis 3 measures aimed at providing basic services for the economy and rural 
population (321) and village renewal and development (322), as well as the LEADER 
Approach. 
 
The use of rural development measures for achieving climate objectives is a more 
recent focus than other environmental parameters, although for the 2007-13 
programming period, addressing the climate challenge is set out as an objective within 
the Community Strategic Guidelines for the EAFRD. As a result, evaluations of the 
previous programming period do not consider the impact of measures on reducing 
emissions, improving carbon sequestration or helping habitats and species adapt to 
climate change. The CMEF impact indicator, measuring the increase in the production 
of renewable energy can help to give some indication of the potential impact of 
measures, as can information from the case studies. 
 
For example, the UK case study shows that agri-environment schemes are thought to 
have the potential to contribute to climate change, both in terms of mitigation and 
adaptation, with a key role to play in helping biodiversity adapt to climate change 
through improving the connectivity of habitats and resilience of existing high value 
habitats. A recent evaluation of agri-environment schemes68 states that the schemes 
already have a positive impact on climate change, but can be improved to make more 
of a contribution to meeting the climate change challenge in the future, however they 
will need to work in conjunction with other measures outside of the CAP to do this 
effectively. Voluntary modulation is also anticipated to have an impact on the 
production of renewable energy in the UK, as a proportion of these funds have been 
targeted specifically at the establishment of energy crops with the objective of 
developing renewable energy supply chains and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
In France, the training that farmers are given on more efficient fertiliser use through 
Axis 1 measures could possibly reduce nitrous oxide emissions, and the use of the 
farm modernisation measure to improve livestock housing may have a positive impact 
on air quality.  
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A number of evaluation studies have reported that the afforestation measures have 
contributed positively to carbon storage, although the levels of carbon stored vary 
between Member States. Afforestation can also help flood alleviation by protecting 
soils and increasing the infiltration capacity of the land. Beyond the information from 
the case studies, there is little further information available on the degree to which 
investment has been made in renewable energy infrastructure through Axis 1 
measures, or to fund community based renewable energy schemes through Axis 3.  
 
CAPRI is able to provide information on the impacts of increased levels of 
modulation on both methane and nitrous oxide emissions. In relation to methane, 
under the Health Check scenario, the results show that overall modulation will result 
in a 0.14% decrease in the emissions of methane from agriculture (see Table 6.5). 
This is explained in the model by the potential for Axis 1 measures, such as the farm 
modernisation measure to lead to more efficient feeding systems, for example, as well 
as the predicted decline in beef cattle resulting from decreases in Pillar 1 direct 
payments. Although the figures indicate that increased expenditure under the agri-
environment measure increases methane emissions, this is based on an assumption 
that agri-environment support keeps more grassland in production, and therefore more 
livestock grazing, that would otherwise be the case. In reality, therefore, this support 
is more likely to be retaining methane emissions at current levels, rather than actually 
increasing them per se. 
 
Larger decreases of N2O emissions (-0.37%) are indicated by CAPRI under the 
Health Check scenario (see Table 6.5). Since the global warming potential of N2O is 
even larger than that of methane, this reduction is even more significant in terms of 
greenhouse gas mitigation. Since N2O is a by-product in the production of fertiliser, 
the indicator is linked to mineral fertiliser use and thus on intensity in the arable 
cropping sectors. The reductions in emissions, therefore results from both the 
reduction of the first pillar payments (which reduce somewhat the area under arable 
crops), and the increase in availability of funding for Axis 1 capital investment 
measures (which can lead to more efficient fertiliser use, or changes in crop varieties), 
and Axis 2 measures supporting more extensive management practices.  
 
In relation to the CMEF impact indicator, which considers the anticipated contribution 
that the programme measures will make to climate change as measured by renewable 
energy production, data has been provided in a range of different forms (see Table 
6.12). Where target amounts are specified these generally predict the number of Ktoe 
of renewable energy that will be produced over the lifetime of the programme. For 
some Member States targets are calculated for the agricultural and forestry sectors 
separately. Where baseline information is available to allow the relative increase to be 
measured, these increases range from 8% in the UK (Scotland) to 120% in Slovenia 
for the forestry sector, and from 14% in Finland to 77% in Poland for the agriculture 
sector.  
 
Given the range of different measures that could be used to contribute to meeting 
these targets, it is difficult to estimate the contribution that compulsory modulation 
makes, however a crude estimate could be made based on the proportional 
contribution that compulsory modulation makes to the overall EAFRD budget within 
the specific Member State. As with the other indicators, this will range from 5%-30% 
of the target values under the baseline scenario. 
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Table 6.12 Targets for the climate change impact indicator in the case study countries, 2013 
Indicator Percentage 
target 
Absolute quantitative target Qualitative target 
Contribution to 
combating 
climate change  
No specific 
percentage 
targets set – 
although these 





where these are 
available 
 592500 ha covered = 23.1% of 
UAA (DE-NRW) 
 137000 ha (DE - THU) 
 5.95-6.94 Mtoe (+77%) (PL) 
 41 Ktoe/year of renewable energy 
(UK -ENG) 
 5 ton CO2/ha (PT) 
 Agriculture: 108 Ktoe, Forestry: 
7.895 Ktoe (+14%), arable area: 
200000 ha, open landscape: 2,2-
2,3 million ha (FI) 
 10.058 Kton CO2 can be absorbed 
from afforestation measure (NL)  
 Increase from forestry: significant 
1,000 Ktoe (+120%) (SI) 
 Carbon savings from forestry 0.6 
MtC by 2013 (+8%) (UK – SCO) 
 
 Positive contribution (PT) 
 Positive contribution (DE - 
SAX-A) 
 Contribute, no target (UK-
SCO) 
 Increase agriculture: low, (SI) 
 Financing independent of 
Pillar 2 (FR) 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
Not many of the case study Member States have completed data on the CMEF Result 
indicator relating to the anticipated area of land brought under successful management 
in relation to climate change (Table 6.13). For the four programmes where this has 
been done, the data shows that agri-environment schemes are expected to result in 
between 2% (France) and 17% (Germany – North Rhine Westphalia) of land managed 
for climate change objectives. A crude estimate, based on the proportion of the RDP 
budget made up of modulated funds, indicates that compulsory modulation, under the 
baseline scenario, is estimated to lead to an additional 58,000 hectares of land being 
managed to meet climate change objectives in France (0.2% of total UAA), to 19,600 
hectares in Portugal (0.5% of total UAA). There is insufficient data provided for other 
measures in relation to this result indicator, to make analysis meaningful. 
 
Table 6.13 CMEF Result Indicator for Agri-Environment measure: Area under successful 
management for climate change 
Agri-Environment (214) FR* NL PT DE-NRW 
Result 4 
ha climate change  420,000 1,880 245,000 255,000 
% due to modulation 14 19 8 16 
Ha due to modulation 58,800 357 19,600 40,800 
Benchmark (ha UAA) 27,590,940 1,958,060 3,679,590 1,523,747 
Total as % of benchmark 2 0.1 7 17 
Modulation as % of benchmark 0.2 0.02 0.5 3 
Source: Based on information provided within individual Member State Rural Development Programmes  
* The result indicators are for measures 211,212, 214 and 216 together. To be able to calculate the effect of 
modulation all were put under measure 214 with a modulation rate of 14%. 
Climate change is one of the priority challenges set out under the Commission’s 
Health Check proposals. The proposals focus predominantly on the role that 
agriculture and the forestry sectors can play in providing feedstocks for bio-energy, in 
promoting carbon sequestration and in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, rather than 
on they way in which they can aid biodiversity to adapt to climate change. However, 
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it is likely that increased investment in a number of key environmental measures (for 
example agri-environment) as a result of the availability of additional modulated 
funds under the Health Check scenario, will also lead to adaptation benefits being 
provided as a result of increased funding. We would anticipate, therefore, that under 
the Health Check Scenario, compulsory modulation will lead to a greater reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, increase the carbon sequestration potential of soils and that 
can improve the capacity of biodiversity to adapt to climate change. 
 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 




This study has sought to assess the economic, social and environmental impacts of 
compulsory modulation, both under current rates and rules (the baseline scenario), 
and a potential future scenario (the Health Check scenario), based on the 
Commission’s proposals for increasing modulation as part of the CAP Health Check. 
The timeframe for the study is the 2007-13 programming period. The study has 
focused predominantly on the impacts across the EU-15, however, results are also 
provided for the EU-27 to take into account the introduction of modulation for the 
new Member States at the end of the programming period. Specifically the study has 
sought to explore the impacts of compulsory modulation on farm structures, the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector, farm and farm household income, 
employment, quality of life in rural areas and the environment. 
 
7.1 Methodological Approach  
 
Given the aims of the study, an approach was needed that allowed for an assessment 
of the full range of social, economic and environmental impacts of compulsory 
modulation, both as a result of the effect of a reduction in Pillar 1 direct payments and 
the redistribution of these funds through Pillar 2: 8.8 billion euro in the period 2007-
2013 under the Baseline Scenario. To do this, ideally an understanding of the impact 
at both the farm level and the Member State/regional level is needed. In addition, the 
impact of the redistribution of modulated funds through Pillar 2 is dependent on a 
wide range of variables including the way in which the modulated funds are used, 
how schemes are targeted and who is eligible. One of the key challenges for this 
study, therefore, has been to reflect the complexity of local impacts on the ground 
(social, economic and environmental), to understand how these relate to the variety of 
ways in which Member States have implemented their Rural Development 
Programmes, and to then disentangle the extent to which modulated funds have 
contributed to these impacts.  
 
It was not possible to find a single analytical tool that could provide a comprehensive 
picture of the full range of impacts arising from the two modulation scenarios. In 
order to assess the impacts of modulation, therefore, two separate, but interlinked 
methodological approaches – a modelling approach and a non-modelling approach – 
have been used. The modelling approach consists of: a budget model, providing the 
financial and budgetary information relating to the redistribution of funds between 
Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, between Member States, and, based on a number of assumptions, 
the breakdown between RDP measures; and a suite of economic models (CAPRI, 
FES, LEITAP) which were used to assess the economic and sectoral impacts. The 
modelling approach allowed for results to be generated on impacts across the EU-27, 
and for projections to be made about how these impacts might change under different 
rates of modulation. It also permitted an exploration of any differences that might 
emerge from changes to rules relating to franchise levels, co-financing requirements, 
or allocation of funds within Pillar 2 to specific measures, albeit based on a set of 
generalised assumptions. The models were complemented by the non-modelling 
approach which consisted of case studies carried out in eight Member States; 
telephone interviews with officials in those Member States where case studies were 
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not undertaken; an analysis of the relevant CMEF indicators from the 2007-13 RDPs 
and a literature review. These tools allowed for more context specific insights into the 
impacts of modulation to be made. 
 
Despite the use of a range of different methodological and analytical tools, identifying 
the precise impacts of compulsory modulation on the range of themes addressed by 
this study, has, in reality, been difficult. There are a number of reasons for this, some 
of them methodological, and some relating to data availability. 
 
The main methodological issue concerns the accuracy with which it is possible to 
assess the impacts of compulsory modulation on Pillar 2 measures, as so many of the 
impacts are dependent on the way in which Member States have chosen to use the 
CM funds, the structure of the RDP more generally, and how they have designed and 
implemented the specific measures. The accuracy and degree to which detailed 
analysis of the impacts of modulation on Pillar 2 measures is able to be undertaken is 
also limited by the lack of availability of detailed data on the impacts of specific 
measures on particular indicators and parameters.  In addition, because of the short 
time span between the implementation of the current system of compulsory (and 
voluntary) modulation and the present time, there is relatively little data available 
with which to inform an ex post study of the impacts of modulation. Literature 
relating to the impacts of Pillar 2 measures were restricted to the mid-term evaluations 
of the 2000-2006 period, which meant that much of the analysis had to be based on an 
ex ante approach, predicting the likely impacts of compulsory modulation over the 
2007-2013 programming period. 
 
In addition, the impacts of modulation are conditioned by global trends that are 
driving the evolution of the agricultural economy. In contrast to these macro-trends, 
the direction and the degree of this inflection caused by modulation that is the focus 
for the analysis within this study were not straightforward to distinguish. 
 
Issues relating to the modelling 
Prior to this study, a systematic assessment of the impacts of Pillar 2 measures had not 
been attempted with the economic models used. This has let to significant 
developmental challenges for the models, not all of which have been easy to resolve. 
The models have had to tackle a wide variety of issues, which include the 
heterogeneity of measures and farm circumstances, the multi causality of farm 
management decisions, and the fact that Member States can use additional funds to 
adjust and expand their individual schemes within RDPs in a range of different ways. 
With regard to the last point, this means, for example, increasing the area under 
agreement/ the number of agreement holders for existing schemes, increasing 
payment rates (up to set limits), introducing additional options, etc. Added to this, the 
lack of detailed monitoring of the outcomes of Pillar 2 measures to date means that 
there continues to be little quantified data in the majority of Member States with 
which to measure the impacts of individual measures, including information for 
accurately estimating the deadweight and displacement effects associated with 
different measures.  
 
This means that the models have to rely on assumptions that are based largely on 
expert judgement rather than empirical data, which adds an additional margin of error 
to the subsequent calculations and has limited the accuracy with which any impacts of 
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compulsory modulation can be assessed. All assumptions have been made transparent 
within the report, in order to make sure that the results highlight the margin of error 
associated with them and hence the degree of accuracy of any subsequent analysis.  
Issues relating to the case studies 
Eliciting reliable information about the likely response of authorities in the Member 
States to hypothetical increases in modulation is a challenge given the political 
sensitivity of the topic and the inherent uncertainty of future policy choices. In this 
case, information was sought from Ministry officials, whose response was 
conditioned by their limited authority in this domain and the CAP policy context at 
the time of the enquiry – the run up to the publication of the Commission’s Health 
Check legislative proposals on May 20th 2008. While the case study experts sought to 
separate these policy considerations from the actual empirical effects of reducing 
Pillar 1 payments and increasing available funding in Pillar 2, it is apparent from the 
case study reports that the on-going policy debate affected the data collection to some 
extent, particularly in relation to the prospective element of the study. This was either 
because Member States were not prepared to divulge what they think the potential 
impacts of increased rates of compulsory modulation might be before they made 
official statements on their position, or because insufficient thought had as yet been 
given to what the implications of an increase in funding for Pillar 2 might be. This 
means that the prospective dimension of the case study reports has not been as 
elucidating as it might otherwise have been.  
 
It also proved difficult for the case study experts to identify precisely which measures 
within the 2007-13 RDPs that the additional compulsory modulation funds had been 
focused upon, beyond a general overall increase to the Pillar 2 budget. As a result, 
analysis has had to be based on the assumption that the additional funds have been 
spread across the Axes and measures in the same way as the core EAFRD budget. In 
reality, however, it is clear that not all measures are able to absorb additional funds 
equally due to, for example, where payment rates are at the maximum allowed, or 
measures are geographically delimited. This is particularly the case with the LFA 
measure, for example.   
 
The introduction of the indicators within the Common Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework (CMEF) has been a helpful step towards facilitating a more informative 
analysis of the impacts and estimates provided by Member States within their RDPs 
on the anticipated outputs, results and impacts of the various measures within Pillar 2. 
However, these data, by their very nature, are projections rather than actual values, 
and given the fact that they will be used as a means of evaluating the RDPs, are likely 
to have been developed with this in mind. As such, they are likely to have some 
margin of error associated with them, and should probably be treated as a slight 
underestimate of the likely actual situation in 2013.  
 
Within the limits of these significant methodological and practical issues, the study 
has identified a range of impacts that can be attributed to modulation. Overall, the net 
aggregated impacts of modulation are generally small, in percentage terms with the 
impacts of the additional funds within Pillar 2 generally being significantly greater 
than those of reducing Pillar 1 direct payments. More significant impacts are likely to 
be visible at the local level or by farm type, but these have not been possible to 
identify within this study. 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report (June 2009) – page 151  
 
 
Before turning to the specific impacts of compulsory modulation on the study themes, 
it is helpful to set out the more generic effects of the modulation instrument itself in 
terms of budgetary redistribution. 
 
7.2 The Redistribution Effects of Compulsory Modulation 
As a policy instrument, modulation redistributes money from Pillar 1 direct payments 
to Pillar 2. However, its effects extend considerably beyond a simple readjustment to 
the funds available within the two pillars, as the additional funds that are made 
available for Pillar 2 are then augmented by national co-financing and, for certain 
measures, by private sector contributions. As such, compulsory modulation acts as a 
conduit for leveraging an increase in funding available for rural areas, both to the 
agricultural sector and beyond.  
 
Modulation, under the baseline scenario, also redistributes money between Member 
States. Due to the fact that funds are not distributed proportionately between Member 
States, predominantly Southern Member States (but also Austria and Finland) have 
benefited by receiving back more funds than they have generated through compulsory 
modulation, thereby accelerating the growth of their RDPs (some of which, in the 
past, have been criticised for not being particularly ambitious). This effect is 
considerably lessened under the Health Check scenario, however, as all the additional 
funds generated return to the country of origin. 
 
Although it was anticipated that the increased availability of funds within Pillar 2, as a 
result of modulation, would result in some differential impact between funding for the 
different Axes and measures, in fact, under the baseline scenario, the additional funds 
were allocated across measures in the same way as the core EAFRD allocation for the 
2007-13 programming period. Two exceptions to this exist – Finland and the UK 
(England) – where the funding has been specifically targeted at the agri-environment 
measure. This effect changes under the Health Check Scenario. Due to the fact that 
this scenario assumes that additional funds are specifically focused on measures that 
are able to deliver against the ‘new challenges’ of biodiversity, climate change, 
renewable energies and water management, this means that the additional modulated 
funds in all Member States are focused predominantly on measures within Axes 1 and 
2 – although measures within Axis 3 and the LEADER approach may also play a 
small role.  
 
In addition, modulation can lead to a significant transfer of support between farms of 
differing type and size. Logical deduction from the existing pattern of payments 
suggests that, in general, modulation tends to lead to a redistribution of funds from: 
• Larger  to smaller farms, although the participation of rather small farms in 
many Pillar 2 measures is low in many Member States 
• Larger arable farms to: 
o Livestock farms, including a significant proportion of more extensive 
farms, which are the main recipients of Axis 2 money, but also dairy 
farms, potentially accessing funding under all axes. 
o other farm types which are able to access physical and human capital 
investments under Axis 1 
o Forestry and farm/forestry enterprises (through the forestry measures) 
o Beyond the agricultural sector to the broader rural economy 
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There is some evidence to support this analysis from the FES model using 2005 
FADN data, which also suggests that the smallest category of farm (2-4 ESU) will be 
least affected by modulation.  
7.3 Impacts of Modulation on the Study Themes – Summary of main findings 
 
Turning to the specific thematic impacts of modulation, it is evident that the 
programming approach that characterises Pillar 2, whereby support is directed to 
specific goals, subject to clear rules and requirements in terms of implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation, makes expenditure inherently more likely to be more 
supportive of EU objectives than untargeted direct payments. In principle, the 
redistribution of funds from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 should intrinsically bring about better 
added value in terms of outputs, bearing in mind the significantly higher transaction 
costs involved with Pillar 2 expenditure compared to Pillar 1. Calculating the 
additional transactions costs associated with modulation has been beyond the scope of 
this study, however the under representation of this important factor needs to be borne 
in mind when interpreting the results. 
 
Overall impact  
The models suggest that the overall net economic impacts of compulsory modulation 
at the rates explored here are positive, albeit relatively small. The case studies do not 
contradict this but point to larger impacts within certain groups of farms. Most 
notably, the reduction in P1 payments does not appear to have a significant impact on 
any of the study themes, whereas the availability of additional funds through Pillar 2, 
especially when these are reinforced with additional national co-financing, does have 
some considerable positive impacts, particularly in relation to the environment. 
Indeed, the results indicate that the major benefits from modulation are environmental 
and social (through Axis 2) as well as with regard to productivity (through human and 
social capital support under Axis 1). However the precise scale of the socio-
environmental benefits is difficult to determine without much improved data.  
 
In general, the results show a greater impact for EU-15 than for the EU-27, but this is 
simply due to the fact that compulsory modulation does not apply to the new Member 
States until 2012.  
 
Due to the methodological and data limitations highlighted above, many of the results 
are very generalised in nature, often referring to the situation for the EU-15 and/or 
EU-27. These results are complemented by findings from the case studies, which 
demonstrate that these averaged results will mask more significant impacts at the local 
level. However, it has not been possible to quantify these more localised impacts 
within the scope of this study.  
 
Specifically, in relation to the individual study themes: 
 
Farm Structure: Modulation on the scale examined here is not seen to have a 
significant net impact on changes in the number or size of farms within the EU-15 – 
although it may accelerate existing trends towards fewer, larger farms and certain 
categories of investment, particularly as a result of the availability of additional funds 
for the physical and human capital investments in Pillar 2. Measures that specifically 
aim to bring about restructuring, such as the Early Retirement measure, however, are 
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only used in a minority of Member States (nine) and account for a very small 
proportion of the overall EAFRD budget for 2007-13 and as a result, increases in the 
availability of funds via CM are unlikely to have a significant impact.  However, CM 
may also serve to slow down structural change as a result of increased support for 
Pillar 2 measures, such as LFA and agri-environment, which can help maintain the 
economic viability of farm businesses, particularly in marginal areas, that would 
otherwise disappear. Increased Pillar 2 expenditure potentially could counteract 
localised abandonment arising from direct payment reductions, depending on how it is 
targeted.  
 
Production: According to the models the net overall agricultural production effect 
due to modulation under the Health Check scenario appears to be positive, albeit 
small, for primary agriculture in the EU-15 (0.48%) and the EU-27 (0.4%). Taken 
alone, the reduction of Pillar 1 direct payments has a minimal negative production 
effect (-0.06%), which is to be expected, given that payments are decoupled. 
 
There are some differences between products. The net production effect is slightly 
positive for all broad groups of products (e.g. oilseeds, vegetables and permanent 
crops, meat), with the meat sectors being the most strongly influenced by modulation 
in terms of production. The exception to this is cereals, where the models indicate a 
slight net decrease in production. However, this relates solely to a number of specific 
cereal crops, particularly durum wheat, which at present still receives coupled 
payments in some areas, and, benefits from significant Article 69 support, particularly 
in Italy.  
 
The main cause of this positive effect is the availability of additional money for Pillar 
2 measures, particularly physical capital investment measures. However, there are a 
number of factors at play here. While investments in human and physical capital 
measures through Axis 1 may increase production, investments in Axis 2 measures 
will equally require the maintenance or introduction of more extensive management 
practices, which may conversely constrain production. Equally overall results for EU-
27 may mask more significant changes at the regional level.  
 
Competitiveness: Increased rates of compulsory modulation appear to have a small 
net positive impact upon competitiveness within the agriculture sector, albeit 
measured in the narrow sense of gross value added within agriculture.  
 
Outputs from the economic models suggest that the increased rates of modulation 
under the Health Check scenario have a small net positive impact on GVA, compared 
with the baseline scenario. The impact on welfare is slightly positive. This is the case, 
even without taking into account the anticipated impacts of the additional funds on the 
delivery of environmental non-market goods, which it is not possible to quantify as 
part of this analysis. On the other hand, transaction costs are not taken into account. 
The growth of value added as a result of modulation is highest in the primary 
agriculture (0.14%), services (0.04%) and processed food (0.02%) sectors. The impact 
is negligible for energy sectors and services. The figures for the agricultural sector are 
similar to those estimated by the Member States in relation to the GVA CMEF Impact 
Indicator.  
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The positive impact is mainly caused by the impacts of Pillar 2 measures, particularly 
the dynamic impact of measures that increase the productivity of production factors 
such as human and physical capital mainly in Axis 1, for example those that enable 
investments in new technologies and physical infrastructure to be made, as well as 
those that focus on improving human capital, thereby helping to rationalise production 
processes, or to improve the quality of products. In relation to the service and 
processed food sectors, Axis 3 measures also have a role to play in contributing to 
increased competitiveness outside the agricultural sector, particularly those focused 
on incentivising diversification, improvements to rural infrastructure and stimulating 
tourism. 
 
In addition, the models suggest that net exports increase for all products except for 
dairy products under the Health Check scenario. Again this positive net trade effect 
comes from the availability of additional funds for the human and physical capital 
measures within Pillar 2. In contrast, other Pillar 2 measures seem to be showing the 
opposite effect on the net trade balance.  
 
Farm Income: The impact of modulation on farm family income is unclear, with 
different economic models giving slightly differing results. According to FES, at the 
Member State level it would appear that aggregate farm household income declines 
very slightly as a result of modulation. Conversely, CAPRI and LEITAP indicate a 
slightly positive income effect. These results, however, have to be treated with 
extreme caution as they are very dependent on the assumptions made about which 
Pillar 2 measures that focus on the agricultural sector are considered to have an 
income effect. It also masks potentially more significant local and regional 
differences, particularly between farm types, whereby some types of farms/businesses 
are likely to benefit and some will lose out in terms of income.  
 
Accepting that most measures within Pillar 2 will only have a small income effect, we 
would expect that, looking at the overall impact of modulation, the main farm types to 
‘lose’ from modulation would be arable/permanent crops, and beef producers. These 
types of farm tend to be recipient of higher levels of direct payments through Pillar 1, 
and although they may receive money back through Axis 1 and Axis 2 measures, it 
will be conditional on meeting additional obligations in many cases and probably not 
be sufficient to make up for the losses in their direct payments.  
 
Those that are more likely to gain from modulation include dairy farms and fruit and 
vegetable producers, due to the lower level of direct payment receipts, and the 
possibility of them accessing funds through Axis 1 (and possibly Axis 2), as well as 
suckler cows and sheep and goats, due to the likelihood of their being able to access 
Pillar 2 funds, particularly agri-environment and LFA support, but also support 
through Axis 1.  
 
In addition, there may be some counter-intuitive effects, whereby farms with 
attributes highly compatible with Pillar 2 objectives lose out under modulation 
because they experience Pillar 1 reductions but cannot access any further Pillar 2 
measures, for example because they are participating in all the schemes for which 
they are already eligible. Such farms are most likely to be those enrolled in multi-
annual schemes such as LFA and agri-environment schemes and will include some 
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This issue has been explored in the FES model using 2005 FADN data. The results 
suggest that net changes in farm income are small in most cases. Across the EU-15, 
grazing farms show the largest proportion of net winners from modulation, with 36% 
of farms experiencing an increase in farm income of over 0.5% – although this figure 
masks much higher proportions of grazing farms gaining in France (69%) and the UK 
(96%). Mixed and diary farms, on the other hand, tend to have the largest proportion 
of net losers, with 45% of farms experiencing a net decrease in farm income of more 
than 0.5% – again the figures are as high as 90% in Denmark and 88% in Ireland.  
 
Employment: While some changes in employment both within agriculture and the 
services, energy and industry sectors are likely to be experienced as a result of 
compulsory modulation, these changes are very minor. Overall, under the Health 
Check scenario, employment in the food processing and services sectors increases 
very slightly (0.02%) and decreases within the primary agriculture sector, albeit only 
by 0.12%. In relation to the agricultural sector, the main reason for this decrease 
stems from the reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments. This is then reinforced by the 
Pillar 2 investments in physical capital (mainly Axis 1), some of which may 
encourage further structural change. Modernization implies that some labour might be 
released in the short run but that the remaining farmers are more competitive in the 
long run. The ones who leave agriculture find a job in other sectors due to Axis 3 
measures and a small GDP growth. Modulation therefore encourages and 
accommodates the process of structural change. 
 
The models, CMEF indicators and case studies, all suggest that, under the Health 
Check Scenario, higher employment levels are likely to be experienced than would be 
the case with no modulation, as a result of the input of additional funds in Axis 2 and 
Axis 3 of the second pillar. However these do not outweigh the decreases seen as a 
result of reductions in Pillar 1 and the additional availability of funds for physical 
capital measures. The LFA and agri-environment measures help maintain and 
generate additional employment both directly within the agricultural sector and well 
as indirectly within other economic sectors. LFA payments, for example, contribute to 
farm income and the maintenance of employment in rural areas, and agri-environment 
schemes can have beneficial employment effects, for example by promoting organic 
farming, which is generally more labour intensive, and through generating the need 
for the use of contractors with specialist and traditional skills. In addition, the 
environmental benefits that accrue from these schemes can lead to indirect 
employment benefits resulting from increased tourism and recreation. Axis 3 
measures relating to creating diversification opportunities, new business start-ups, 
improving service provision in rural areas an enhancing an area’s tourism potential, as 
well as activities funded through the LEADER approach, all have the potential to 
increase employment in rural areas, largely outside the agricultural sector. While the 
impact of these measures on employment creation will be small, given the limited 
resources allocated to these measures, the impact may be locally significant, 
contributing to a more diverse and secure job market in rural areas. 
 
Increased levels of modulation only have a minor influence on social and working 
conditions and these are hard to measure. However, the case-studies point to 
modulation having a positive effect, particularly as a result of investment in physical 
and human capital measures, for example improved on-farm infrastructure and 
increased availability of training. 
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Quality of Life: Overall the quality of life in rural areas is expected to benefit from 
increased levels of modulation, although it has not been possible to quantify this 
impact. Taking GDP as a somewhat crude proxy to reflect the material wellbeing 
across the EU, any increase in GDP can provide some indication of the potential 
improvement in the quality of life insofar as this relates to the growth in the economy 
overall. The models indicate that increased rates of modulation under the Health 
Check scenario have a positive, albeit very small, impact on GDP growth (0.04% at 
rates of 13% modulation). This positive result is entirely due to the increased 
availability of funds, and their associated national co-financing, within Pillar 2. The 
effect is largely caused by those Axis 3 measures which are focused predominantly on 
investments outside of the agricultural sector, for example on the setting up of new 
businesses, improving rural services and promoting tourism.  
 
Looking beyond GDP, at low levels of modulation, reductions in Pillar 1 would not 
appear to have any real impact on the quality of life in rural areas, as no significant 
effects in terms of farm restructuring or land abandonment are experienced. However, 
drawing mainly on evidence from the case studies, increases in expenditure in Pillar 2 
do have a positive effect on quality of life by increasing the funding available for 
measures that promote innovation, create employment opportunities, improve access 
to services for the rural population or provide funding for activities that can improve 
the economic attractiveness of, and thereby encourage investment in, rural areas. 
Increased availability of funding for activities implemented under the LEADER 
approach can help to further increase capacity building, and strengthening co-
operation within local areas, which alongside the social benefits, may also lead to 
economic and environmental benefits. Beyond Axis 3 and the LEADER approach, the 
LFA and the agri-environment measures stand out as having the potential to enhance 
the quality of life in rural areas in relation to their role in maintaining and enhancing 
the attractiveness of rural areas, and hence in attracting increased tourism. In addition, 
the case studies highlighted the value of these measures for keeping people in 
farming, which therefore constrains somewhat the trend towards outmigration.  
 
Environment: Overall, the impacts of modulation on the environment are positive for 
all environmental parameters including biodiversity, water quality, soil quality, 
landscape and climate change. These positive impacts are the result of the availability 
of additional funds within Pillar 2 and relate to a whole range of measures across all 
four Axes. The extent of these impacts, however, is hard to quantify beyond general 
terms.  
 
The reductions in Pillar 1 direct payments do not appear to have had significant 
impacts on the environment. This is unsurprising, given that the impacts on 
agricultural producers (in terms of influencing factors of productivity, farm structure 
and income) of reducing Pillar 1 payments have been shown to be limited. The 
models show that there may be a small increase in land leaving agriculture as a result 
of reductions in Pillar 1 payments; however, these appear to have been more than 
compensated for by increases in the availability of funds within Pillar 2, particularly 
for the LFA and agri-environment measures. These impacts could, of course become 
more significant as the modulation rate increases and/or the franchise level changes.  
 
The availability of additional funds within Pillar 2, however, is likely to have a 
significant impact upon the environment across the EU-15, but particularly in Finland 
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and the UK (England) where the additional funds have been specifically focused on 
the agri-environment measure. In all Member States, modulation can be seen to have 
a positive impact on the trends identified for the CMEF impact indicators relating to 
the area of HNV farmland, the farmland bird index, nutrient surplus and production of 
renewable energy. In relation to the CMEF result indicators, modulation, under the 
baseline scenario, is estimated to enable over 5 million hectares of land to be managed 
in ways that benefit biodiversity, 3 million hectares to be managed to help improve 
water quality and soil quality and 1 million hectares to be managed in ways that will 
help with climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. 
 
The results also suggest that the availability of additional funds for, in particular, the 
agri-environment and LFA measures is likely to retain slightly more land under 
agricultural management that would be the case without modulation. The models 
show that this land is more likely to be grassland, than cropped land. The CMEF 
impact indicators also show that a significant area of land is anticipated to be 
prevented from being abandoned over the 2007-13 programming period. While the 
proportions of land indicated by the models are very small (under 1% of all 
agricultural land), in reality, the effect could be much greater. It would certainly not 
be a uniform impact across the EU-15 and will depend crucially on local factors such 
as succession, land ownership, remoteness from markets etc. 
 
The results from CAPRI enable the potential environmental benefits of investment aid 
for farm modernisation and other Axis 1 measures to be seen, particularly in terms of 
reducing nutrient surpluses, pesticide use and greenhouse gas emissions. It is also 
clear from the case studies that a number of Member States are using these measures 
to improve the sustainability of the agricultural sector and limit its environmental 
footprint. Increased funding for these measures is likely to be leading to an increase in 
investments in infrastructure that improves waste management in water saving 
solutions/technologies; in renewable energy technologies and infrastructure; the 
development of community led projects for the production of renewable energy; and 
improvements in energy efficiency for local businesses. 
7.4 Gaps / Research and analytical issues that need follow-up 
The study has sought to explore the impacts of modulation through the use of 
economic models and national case studies. This has revealed the considerable 
methodological and data challenges inherent in a complex policy evaluation exercise 
of this kind. This is particularly the case in seeking to specify and quantify the 
impacts of rural development policies in Pillar 2. Since these measures are a growing 
element of the CAP it is recommended that further investment both in analytical tools 
and data collection (at different geographical levels) is prioritised at both the Member 
State and EU level.  
 
The availability of good quality, precise and comparable empirical evidence on the 
impacts of Pillar 2 measures at local, regional and Member State level is critical to 
inform future policy evaluations. While the CMEF indicators are a helpful step 
towards facilitating a more informative analysis of the impacts and estimates provided 
by Member States within their RDPs on the anticipated outputs, results and impacts of 
the various measures within Pillar 2, these need to be complemented by detailed 
monitoring programmes at the Member State level. 
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The newly established rural development and evaluation networks could offer a 
timely opportunity in this regard. These networks could be used to provide an 
assessment of current monitoring and evaluation programmes within individual 
Member States and work with the national networks to share good practice, and 
improve monitoring programmes to ensure that the benefits of Pillar 2 measures can 
be assessed more precisely and the information disseminated widely across all 
Member States.  
 
If modelling is to be used to predict the impacts of different policy scenarios in 
relation to Pillar 2 measures with greater confidence, then again empirical evidence of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of these measures is crucial. For example, 
information about the rates of return to human and physical capital investments is 
needed, the level of deadweight or crowding out effects, transaction costs, and the 
impact of environmental measures on yields. Europe-wide economic models need to 
be developed further to enable them to reflect more locally differentiated impacts, 
including by farm type, based on the different ways in which measures are 
implemented in different locations. The work currently being undertaken in EUruralis 
3.0 and the FP7 project ‘CAPRI-RD’ is a good start in this regard. Another large area 
of research is the conceptualization, modelling and monetization of public goods. 
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ANNEX 1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIN OF MODELS: LEITAP – ESIM – 
CAPRI – FES – DYNA-CLUE 
 
To perform the analysis, a modelling framework is constructed, existing of four 
economic models (LEITAP, ESIM, FES, CAPRI) and a land use allocation model 
(Dyna-CLUE) to disaggregate the outcomes spatially. In this modelling framework 
the economic and environmental consequences of different scenarios are quantified 
and analysed, starting from 2007 up to 2013, for several regions in the world69 and in 
the EU-25 or EU-27, according to which model is being used.  
 
The role of ESIM is the projection of developments in EU agricultural markets into 
the future (Banse, 2008). The role of FES is to assess the impact of changes in 
modulation at the farm level (specifically the viability of farms) in the EU-25. 
CAPRI’s main function is to assess the regional impact of modulation (NUTS2 level, 
Britz at al., 2008). In order to be able to assess the impacts of modulation as 
accurately as possible, the CAPRI model has been extended to take account of article 
69 payments within the Pillar 1 and the second pillar measures. Within CAPRI, RD 
measure groupings70 03 LFA, 04 Natura 2000 (N2K) and 05 Agri-environment (AE) 
are assumed to have a direct impact on agricultural land use. The remaining measures 
are assumed to work indirectly by influencing factor productivity and costs. Therefore 
the LFA, N2K and AE measures are directly accounted for in CAPRI, and the 
remaining measures are captured by linking the costs and production technology of 
CAPRI to the simulated results of LEITAP, where those other measures are explicitly 
implemented. This is consistent with the CAPRI accounting principle, according to 
which agricultural income is accounted for as modified gross value added, i.e. 
agricultural revenues plus premiums minus variable costs. The main contribution of 
LEITAP is to consider the impacts of modulation on the rest of the economy (other 
industries and factor markets). The ESIM and CAPRI models are EU-25 partial 
equilibrium models for the agricultural sector at country and NUTS2 level 
respectively, with a strong focus on the CAP.  
 
The FES model is a farm level financial economic simulation model originally 
developed for Belgium and the Netherlands. For the purposes of this study, the FES 
model has been extended to the EU-25 countries. The model uses FADN data and has 
a strong focus on the CAP. FES calculates the effects of modulation in relation to 
farm structures and viability for FADN farms. Aggregations are made to enable 
analysis of the effects of modulation by farm type (TF8) and by size class (ES7). At 
the Member State level there is information available on the effect of modulation on a 
range of variables. The most important ones for this project are: the Pillar 1 payments, 
farm viability and farm income. The cut in Pillar 1 payments is returned to the 
Member States through an increase in the money available for Pillar 2 measures. FES, 
takes into account the additional money available for LFA, agri-environment (AE), 
physical capital and human investment payments. 
 
                                                 
69
 In order to understand the development of agricultural development in the baseline, as was the case 
in Scenar 2020 (Nowicki et al, 2007)), and in particular to analyse competiveness in the EU 
compared to the rest of the world. 
70
 As set out in Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
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LEITAP is a global computable general equilibrium model that covers the whole 
economy including factor markets and is often used in WTO analyses (Francois et al., 
2005) and CAP analyses (Meijl and Tongeren, 2002). More specifically, LEITAP is a 
modified version of the global general equilibrium Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model. Agricultural policies are treated explicitly (e.g. production quotas, 
intervention prices, tariff rate quotas, (de)coupled payments). Information is used 
from the OECD’s Policy Evaluation Model (PEM) to improve the production 
structure (Hertel and Keening, 2006) and a new land allocation method, that takes into 
account the variation of substitutability between different types of land (Huang et al., 
2004), as well as a new land supply curve have been introduced (Meijl et al., 2006b; 
Eickhout et al., 2007). A key feature of modulation is that some measures like 
physical and human capital investment have dynamic impacts. For example training 
increases labour productivity, and increased labour productivity has a positive impact 
on yields; an investment in one year has cumulative effects over following years. To 
include these dynamics the LEITAP model has been extended to include a recursive 
dynamic version with endogenous technological change by specifying a relation 
between investments and productivity change. 
 
In the final modelling stage the spatially explicit land use model Dyna-CLUE 
(Dynamic Conversion of Land Use and its Effects) is used. The Dyna-CLUE model 
disaggregates the outcomes of ESIM – CAPRI – LEITAP to a temporal resolution of 
two years and a spatial resolution of 1 km. Dyna-CLUE provides a cross-sectoral 
approach that includes all land use relevant sectors, while ESIM – CAPRI – LEITAP 
mainly address agricultural land use. To provide a comprehensive analysis of land use 
dynamics it is important to include all relevant sectors because the future of Europe’s 
rural areas is dependent on the combined effect of various developments including 
changes in agricultural land use, land used primarily for nature conservation, peri-
urban development, forestry, recreation, etc. The Dyna-CLUE model takes 
information on the amount of agricultural land used by the different sectors at the 
national level, provided by the economic models, and allocates this over the land area 
according to location suitability, spatial policies (LFA, Natura 2000) and rules for 
natural succession. With regard to location suitability, environmental (biophysical) 
driving forces, which determine the allocation of land use, are explicitly accounted 
for. In the economic model chain these factors are not taken into account. 
 
The Dyna-CLUE model helps in assessing the modulation impacts by downscaling 
and visualising the impacts of modulation shown by LEITAP in relation to local land 
use patterns. It is possible to identify critical regions impacted by the effects of 
changes in total agricultural area and possible land abandonment. Moreover, the 
spatially explicit results allow an assessment of the changes within geographically 
delineated areas, where some Second Pillar measures are targeted, including Less 
Favoured Areas and Natura 2000 areas.  
 
More specifically, the model addresses the possible impacts of strengthening a 
number of Pillar 2 measures through modulation, including measure: 
o 211: Natural handicap payments to farmers in mountain areas 
o 212: Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps, other than in mountain 
areas.  
o 213: Natura 2000 payments and payments linked to the Water Framework 
Directive 
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o 221: First afforestation of agricultural land  
o 224: Natura 2000 payments for forestry 
 
The estimated effects of enhancing these measures are assessed in a semi-quantitative 
way since these measures can have different types of implementation that may be 
region dependent making a consistent assessment difficult. 
 
Links between the models 
To obtain consistent results the models are linked to each other (see Figure 2.4 in 
main text). The budget model provides information to the other models on the effects 
of modulation on the first and second pillar budgets under the different scenarios. The 
case studies and literature review provide information on the impact of modulation on 
variables such as production and technology. This information is used by the models 
to adjust their model structure and to obtain a link between measures and inputs to 
their models. The LEITAP model uses information on policy changes from the budget 
model and information from the case studies and the literature on, for example, the 
impact of human capital investments. It provides to the other models the changes in 
national income (GDP), consumer price index (CPI) and factor prices, and especially 
the change in land use for Dyna-CLUE. Based on the macro-economic indicators of 
LEITAP, the partial equilibrium model ESIM provides projections of agricultural 
commodity quantities to CAPRI at national level. The farm level FSS model uses 
budget information and expert information and provides information on the impact of 
modulation on yields and revenues to CAPRI. CAPRI uses the information of all 
other models and provides results at the regional level. 
 
The link between CAPRI and LEITAP was set up by linking, top-down, and the 
following items in LEITAP to parameters of CAPRI: 
Table 1. Link between LEITAP and CAPRI  
LEITAP CAPRI 
Consumer expenditure Consumer expenditure 
Price index of consumption Consumer price index of the non-agric. good 
Price index of tradable inputs that are not 
agricultural and not services 
Prices of fertilizers and other variable inputs 
Price of services Price of maintenance and service inputs 
Prices of Capital and Skilled and Unskilled labour Shift of the behavioural term of the producers’ 
objective function 
Total factor productivity (Hicks-neutral technical 
change71) 
Yield increase 50%, input reduction 50% 
 
The linking of the prices of capital and labour to the behavioural function is 
important. It was obtained in two steps. In the first step, the approximate use of labour 
and capital in the production of CAPRI goods was computed. This was done using a 
special aggregation of the GTAP72 database, where agricultural products were 
disaggregated as finely as possible, and the regions were aggregated in a way similar 
to CAPRI. The shares of labour and capital in the agricultural sectors of GTAP were 
computed and mapped to the CAPRI products, where they were multiplied by the sum 
of market revenues plus premiums for the corresponding agricultural activities. The 
resulting numbers were termed quasi-input-coefficients, and are interpreted as the use 
                                                 
71
 The relation between and the amount of input does not change but more output is produced. 
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of capital and labour in constant euro. In the second step, LEITAP is run for any 
scenario, and the percentage change in the prices of capital and labour is computed. 
That percentage change is used to shift the behavioural term of the CAPRI objective 
function, i.e. to change the marginal cost of each production activity in direct 
proportion to its quasi-input-coefficients. 
 
The link for capital and labour has the drawback that it does not consider possible 
substitution of capital for labour or vice versa in LEITAP, because it uses static quasi-
input-coefficients. Nevertheless, it essentially captures the effect of changes on the 
factor markets. However this effect is marginal, and therefore the error in the 
specification due to the static coefficients should be negligible. 
 
LEITAP translates the Human and Physical Capital Investment measures into (Hicks-
neutral) technical change, which implies an expansion of the entire production 
function. As this turns out to be key to the impact of the second pillar, it is important 
to link CAPRI technical progress in LEITAP in a way that captures its essence. In 
LEITAP, the (Hicks-neutral) technical change does not distinguish “producing more 
output with the same inputs” from “requiring less inputs for producing the same 
output”. In contrast, CAPRI assumes a micro-economic model where the producer 
decides about the allocation of land and numbers of animals, not about tons or euros 
of final product. Most technical input/output coefficients in CAPRI, such as yield and 
input use, are on “per hectare” or “per animal” basis, and the production structure is 
more rigid (essentially “Leontieff”73). Simply increasing yields and leaving the input 
coefficients unchanged (per hectare or head) would formally imply the proper sort of 
technical progress, but the rigid Leontieff structure would prevent the “CAPRI-
farmer” from moving along the production possibilities frontier to a position where 
some of the output increase is traded for less input use per hectare. In reality, 
technical progress consists of a multitude of small improvements, many of which are 
input saving (per hectare or animal). In order to reflect this in CAPRI, an 
interpretation of the result from LEITAP was chosen where technical progress is 
partly neutral (a yield increase) and partly biased input saving in such a way that less 
inputs per hectare or animal is required. Since neither LEITAP nor the case studies 
provides detailed information on the details of technical change, a blanket assumption 
of 50% yield increase and 50% input saving was applied across all activities and 
inputs in CAPRI.  
 
Treatment of first and second pillar measures within the models 
In order to be able to asses the reliability of the outputs of models effectively, it is 
necessary to elaborate on the way in which the first and second pillar measures have 
been treated in the quantitative models. The economic tools, as they currently stand, 
are more useful tools for the analyses of the effects of modulation on the first pillar of 
the CAP, but less so for the analyses of effects of modulation on the second pillar. 
However, modelling the reductions in direct payments within the first pillar is also not 
without its problems as the impact of decoupling and the reductions of decoupled 
payments are not yet empirically known. Pillar 2 measures are difficult to analyse 
mainly because of the range of different measures, with different objectives, and 
which can be implemented in many different ways in individual Member States or 
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regions. In addition, any attempt of modelling second pillar measures such as physical 
and human capital investments needs to include dynamic effects.  
The effects of reducing first pillar payments 
There are two methodological issues to be dealt with in relation to reducing first pillar 
money. The first is the issue of how to model payments in the SPS, and the second is 
how to model the implementation of the reduction of the direct payments themselves 
(see Table 2). Decoupling of first pillar money from production is difficult in 
agricultural commodity models, as the impact of decoupling is not yet empirically 
known. The way that direct payments have been dealt with within the models for this 
study is based on the general logic of intervention for direct payments, accompanied 
by available literature which considers the effects of these payments on production 
factors.  
  
It is clear that, due to the coupling options provided in regulation 1782/2003, not all 
payments enter the single payment system (SPS). Most total direct payments in 2013 
will consist of explicitly decoupled SPS payments, but some will be partially coupled 
to production either via the options for maintaining coupled support or via “article 
69”. The effect differs across Member States depending on their choices in 
implementing the 2003 reform 
 
In 2007, the 82% of the SPS payments that are fully decoupled continue to be largely 
based on historic entitlements and do not relate to current prices. There is, however, a 
weak direct production link still in place, via restrictions that the land corresponding 
to the payment entitlements must be kept in “good agricultural and environmental 
condition”, i.e. land cannot be abandoned or leave agriculture. Furthermore, there may 
be an indirect effect via income: theoretically, a lump sum payment has no influence 
on production decisions, if farmers operate in perfect market with no risk and 
uncertainty. But these are rather strong assumptions. Therefore one observes the 
following five lines of arguments which imply some effect of decoupled income 
support on production: 
 
Firstly, because direct decoupled income support is a rather fixed and reliable income 
component, farmers may go for more risky production in agriculture, with higher 
levels of input use and output. This would be a reason for a positive production effect 
of direct decoupled income support (Sckokai 2005, Roche and McQuinn 2004).  
 
Secondly, farmers might be liquidity constrained and also because of differences in 
interest rates for debts and savings, the availability of direct decoupled income 
support can stimulate investment (Vercammen, 2003; Sckokai, 2005; Bezlepkina et 
al, 2005, Hennessy and Thorne 2005).  
 
Thirdly, direct decoupled income support leads to an increase in income and wealth 
(either directly or via asset prices). This income and wealth effect may reduce the 
labour time of farm households in agricultural production (Ooms and Hall, 2005; 
Ahituv and Kimhi, 2006; Kimhi and Rapaport, 2004).  
 
Fourthly, decoupled income support may influence the structure of agricultural 
production by keeping more farms in business than would be the case in the absence 
of support (a freezing effect), but also by an increasing number of small and medium 
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sized farms who give up farming and sell land, quota (including the rights on direct 
income support) to larger and more efficient farms. Often large farms generate more 
production per hectare. The structural effects of direct income support is ambiguous 
and an item for further research (Schunk, 2001). 
 
Finally, decoupled direct income support can easily leak away to other parts of the 
economy, for example by being capitalized in agricultural land rent of land owners 
(Burfisher and Hopkins, 2003). As usual with agricultural policy measures, the rent 
element leaks away during the ownership change of farms or farm assets. 
 
Given these considerations in CAPRI, the decoupled payment is modelled as a direct 
payment linked to land, but where the amount paid is the same regardless of how the 
land is used, as long as it is not completely abandoned. Thus, the payment has the 
effect of increasing land rents (compared to no policy), increasing agricultural income 
and of preventing land abandonment, but has no effect on the choice between eligible 
crops. Wealth and insurance effects are not modelled, and neither is the potential 
effect on farm viability, since neither risk nor single farms are explicitly modelled in 
CAPRI. 
 
The treatment of abandoned land is particularly tricky. In CAPRI there is, in addition 
to set-aside, also the possibility to abandon land, which costs nothing at all for the 
producer to maintain (because it is not maintained). In reality, there appears to be a 
class of land that is something in between set-aside and fallow land, which is eligible 
for premiums but is not part of the rotation. Such an “activity” was created in CAPRI, 
with the same variable cost per hectare as voluntary set-aside by splitting up the class 
“fallow land”. It is as of yet empirically unclear how large a share of the fallow land 
actually is eligible for premiums. In the current study, we assumed that the share was 
proportional to the ratio of voluntary set-aside plus non-food production on set-aside 
in relation to total fallow land, limited to be between 25% and 75% of the total fallow 
land area. This implies that the single farm payments are treated as very close to fully 
decoupled (see analysis of the degree of coupling below). 
 
A similar approach has been chosen for the general equilibrium model LEITAP. In 
LEITAP, decoupled direct payments are also modelled as factor payments. It is 
assumed that all production factors in all agricultural sectors that are eligible for 
single farm payments receive the same payment rate. Therefore, the payment has no 
effect on the choice between eligible crops within agriculture and no effect on the 
choice of which production factor to use in production. However, in this economy 
wide model the payment favours agricultural sectors relative to manufacturing and 
service sectors. Due to the payments, farm income increases and more production 
factors stay within the agricultural sector. And thus, for example, land abandonment 
will be less. 
 
With regard to Pillar 1, the FES model is especially helpful to get insight with regard 
to the continuity perspectives and the impacts on financial ratios such as family 
income, modernity of the assets and solvency rates. Since the calculations are based 
on individual data, information can be provided about regions, farm types, etc.  
 
The way that the models have dealt with Pillar 1 payments is set out in Table 2. 
 
Study on the Impact of Modulation 
Contract Nº 30-CE-0162480/00-47 – Final Report (June 2009) – page 165  
 
 
Table 2. Treatment of Direct Payments (Pillar 1) in models 
 Treated in  
Model 
Implementation  















Farm payments are implemented as primary factor payments in 
the various agricultural sectors. Coupled payments are directly 
coupled to sectors. Decoupled payments are implemented as an 
equal payment rate to all factors in all eligible sectors and 
therefore do not provide an incentive to switch between eligible 
sectors and between production factors used within the eligible 
sectors.  
 
Farm payments are directly calculated and implemented at farm 
level 
 
Analyses the effects of changes in farm payments at the regional 
farm and sector level. CAPRI distinguishes between a large 
number of types of premiums. Decoupled premiums as, for 
example, milk and sugar premiums are distributed over the 
eligible crops of the regional farm. Coupled premiums are 
linked to agricultural activities at the regional level. 
 
After implementing the decoupling the implementation of the modulation reductions 
is rather straightforward.  
 
All direct payments to the agricultural sector are subject to modulation, which means 
a reduction of payments. The effective rate of modulation enters the definition of each 
premium taken into account and is processed in the premium module of CAPRI. The 
challenge is thus to compute the proper modulation rate. In reality, the effective rate 
of modulation of direct payment differs per farm, depending on the amount of direct 
payment received, such that the funds above certain thresholds are subject to greater 
reduction rates. CAPRI computes the effects of modulation at the regional farm and 
sector level. Thus, the farm structure is not applicable within CAPRI. Moreover, the 
CAPRI database is not directly built from individual farm data but from regional 
statistics. Hence, direct payment per farm is not a variable in CAPRI and effects at 
market level can not be analysed directly. To overcome this problem, an approach 
using a static distribution of farm payment receipts is implemented. 
 
The Health Check scenario increases the modulation rate, but allows for differing 
rates to be applied depending on the level of direct payments received. This is set out 
as a “banded” approach that implies that the more money a farm receives per year, the 
greater the rate of modulation. Great effort has been made to implement a flexible and 
policy-like computation of modulation rate. The effective modulation rate R is 
computed as 
 




















R max"",imax"",j  (1) 
where 
i denotes the “bands”, i.e. the farm classes of pillar 1 receipts ; 
n is the number of farms;  
p is the average annual pillar 1 receipt per farm;  
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c is the matrix of lower and upper bands for the size class; and  
r is the modulation rate per class. 
 
The rationale behind the equation is the following: The numerator sums up the 
amount of modulated money within each band i. The first term of the numerator 
computes the modulated money for farms receipts that fall inside the current band, but 
only the part of the average farm receipt pi that is greater than the lower bound ci,“min” 
for the current band (the part of pi that is lower than the current lower bound of the 
band is handled by the second term) multiplied by the number of such farms ni 
multiplied by the modulation rate for that band ri. The second term adds the 
modulated money for farms falling in the current band for each band that is lower 
than the current band, e.g. it adds 0 EUR for the first 5000 EUR of receipts, plus 5% 
percent of the next 5000 EUR and so forth. Then the whole sum of modulated money 
for all bands is divided by the total premium receipt in the sample (the denominator). 
The computation of effective modulation rate is done separately for each region and 
premium scheme, and also separately for voluntary and compulsory modulation. 
Those indices are omitted in equation 1for clarity. 
 
The classes used in the size distribution of farms are adapted to the bands proposed in 
the Health Check. The size classes are set out in Table 3. 
Table 3. Modulation bands. Class limits for farm size classes (euro per farm), 
matrix c in equation 1. 
Class Min Max 
 
0 to 5 0 5000 
 
5 to 10 5001 10000 
 
10 to 100 10001 100000 
 
100 to 200 100001 200000 
 
200 to 300 200001 300000 
 
300+ 300001 No limit 
 
 
Data on the number of farms n and the total CAP pillar 1 receipts np in each class are 
obtained from FADN for 2005. Furthermore, the number of farms and first pillar 
receipts are further disaggregated to each of eight broad farm types, set out in Table 5. 
Each premium scheme74 of Pillar 1 in CAPRI has been mapped to one and only one of 
those farm types, so that there is potentially a different modulation rate for each 
premium depending on which farm type typically receives the premium. However, 
within the single payment scheme, most of the budget is allocated to direct payments, 
which cannot be attributed to a specific farm type, and thus most funds are linked to 
the aggregate farm type “Total”. For Bulgaria and Romania, no modulation was 
assumed in 2013. The computed effective modulation rate per country, aggregated 
over all premiums, taking all of the above into account, is shown in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4. Average effective modulation rates per EU member state in CAPRI in 
2013 with both the 5% and Health Check scenario modulation rates and a franchise of 
5000 euro.  
 5% modulation rate HC scenario modulation rate 
 Compulsory Voluntary Total Compulsory Voluntary Total 
Belgium 3.79  3.79 9.87  9.87 
Denmark 4.08  4.08 10.80  10.80 
Germany 4.04  4.04 11.84  11.84 
Greece 1.57  1.57 4.09  4.09 
Spain 2.96  2.96 7.73  7.73 
France 4.17  4.17 10.90  10.90 
Ireland 3.08  3.08 8.01  8.01 
Italy 2.97  2.97 8.33  8.33 
Netherlands 3.73  3.73 9.72  9.72 
Austria 2.70  2.70 7.01  7.01 
Portugal 2.84 5.69 8.53 7.58 1.02 8.61 
Sweden 3.93  3.93 10.36  10.36 
Finland 3.43  3.43 8.95  8.95 
UK 4.40 14.00 18.40 11.94 6.51 18.45 
Cyprus 2.83  2.83 2.83  2.83 
Czech Republic 3.41  3.41 3.41  3.41 
Estonia 2.93  2.93 2.93  2.93 
Hungary 3.20  3.20 3.20  3.20 
Lithuania 1.83  1.83 1.83  1.83 
Latvia 2.62  2.62 2.62  2.62 
Malta 3.18  3.18 3.18  3.18 
Poland 1.48  1.48 1.48  1.48 
Slovenia 1.09  1.09 1.09  1.09 
Slovakia 3.82  3.82 3.82  3.82 
Luxemburg 3.79  3.79 9.87  9.87 
Source: Own simulations with CAPRI. 
The farm size distribution obtained from FADN is constant. Thus, any impact of 
modulation or other policies in CAPRI on farm structure will not impact on the 
effective average modulation rates given in Table 4. 
Human capital investments 
Investments in human capital (7% of the total EAFRD budget), according to the 
intervention logics for these measures, are likely to lead to an overall increase in 
productivity, higher levels of knowledge may lead to better use of machinery and 
treatment of cattle, better fertiliser, pesticide and feed use, more efficient organisation 
of work, and more efficient use of land (for example through better timing, producing 
higher quality products). Thus, human capital investments result in a general 
productivity increase. The LEITAP model is extended by including a direct link 
between human capital payments and technological change. As we have no empirical 
information from the literature or case studies about the factor bias or effectiveness of 
human capital expenditure within the rural development programmes, we assume that 
they have a similar rate of return as other general human capital investments and we 
assume a Hicks neutral rate of technological change (all production factors and inputs 
will be reduced with the same rate of technological change). Evenson (2001) provides 
an excellent overview on human capital investments, suggesting a internal rate of 
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return of 40% for the OECD countries (see, tables 8 and 9). We explain the increase 
in labour productivity by the education and training expenditures per unit of output. 
The implementation implies that if 1% of total revenues are used for investment in 
human capital, output productivity increases with 0.40*1%= 0.40%. 
 
The case studies and literature review indicate that, in some cases (for example in 
relation to the early retirement measure), investments are likely to have been 
undertaken also in the absence of Pillar 2 funding for human capital. In economic 
terms there is a crowding out or deadweight effect. Precise estimates on the 
magnitude of this do not exist, and therefore we have taken a crude assumption that 
0% of the funds used for investments in human capital, fund investments that would 
have been carried out anyway. As this assumption is crude we have also carried out a 
sensitivity analyses with a deadweight effect of 25%. The deadweight element of the 
payments for human capital investments are considered as an income payment. It is 
important to realise that human capital investments provide a growth in productivity 
each year, so there will be a cumulative impact in 2013 Therefore in LEITAP output 
productivity will be increase by 100% (because 100% of the payments are assumed to 
be effective as deadweight is 0%) of 0.4% (because of the rate of return on investment 
in education) of investment per unit of output. In case of 25% deadweight loss, only 
75% of the payments are effective and the other part of the payment has no 
consequences for behaviour, but increases farm income. 
 
The CAPRI model includes the impact of human capital investments by a link with 
the LEITAP model. The measures “01 – Human capital investment” is implemented 
in LEITAP to produce a Hicks-neutral technical change. It implies that with a given 
input mixture, more output is produced, and is obtained by increasing the whole 
production function (per sector) in LEITAP by some factor ao, where the index “o” 
denotes that it is the output that is affected (in contrast to factors of production). In a 
normal simulation with LEITAP, ao equals “1”, and in the modulation study it is only 
influenced by the investments in Human and Physical capital. It is worthwhile noting 
that ao is sector specific. 
 
CAPRI reads ao from LEITAP, and uses it to on the one hand increase yield by 50% 
of ao (since it is a factor, we use 1 + [ao − 1]/2), and on the other hand to decrease 
input requirement by 50%. This ad-hoc division of the effect is necessary in CAPRI 
since the production technologies essentially work with fixed input/output coefficient 
in contrast to a smooth production function as in LEITAP.  
Physical capital investments 
Physical capital investments, according to the intervention logics for these measures, 
are likely to lead to an overall increase in productivity. For example, new machines 
may automate feeding, improve the precision of fertiliser distribution (reducing use 
and increasing productivity), save on labour use, but increase the cost of capital. 
Physical capital investments are included in the FES and dynamic LEITAP model. 
We assume that physical capital investments provide each year a growth in 
productivity, so in 2013 we obtain the cumulative impact.  
 
Extra capital investment may renew the capital stock, and therefore accomplish an 
increase in productivity because of capital embodied technology. In the 
implementation we did a very simple thought experiment. As we do not have 
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sufficient information from case studies or literature about the factor bias in 
technological progress we assume a general productivity increase (Hicks neutral 
technological change) in the same way as for human capital investments. As we have 
no solid empirical evidence of deadweight loss we also assume a 0% deadweight 
effect in relation to investments in physical capital that would also have been 
undertaken without funding. A sensitivity analysis with a 25% deadweight effect is 
also carried out around this assumption.  
 
Indirect estimates of the vintage effect of investment in physical capital on 
productivity can be found in Wolff (1996), De Long and Summers (1991) and 
Gittleman, ten Raab and Wolff (2006). Wolff (1996) finds a coefficient of -0.041 for 
the change in the age of the capital stock. If we assume that one year decrease in 
average age of capital requires an investment of about 1/12 of capital stock, the 
implicit coefficient for the aoall is 15*0.041=0.66, i.e. higher than our coefficient. 
Gittleman, ten Raab and Wolff (2006) suggest that the vintage effect in Wolff (1996) 
is much too high.75 So, we assume that an extra investment of 1% of the capital stock 
generates an increase in output productivity of 0.3*1%=0.3%. 
 
As we do not have sufficient information from case studies or literature about the 
factor bias in technological progress, we assume a general productivity increase 
(Hicks neutral technological change) in the same way as for human capital 
investments. We also assume a 0% deadweight effect in relation to investments in 
physical capital that would also have been undertaken without funding. A sensitivity 
analysis with a 25% deadweight effect is also carried out around this assumption. A 
review of other sources of literature in relation to physical capital, suggests that the 
rate of return on investment in capital is 0.3, implying that investment of one dollar 
per unit of physical capital stock increases output productivity with 0.3%. Therefore, 
in LEITAP output productivity will be increased by 100% (because 100% of the 
payments are assumed to be effective) of 0.30% (because of the rate of return on 
investment) of investment per unit of physical capital stock. In case of 25% 
deadweight loss, only 75% of the payments are effective and the other part of the 
payment has no consequences for behaviour, but increases farm income.  
 
The CAPRI model includes the impact of physical capital investments by a link with 
the LEITAP model similar to human capital investments. In FES physical and human 
capital payments are treated as a direct payment to investments. Additional 
investments in human and physical capital provide a small additional return to the 
farmer of about 10%. Since this return is received during the life span of the asset, 
only a very small increase in farm income is realized. The deadweight is assumed to 
be 25%.  
LFA land use support  
LFA payments provide compensation for producing under less efficient 
circumstances, with the aim of keeping land in marginal areas under production. 
Pufahl and Weiss (2008) have analysed the effects of LFA payments schemes in 
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 It is important to be aware that the vintage productivity effects are probably not long term effects. 
Faster implementation of new technologies may just speed up the process. But, on the other hand, 
through learning by doing and inventions made by experience with the new capital goods may speed up 
also long-term technical progress. 
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Germany by comparing similar farms with and without LFA payments. They find that 
LFA payments especially keep land into production and have a small positive 
production effect. 
 
In CAPRI the LFA measure was implemented as a direct payment to arable cropping 
and grassland. The first challenge encountered when implementing the LFA 
premiums is that the regions do not coincide with the administrative regions used in 
CAPRI. It is important to remember that CAPRI only has one single representative 
firm in each NUTS2 region. In reality, only a share of the land in a NUTS region, 
generally much less than 100%, is eligible for LFA payments, and it may very well be 
the case that the specialisation of farms operating on that land is different from the 
regional average. For example, one may expect that a mountainous LFA area contains 
more grassland than the surrounding flat land agricultural areas in the same NUTS 2 
region. In order to capture a possible bias of this nature, data from Dyna-CLUE was 
used to compute the shares Sij of LFA in different broad land-use classes j ∈ {non-
irrigated arable land, irrigated arable land, pasture, permanent crops} in each region i. 
Those shares were multiplied by a nominal premium rate A to compute an average 
premium amount Pij for crops belonging to each class j in each region i. These 
computed amounts were taken to reflect the biased distribution of crops inside and 
outside of LFA regions. Since Dyna-CLUE does not distinguish “Mountainous” and 
“Other” LFA, the nominal amount A to which the shares S were applied was assumed 
the same everywhere: 250 euro, the maximum amount in mountainous LFA regions. 
 Pij = ASij (2) 
where  P    : Premium per hectare 
            i     : Region 
            j     : Group of crops 
            A   : Maximum amount per hectare, 250 euro 
            S   : Share of LFA in all land of class j 
 
A value ceiling for the premium was computed by adding the budgets for the 
component measures, coming from the LEI budget model. Recall that the premium 
module of CAPRI will apply a cut factor to the amount P such that the ceiling is not 
overshot. 
 
In economic terms, the potentially different premium rates for different groups of 
crops has a production effect, so that the type of production in CAPRI that receives 
the higher rates may expand at the expense of other activities. The interpretation 
would be that more farmers in the LFA areas comply with the LFA eligibility rules 
and modify their production plans to comply with the criteria within these areas. 
Nevertheless, this is a simplification, because in CAPRI, no special technical 
restrictions are required in order to comply with the payment. 
 
In LEITAP a payment to land is used as a proxy for LFA payments. Information on 
the distribution of the payment across sectors from FADN (2005 data) is used to 
distribute payments across sectors (e.g. pork and poultry and horticulture receive no 
LFA payments, and relatively more payments are distributed to grassland than 
cropland). In FES, farmers in LFA areas receive an additional grant, dependent or 
their area. 
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Natura 2000 payments on agricultural land 
In CAPRI the N2K premiums are modelled in a similar way to the LFA premiums, 
but now with the additional assumption that the payments are conditional on 
extensification, reflecting management restrictions. This was implemented using the 
two alternative technologies mentioned in the description of CAPRI. Thus, only the 
technological alternative with a yield 20% below the NUTS2 average and lower input 
requirements (following a yield function) was made eligible for the payment. This is 
based on no empirical investigation, but is a pure assumption based on the fact that 
the N2K payments are conditional on extensive management practices. 
 
The interpretation is the following: If more money is spent on the measure, more 
farmers within the designated areas may switch to extensive agriculture OR maintain 
existing extensive management practices. Then the average payment per hectare of 
the NUTS2 region would increase, reflecting that a larger share of the farmers now 
participate in the measure. It is today indeed the case that not all farms within an N2K 
area receive support.  
 
In LEITAP a land payment is used as a proxy for Natura 2000 payments as in the case 
of LFA payments. 
Agri-environment payments 
The agri-environment measure aims to encourage farmers and other land managers to 
introduce or maintain production methods compatible with the protection of the 
environment, the landscape and its features, natural resources, the soil and genetic 
diversity that go beyond mandatory standards. In terms of public funding, it accounts 
for the largest proportion of expenditure within Pillar 2. It provides compensation for 
income foregone as a consequence of lower land productivity, extra labour and other 
costs. Pufahl and Weiss (2008) show that agri-environment payments can generate an 
increase in land use, generally marginal land that might otherwise have gone out of 
production. Furthermore, the share of grassland increases.  
 
The use of the agri-environment measure results in a very diverse set of schemes and 
management options being implemented in individual Member States. In CAPRI, in 
contrast to the way that the LFA and N2K measures are treated, it would not have 
been meaningful to model a uniform implementation across Member States. Instead, a 
way of capturing the national or regional preferences within the agri-environment 
schemes needed to be captured. 
 
The method for doing this has been to distribute the sum of AE payments to 
agricultural sectors using the receipts by farm types according to FADN in 2005 as 
the key. This is obtained by splitting the single AE measure 05 into eight different 
types of AE measures, which do not correspond directly to real AE measures, but are 
intended to be homogeneous in respect to which type of farming (if any) is targeted. 
The translation from TF8 farm type to CAPRI production activities is given in Table 
5. 
 
Some of the case studies suggest that a farm is more likely to participate in an AE 
scheme if it is located in an LFA region. Given that farms in LFA regions may have a 
different production mix than farms which are not in an LFA region, the allocation of 
the eight TF8 types to CAPRI activities was refined further by using the share of a 
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region that is LFA. The allocation was accomplished as follows: (1) Compute for each 
region, using FES results (FADN 2005), the average AE payment per hectare per TF8 
farm type conditional on a farm being inside or outside of LFA. (2) Compute the 
average payment per hectare for each crop in the whole nuts 2 region by multiplying 
the expected payment per hectare computed in step (1) with the share of the land type 
primarily used by that farm type that is inside or outside LFA, given by Dyna-CLUE. 
 
The principle of the allocation of AE payments is illustrated using Figure 1. The large 
box is a NUTS 2 region. The horizontal fields are different land cover types. The 
diagonal line separates LFA from non-LFA areas. The dashed circle encloses farms 
that receive AE payments. From FES, we obtain the (historical) average regional 
amounts of AE per hectare of land or per animal for each field of the intersection of 
the circle with the land covers and LFA|Non-LFA. In fact, we know more, because 
FES gives not the intersection with land cover types but with the eight farm types. 
Drawing this would be too complex. Using the size of each such intersection in 
relation to the whole box, the average amount per hectare in each TF8 conditional on 
LFA|Non-LFA and a mapping from TF8 to land cover types, and finally a mapping 
from TF8 to CAPRI activities, we compute the average payment per hectare or animal 
for each CAPRI activity in whole NUTS 2 region. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic description of the allocation of AE payments to activities in 
CAPRI. 
 
Based on the French and the UK case studies, it was concluded that support directed 
toward different sub-sectors tends to have different technical constraints. In particular, 
it was assumed that measures applied in field crops or involving arable land 
frequently have an element of extensification (buffer strips that reduce the area of 
land available for cropping, maintenance of hedgerows that may otherwise be 
removed, less fertiliser use, etc), whereas for the livestock production sectors 
(especially in the French case study), the key issue is to maintain existing extensive 
systems of production. The share of support going to mixed farms (TF8) was assumed 
to have no particular extensification or production effect except that of maintaining 
farming, and was implemented by assigning equal support to all agricultural activities 
except land abandonment. 
 
The mapping of support to activities in CAPRI implies linking the support to 
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doubtless the case for some measures in some regions, but certainly not so for all AE 
measures in all regions. Refining the implementation would thus involve conditioning 
the support on technical constraints. Nevertheless, the implementation described 
above has the merit that it allocates the correct budget, resulting from the LEI budget 
model, to approximately the right group of farmers. 
Table 5. Mapping from aggregated farm types in FADN (TF8) to activity 
groups in CAPRI. 
TF8 type Group of activities in CAPRI 
1 Grandes Cultures 
2 Vegetables 
3 Wine 
4 Permanent crops 
5 Dairy cows including pastures 
6 Suckler cows, sheep and goats, including pastures 
7 Pigs and poultry 
8 All agricultural activities 
 
In LEITAP a payment to land will be used as a proxy for agri-environment payments. 
In contrast with the LFA payments, the agri-environment measure can also reduce 
labour and output productivity. Information of current distribution across sectors from 
FADN is used to distribute payments across sectors (e.g. pork and poultry and 
horticulture receive no agri-environment payments, relatively more payments are 
distributed to grassland than cropland). In addition, to capture the extra labour effect, 
labour productivity will decrease (10% of increase in land payment rate). An 
important effect of these agri-environment payments should be improvements in 
biodiversity, landscape and environmental pollution. Because of a lack of information 
this can not be implemented directly in the CGE model, but has to be assessed using 
the other analytical tools. 
Regional payments 
Regional payments are group of diverse measures mainly directed to non-agricultural 
sectors. According to the intervention logics, the main objective of these measures is 
to reverse the trends towards economic and social decline and depopulation of the 
countryside through promoting innovation and creating employment opportunities in 
rural areas, thereby increasing productivity in the wider rural economy.  
 
In LEITAP this diverse range of measures are treated as a Hicks neutral productivity 
increase. As in the case of human and physical capital payments we assume a 50% 
deadweight effect for investments and that impacts are dynamic in the sense that 
investments provide each year a growth in productivity (cumulative impact in 2013) 
We use estimates from the human capital investment as a proxy for these investments. 
Investment of one dollar per unit of output increases output productivity with 0.45%. 
This will be applied to all sectors. In CAPRI these regional measures will be implied 
by a link with LEITAP. 
 
How coupled is “decoupled”? 
In the model CAPRI, the actual production effect of the SPS payments depends on 
two main factors: (1) Which production activities are eligible for support (i.e. how is 
land abandonment handled)? In the simulations reported in this study, the assumption 
was made that a share of “fallow agricultural land”, i.e. land which is not set-aside, 
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but actually abandoned, is in fact eligible for single farm payments (see above). (2) 
How are premium rights handled versus eligible land? In CAPRI, it is assumed that 
land is more scarce than premium rights, and that thus the single farm payment tends 
to keep land rents up. In addition to those two factors, the model behaviour also 
depends on the very structure of the model, i.e. that farmers maximise the sum of 
gross margins and that the direct payments enter that maximisation. There is thus no 
single parameter in the model that determines the “degree of coupling”, but it results 
rather from the interplay of many assumptions and data with model structure. In order 
to quantify the joint effect of all such assumptions, additional simulations were 
carried out. 
 
The definition of “degree of coupling” of a policy instrument p is defined as the ratio 
of the effect of p to the effect of a fully coupled reference policy. The fully coupled 
reference policy is generally price support (e.g. Sckokai and Antón, 2005). In other 
words: what is the effect of spending x euro on some measure p compared to spending 





 as size same  theofsupport  price ofeffect 
 ofeffect 1 −=     (3) 
 
In order to compute DD(“SPS”), we set up two simulation experiments. In the first 
(S1), we shock the price of a single commodity (soft wheat) by a tax of 10% and 
compute the effect on acreage, yield and production for soft wheat for all EU-27. This 
is the “fully coupled” reference policy. We then compute the tax revenues C of the 
policy by multiplying the production by the producer price times the tax. In the 
second experiment (S2), the same amount C is instead added raised by decreasing the 
SPS payments. Those simulation experiments are done with exogenous prices. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the simulation experiments. We see that the degree of 
decoupling of the SPS measure vis-à-vis a price support is 99.4 percent for production 
as a whole. The effect on yields of SPS is close to zero, and almost all the effect is 
coming from the effect on acreages, where the degree of decoupling also is very large 
(99.1%). Thus, the SPS is very close to fully decoupled as it is now implemented in 
CAPRI, having less than 1% of the effect of a price subsidy of the same size. 
Table 6. Degree of decoupling in CAPRI determined by simulation 
experiments. All numbers relate to soft wheat in EU-27, changes relative baseline. 
 Acreage Yield Production 
S1 -6.701% -1.709% -8.296% 
S2 -0.059% 0.007% -0.052% 
Degree of Decoupling 0.991 1.004 0.994 
 
In any simulation, we do not only apply modulation to the single farm payments and 
the SAPS, but also to the payments that remained coupled in the reference scenario 
(continuing the policy resulting from the 2003 reform). The presence of such 
payments increases the production effects in CAPRI. Further influence on production 
comes from the interaction with LEITAP. In order to quantify those effects, another 
set of sensitivity analyses was carried out, with the following setup: 
 
- Reference: 5% modulation for all payments, no link with LEITAP  
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- S3: 5% modulation applied only to SPS payments, no link with LEITAP  
- S4: 0% modulation applied to all first pillar payments, no link with LEITAP 
- S5: 0% modulation applied to all first pillar payments, with LEITAP feedback 
 
Table DD2 shows the effects on the production of cereals, oilseeds, beef and pork and 
poultry, for S3 to S5 compared to Reference. In S3, with 5% modulation only for the 
SPS payments and no modulation to the coupled payments, i.e. relative to the baseline 
give a top-up to the still coupled payments, the production of cereals decreases by 
0.011%, i.e. by approximately a tenth of a promille. This stupendously tiny change is 
due to land competition by the fodder production for beef, which increases due to the 
now increased coupled payments. The same mechanism is influencing the production 
of oil seeds positively via the oil cake prices. The pig and poultry meat production 
decreases due to the changes on the cereals markets. 
 
In S4 we abolish modulation also for the SPS payments, thus relatively speaking also 
top up the SPS payment relative to the coupled premiums. Albeit the SPS premiums 
contain by far the most money, the additional effect is generally small. For cereals, 
the net effect is a change of signs relative to S3, from a decrease to an increase. For 
the other product groups in the table, the sign remains stable but only the absolute size 
of the production influence changes. 
 
In S5, we also introduce the link with LEITAP. That means that less money is 
available for the second pillar, and thus less is invested in human and physical capital. 
That in turn has a negative impact on productivity, which in fact turns out to be 
stronger than the effect within CAPRI “stand-alone”. This fits with the underlying 
assumptions and economic theory. Decoupled payments have little to do with 
production, whereas technical progress has a more pronounced influence.  
Table 7. Production effects of SPS payments, coupled payments and LEITAP 
respectively. 
  S3 S4 S5 
Cereals -0.011% 0.013% -0.136% 
Oilseeds 0.069% 0.088% -0.143% 
Beef 0.010% 0.016% -0.279% 
Pork & Poultry -0.005% -0.003% -0.049% 
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ANNEX 2 THE MONETISATION OF PUBLIC GOODS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Over the past twenty years or so, various attempts have been made to calculate the 
monetary value of non-market goods. One of the rationales for doing so is to create a 
‘balance sheet’ that enables the delivery of public goods by a particular policy 
intervention to be compared with the economic impacts of the same intervention using 
the same unit of measurement. Calculating the monetary value of a public good is 
beset with practical, theoretical and methodological issues. Some of these difficulties 
are briefly discussed below.  
 
The key methodologies developed to generate a monetary value for non-market goods 
associated with agriculture and other forms of land management include stated 
preference techniques, such as willingness to pay, as well as deliberative 
methodologies (DIPs) (see Hanley et al., 1998; Brouwer and Slangen, 1998; Bateman, 
1994; and Willis and Garrod, 1993). Both have methodological shortcomings which 
have been widely discussed in the academic literature. In the environmental sphere, 
factors such as water quality emissions or pollution lend themselves more readily to 
quantitative evaluation and monetisation, whereas others, such as landscape and 
biodiversity, do not. This is in part because of the composite and complex character of 
these environmental goods which causes problems in the expression of preference and 
in distinguishing between use and non use values. In the case of landscape, for 
example, distinguishing landscape values from the value of various ecosystem 
services provided by environmental assets within the landscape raises problems of 
double counting (Swanwick et al., 2007).  
 
An analysis of the results from a range of studies indicates that widely divergent 
values are generated for individual environmental goods and services, explained in 
part by the different methodologies used, varying levels of information and 
understanding available to participants in WTP studies, and because the implicit 
counterfactual situations or policy frameworks are seldom the same. This means that 
any interpretation of the resulting values should be carried out with extreme caution.  
 
Examining the figures in more detail, the cost of carbon emissions can be measured in 
different ways, depending on the assumed cost of carbon for example. In many 
studies this is valued at well above the market rate. Air pollution figures prominently 
in the estimates particularly for this reason. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
measure landscape values, with many methodological questions about the value of 
techniques such as contingent valuation. Buckwell (2005) suggests that conceptually, 
the EFTEC/IEEP methodology is the most fully developed, and empirically the most 
comprehensive. It is based on a clearly and explicitly stated green accounting 
framework that distinguishes – or seeks to distinguish – (1) the flows, stock changes 
and stock levels, (2) the effects attributable to agriculture versus those attributable to 
other sectors, and (3) the effects on economic welfare versus those on other sectors. 
  
A more recent report by Jacobs (2008) attempts to update the 2004 work by 
EFTEC/IEEP, but emphasises the same issues and caveats. It highlights the fact that 
consensus valuation figures are only available for climate change and air quality 
impacts, and that significant gaps remain in relation to landscape, habitats and 
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biodiversity. The report concludes that, ‘in the absence of a standardised set of 
physical data and damage cost curves for environmental impacts, calculation on 
environmental impacts from agriculture are frequently simplistic, requiring many 
assumptions’.   
 
It is because of these concerns that we are doubtful that monetisation studies produce 
comparable results in Europe or that they are a strong enough foundation on which to 
make a quantitative assessment of the different impacts arising from policy 
interventions. The absence of valuation data in relation to landscape and biodiversity 
makes any analysis based upon accounting studies such as these partial at best. To 
base a quantification of the impacts of policy interventions on this rather shaky 
foundation would risk very serious inaccuracy.  
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